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TIME AND THE FOUNDATIONS
OF QUANTUM MECHANICS
Thomas Pashby, PhD
University of Pittsburgh, 2014
Quantum mechanics has provided philosophers of science with many counterin-
tuitive insights and interpretive puzzles, but little has been written about the
role that time plays in the theory. One reason for this is the celebrated argument
of Wolfgang Pauli against the inclusion of time as an observable of the theory,
which has been seen as a demonstration that time may only enter the theory as
a classical parameter. Against this orthodoxy I argue that there are good rea-
sons to expect certain kinds of ‘time observables’ to find a representation within
quantum theory, including clock operators (which provide the means to measure
the passage of time) and event time operators, which provide predictions for the
time at which a particular event occurs, such as the appearance of a dot on a
luminescent screen. I contend that these time operators deserve full status as
observables of the theory, and on reflection provide a uniquely compelling reason
to expand the set of observables allowed by the standard formalism of quantum
mechanics. In addition, I provide a novel association of event time operators with
conditional probabilities, and propose a temporally extended form of quantum
theory to better accommodate the time of an event as an observable quantity.
This leads to a proposal to interpret quantum theory within an event ontology, in-
spired by Bertrand Russell’s Analysis of Matter. On this basis I mount a defense
of Russell’s relational theory of time against a recent attack.
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PREFACE
It has been my great pleasure to have been involved in the philosophy of physics for over
10 years now, and it continues to be a source of fascinating and challenging intellectual ad-
ventures. This particular endeavor began with an invitation by John Earman to attend a
workshop in the foundations of physics (as I am sure have many before). The title of this
workshop was “The Nature of Time in Fundamental Science,”1 and it became clear in listen-
ing to the presentations and conversations of the participants that many of their concerns
were overtly philosophical. However, the approaches they advocated involved sophisticated
mathematical arguments and theoretical apparatus which was often unfamiliar to even the
intended audience of theoretical and mathematical physicists.
Investigating further, I found a significant literature in the foundations of physics re-
garding the status of time within quantum mechanics, which had been mostly overlooked
by philosophers of science. The arguments began by the progenitors of quantum mechanics
such as Heisenberg, Dirac, Pauli and Schro¨dinger have continued up to the present day,
and have generated a variety of ‘no go’ theorems, and ways around them. While these may
appear at first sight to be only of formal interest, it quickly became clear to me that gen-
uinely philosophical questions are being raised (and, perhaps, answered) that have rarely
been considered in the philosophy of physics literature.
Another significant event in my intellectual development began soon after my arrival in
Pittsburgh: I became engaged with the history of science, and in particular developed a
fascination with the early development of relativistic quantum mechanics by Dirac. This
project convinced me of the essential value of the history of science for the continued vitality
of the philosophy of science. In pursuing the philosophical and foundational goals of this
1Center for Fundamental Theory, Penn State, College Park. Nov. 9–10, 2009.
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dissertation, I became drawn into the early history of the theory and the distinctive ap-
proaches to time in quantum mechanics that formed a rich topic for discussion at the famous
Solvay conference of 1927. My interest was also piqued by the ground-breaking work of Jan
Hilgevoord which, although I found much to disagree with, formed a vital and informative
guide for my studies. I hope he will view my attempt to contribute to this field of study in
the spirit of friendly debate in which it is intended.
I should also mention the scholars whose approach to the topic of time in quantum
mechanics forms the backbone of this dissertation: Paul Busch, Romeo Brunetti, Klaus
Fredenhagen, and Marc Hoge. Although I have not had the opportunity to communicate
with them directly, I have learnt a great deal from them. The intellectual debt I owe to Marc
Hoge in particular through my engagement with the rich ideas of his Masters thesis will be
quite evident to him should he ever read this document. For others, I hereby acknowledge
Hoge’s work as the inspiration for my conditional probability interpretation of event times.
I am not sure whether or not he would agree with the direction in which I have taken these
ideas, but I hope at some point to find out.
I also owe a great deal to those whose engagement with my dissertation has been more
direct. First, of course, to my dissertation co-advisors John Earman and John D. Norton.
There is little in this document that has not benefited from my engagement with this advisory
‘dream team’ in comments, conversations, and advice. I feel especially fortunate to have
been part of the great tradition of philosophy of physics at Pitt, and it heartens me greatly
that John Earman is continuing in his role as dissertation advisor for another generation
of students, despite his richly deserved recent retirement. I would also like to thank my
committee members Bob Batterman, Gordon Belot, and Giovanni Valente, whose friendly
advice has also benefited me greatly.
This also gives me an opportunity to thank the generation of graduate students that I
was lucky enough to be a part of at Pitt. While everyone I have known and become friends
with over the last six years deserve thanks, I would like to thank in particular those who
have materially assisted with this project. Conversations and sessions at the whiteboard
with philosophers of physics Balazs Gyenis, Mike Miller and Mike Tamir were particularly
valuable, but Bryan W. Roberts deserves special recognition for the close collaboration he
and I have enjoyed with over the past few years on these topics. I have tried to acknowledge
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in the text where Byran’s influence was especially direct, particularly in Chapters 2 and 4,
but I owe a great deal of my (admittedly partial) understanding of the finer points of time
in quantum and classical mechanics to helpful conversations and correspondence with my
former officemate.
It would be remiss of me not to mention by name Eric Hatleback, William Lebing,
Thomas Cunningham, Peter Distelzweig, Benny Goldberg, Elay Shech, Katie Tabb, Bihui
Li, Preston Stovall, Julia Bursten, and Joe McCaffrey. They will know why. I’d also like to
thank fellow travelers Kerry McKenzie, Elise Crull, Matt Gorski, Pablo Ruiz de Olano, Alex
Blum, Adrian Wuthrich, Matt Farr, Sam Fletcher, Noel Swanson, and especially my great
friend Adam Caulton. Comments by Adam made in conversation about the role of time in
quantum theory have proved suggestive, provocative, and insightful. I owe many thanks to
James Yearsley, who was a sometime (and vital) collaborator in explorations of the idea of
space-time localization.
I’d also like to thank (in no particular order) some more senior members of the community,
whose assistance has been gratefully received: Katherine Brading, Laura Reutsche, Jeremy
Butterfield, Chris Wuthrich, Don Howard, Guido Bacciagaluppi, Erik Curiel, Steve French,
Mark Wilson, Michel Janssen, and Jos Uffink. I must single out Tony Duncan (of the Physics
Department at Pitt) in particular for his generous assistance in my historical endeavors, and
some hearty dinners. James Ladyman deserves special thanks for his crucial role in my
philosophical education.
This brings me, finally, to address the contributions of emotional (and often financial)
support of those closest to me. To my parents, Carolyn and David, I thank you for your
unstinting faith in my abilities, your constant support and love, and the relaxed way that
you have dealt with my continuing presence across the Atlantic. To my darling wife Jean:
your day-to-day companionship, love, devotion, and—occasionally—cajoling or threats, have
been more important to the successful completion of this project than you will ever know,
and I offer you my heartfelt gratitude. Our dissertations have been the silent partners in our
relationship so far, and I am so glad these first projects begun together are complete while
our lives together have just begun.
xi
Thanks must also go to my sister Laura, and to my extended family, including those who
first inspired me to think that graduate school was a worthy endeavor, and that emigration
to North America was not such a bad idea.
Although several names I have mentioned above are no doubt more worthy, I dedicate
this work to my nephews: Elias, Rowan, and Seth. May you never stop asking, “Why?”
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
This dissertation concerns the intersection of two fascinating and contentious philosophical
topics: one as old as the history of Western philosophy (the metaphysics of time), and the
other arising relatively recently (the interpretation and foundations of quantum mechanics).
Unlike most philosophy of time informed by modern physics, our focus will not be on Ein-
stein’s relativistic achievements, but on the quantum revolution of which he was also part.
However, we will not be concerned here with quantum gravity—one of the great unsolved
problems of 21st century physics—at least, not directly. Our concern here is more prosaic:
I will be addressing the good old quantum mechanics of graduate physics textbooks. That
is, the quantum theory of finitely many particles in non-relativistic space-time, often called
Gallilei invariant quantum theory. This is not a theory of space-time—as in special or gen-
eral relativity—but a theory of matter. What could such a theory have to teach philosophers
about time?
As it happens, the role of time in quantum mechanics was the subject of much discussion
in the early history of the theory, and has drawn the attention of foundationally-minded
theoretical and mathematical physicists ever since. Traditionally, the most prominent topic
has been the status of the time-energy uncertainty relation, posited by Heisenberg in 1927.
However, there is a rich and varied tradition of addressing various ‘problems of time’ that
arise in quantum theories. Among philosophers of science, ‘the’ problem of time in canonical
quantum gravity is the best known, and has been subject to recent philosophical analysis.1
It is my contention that the problems of time in humble non-relativistic quantum mechanics
have been unjustly overlooked by philosophers of physics.
In regarding the conjunction of time and quantum mechanics as particularly fertile ground
for foundational work, I am in accord with the editors of a recent two volume series of
1See Belot & Earman (2001); Butterfield & Isham (1999) for an introduction, or the recent dissertation
of Wu¨thrich (2006). The scare quotes indicate the common wisdom that there are several distinct problems
going under that name, see Kucharˇ (1992).
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collected papers on the topic of “Time in Quantum Mechanics”. In their preface, they
introduce the topic as follows:
Time and quantum mechanics have, each of them separately, captivated scientists
and layman alike, as shown by the abundance of popular publications on “time”
or on the many quantum mysteries or paradoxes. We too have been seduced by
these two topics, and in particular by their combination. Indeed, the treatment
of time in quantum mechanics is one of the important and challenging open
questions in the foundations of quantum theory. (Muga et al., 2002)
It is my hope that in pursuing these topics this dissertation will break fertile new ground
for the foundations of physics, while demonstrating to philosophers the relevance of these
foundational issues for metaphysical and interpretational concerns.
The first aim of the dissertation concerns a ‘no go’ result known as Pauli’s Theorem.
Straightening out the content and interpretation of this result will require several chapters,
but the import among physicists has commonly been taken to be this:
[T]ime is just a parameter in quantum mechanics, and not an operator. In
particular, time is not an observable . . . It is nonsensical to talk about the time
operator in the same sense as we talk about the position operator. . . . when
we now look at quantum mechanics in its finished form, there is no trace of a
symmetrical treatment between time and space.2 (Sakurai, 1994, p. 68, original
emphasis)
Recent authors Giannitrapani (1997), Hilgevoord & Atkinson (2011), and Olkhovsky (2011)
have gone so far as to call this ‘the problem of time in quantum mechanics.’ I will argue
here that the statement of the problem is not so simple: Pauli’s Theorem merely restricts
the form of possible time operators, rather than banning them outright. In addressing the
implications of Pauli’s Theorem, I am answering the recent call of Halvorson, who concludes
a presentation of a related result as follows:
A common response is to claim that time is a quantity in quantum theory, but
that it is represented by a parameter (c-number) rather than by an operator.
2Other statements of this sort include: “time is a parameter in quantum mechanics and not an operator”
(Duncan & Janssen, 2013, p. 216, original emphasis); “Since the very beginning of quantum mechanics it is
not so easy to define time at a quantum level; in the ordinary theory, in fact, it is not an observable, but
an external parameter, in other words, time is classical.” (Giannitrapani, 1997, p. 1575, original emphasis).
The introduction of Aharonov & Bohm (1961) contains a similar statement, and may be the source of this
concordance.
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But that distinction is merely verbal, and does nothing to help us understand
the special role of time in quantum theory. What is the difference between
quantities that can be represented by operators, and those—such as ‘amount of
time’—that cannot? And why is time the only such parametric quantity? What
is special about time? (Halvorson, 2010, p. 3)
I will argue that time (in its various roles) can be represented by operators, but nonetheless
retains something of a special status in quantum mechanics.
The second aim of the dissertation is to provide an analysis of a common approach to
introducing time operators in terms of mathematical objects not subject to Pauli’s Theorem,
known as Positive Operator Valued Measures (or POVMs). This approach makes use of tools
developed by mathematical physicists such as Davies & Lewis (1970), Holevo (1973, 2011),
Kraus (1983), and Ludwig (1983) to solve certain problems in quantum measurement theory.
Following the work of Werner (1986), Busch et al. (1994), and Giannitrapani (1997), among
others, this approach to time in quantum mechanics became well enough established to
deserve the name ‘the standard approach’ in the recent collection of Muga et al. (2002).
These tools and techniques have, however, received minimal attention from philosophers,3
or have been spuriously dismissed as irrelevant (Hilgevoord & Atkinson, 2011).4 The several
chapters I devote to the use of POVMs as a means to define time operators and their
significance for quantum foundations provide a much needed introduction of these topics
into the philosophy of science.
The third aim of the dissertation is interpretative. I provide an interpretation of the use of
these time POVMs as quantum clocks and as event time observables, and an assessment of the
possible implications for familiar issues in the interpretation of quantum mechanics. This is a
subject that has received little attention from physicists, and is ripe for philosophical analysis.
Event times prove particularly difficult to account for on the conventional interpretation of
quantum mechanics. This leads to my major positive contribution: a novel interpretation
of event times as conditional probabilities, which I use to give a consistent interpretation
of the proposal of Brunetti & Fredenhagen (2002b) for generalized event time POVMs. I
supply an interpretation of these probabilities formally in terms of an extended Hilbert space
3Butterfield (2013) deserves an honorable mention here for acknowledging their importance. A recent
review of time in quantum mechanics, Zeh (2009), fails to mention them at all.
4These last authors state: “POVMs are interesting in their own right, having many practical applications,
but we shall not discuss them here, since we believe their use as a way of nullifying Pauli’s objection to be
fundamentally misdirected.” I will argue against some specific reasons for this claim in §§2.2–2.3, but this
dissertation as a whole can be read as an argument in favor of their relevance for this purpose.
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of functions of time and space, and philosophically as Lewisian chances (i.e. objectified
credences). This suggests an account of quantum theory in terms of events rather than
persisting objects, and I conclude with an examination of some ontological and metaphysical
concerns from this point of view, including some implications for the metaphysics of time.
A surprisingly broad cross-section of these topics and aims were considered or shared
by the authors of quantum mechanics in the years leading up to the establishment of the
standard (Dirac-von Neumann) formalism in use today. This is because the role of time
in quantum theory was far from settled in those early years, before the foundations of the
theory were set hard. The speculations and arguments of the founders of quantum mechanics
regarding time, therefore, often provide a richer source of possibilities and concerns than can
be found in the foundations literature today. I believe we can learn a lot from the struggles
of our forebears in this regard, and the views developed at length in this dissertation owe
much to the inspiration of quantum luminaries such as Werner Heisenberg, Wolfgang Pauli,
Erwin Schro¨dinger and Paul Dirac. I also owe those who have walked these paths more
recently a sincere debt. As will be evident to the reader, this dissertation would not have
been possible without the work of those intrepid explorers in the foundations of quantum
theory who thought to ask, “What about time?”
1.1 SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS
Chapter 2 begins with a history of time in quantum theory, or rather a pre-history of time in
quantum mechanics, since this history ends more or less where the modern form of quantum
mechanics begins. This provides an introduction to many of the topics that later chapters
are devoted to, set in the context in which they originally arose. For example, this chapter
contains our first introduction to Pauli’s Theorem, which became the driving force behind
the common wisdom that time must play a limited role in quantum mechanics. It also
transpires that the close links with classical mechanics of the early quantum theory were
both a source of inspiration and confusion during those years. This chapter concludes with
an contemporary assessment of the role of time in classical mechanics, and contains details
of the relationship between some simple classical and quantum systems and the way time
enters into their description.
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In Chapter 3, I introduce the formalism of modern quantum mechanics, paying particular
attention to the role of Positive Operator Valued Measures (POVMs). I provide a character-
ization of what I call Ordinary Quantum Mechanics (i.e. the standard textbook account) and
explore the motivations that have led many researchers in the foundations of measurement to
go beyond it. This chapter contains a critical assessment of the role of the Spectral Theorem
in excluding POVMs from the range of observables of the theory, i.e. the quantities thought
to have empirical significance in concrete experimental situations. That is, I review some
results that encourage us to go beyond the ambit of Ordinary Quantum Mechanics and em-
brace the expanded theoretical framework of POVMs. Doing so leaves open the possibility
of finding a substantive role for observables concerning temporal quantities and processes in
quantum theory.
Chapter 4 contains a detailed analysis of the statement, scope, and interpretation of
Pauli’s Theorem, which purports to rule out time observables in quantum mechanics. I first
point out that, strictly speaking, Pauli did not present a theorem at all since his original
argument admits significant classes of counterexamples. Nonetheless, Pauli’s argumentative
strategy was sound and there are closely related results that appear to support his conclusion.
I discuss two versions: a somewhat limited result that sticks closely to Pauli’s strategy
but excludes periodic systems from consideration, and a recent strengthening of that result
which relies on a premise further restricting the allowed energies of the system. Roughly
put, this premise (known as the spectrum condition) limits the allowed values of energy
of a quantum system to be positive, or at least have a lower bound. This result applies
quite comprehensively, but, I argue, it doesn’t support the negative conclusions often drawn
regarding the prospects for time observables in quantum theory.
The idea that some time observables may avoid Pauli’s Theorem is not new, and there
are some well-established examples which have drawn much attention in the foundations
literature. Chapter 5 provides an introduction to those examples by exploring the ideas of
the previous two chapters in these specific contexts. These examples make clear the role of
POVMs in avoiding Pauli’s Theorem, and provide concrete applications of this framework
which demonstrate its usefulness for defining time observables. These applications are often
paradigmatic examples of the more general approaches considered in later chapters. This
chapter also contains a critique of the common interpretation of a particular quantum system,
the freely falling particle, as defining a time observable of this sort.
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Drawing on this detailed analysis of some specific cases, Chapter 6 provides a critical
look at attempts to define ideal quantum clocks: quantum systems which perfectly track
the passage of time. I begin by presenting some ‘no go’ results for quantum clocks derived
from Pauli’s Theorem, and argue against a particular proposal for getting around them
by discarding the spectrum condition. In its place I endorse the use of the phase of a
quantum harmonic oscillator (a system that respects the spectrum condition) to provide a
limiting notion of an ideal clock. I show how the two proposals have much in common,
and demonstrate that the harmonic oscillator clock has much going in its favor—not least
the availability of a concrete physical realization. I conclude with a skeptical assessment of
recent claims that every system can serve as a quantum clock.
Chapters 7 and 8 provide a novel account of the use and interpretation of POVMs in
accounting for event times in quantum mechanics. Event times arise in common experimental
situations where the possible outcomes are distributed in time. Making predictions for these
temporal distributions from the instantaneous form of quantum mechanics in common use
presents many practical and conceptual difficulties. In Chapter 7 I review some recent
proposals for providing these temporal probability distributions using POVMs. Despite
some impressive progress, the interpretation of these event time POVMs as observables of
the theory has remained somewhat opaque. I argue that the difficulties arise specifically
from the failure of the so-called Standard Model of Measurement in these cases.
In Chapter 8 I propose a new interpretation in terms of conditional probabilities: an
event time POVM predicts the occurrence of an event during a specific time interval, given
the occurrence of the event at some time. The need to give an account of the occurrence
of these events independently of the notion of measurement leads to their interpretation as
resulting from an observer-independent physical process. Whatever the form this process
takes, I contend that the conditional probabilities supplied by the theory have the form
of Lewisian chances. That is, they supply an assignment of probabilities to future events,
considered as occurring in distinct possible worlds.
I point out that the probabilities supplied by Ordinary Quantum Mechanics involve
an implicit conditionalization on the occurrence of some event at a particular instant of
time. Furthermore, I argue that the usual interpretation of instantaneous projections as the
possessed properties of a persisting quantum system combines with the results of Chapter 4
to lead to some absurd consequences. As an alternative to the interpretation of the quantum
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state in terms of properties, I suggest a view where the state gives the probabilities for the
occurrence of events, interpreted as physical happenings situated in time and space.
Chapter 9 concludes the dissertation. I begin by exploring some of the implications of
the alternative event-based interpretation I suggest in Chapter 8. First, I consider some
recent advocates of this event-based view of quantum theory and bring them into contact
with some other extant interpretations of quantum mechanics that seem to make room for
events. I contend that the account of quantum theory presented in Chapter 8 is interestingly
distinct, and suggest some areas of empirical investigation that may reveal the benefits of this
approach. I also examine the relevance of the results of Chapter 6 for the metaphysics of time,
and advocate a particular relational view of time inspired by Leibniz and held by Russell.
I defend Russell’s view against a recent attack by making use of his proposal for an event
ontology, given in The Analysis of Matter (1927). I conclude by (very) briefly suggesting a
further application of this proposal to recent structuralist philosophies of science.
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2.0 A PRELUDE TO TIME IN QUANTUM MECHANICS
This chapter provides some valuable historical and conceptual background to the issues to
be addressed in the remainder of the dissertation. The aim of the dissertation as a whole is
to address the representation of time and temporal processes within quantum theory, and to
do so we will use the mathematical and conceptual resources currently associated with the
theory. However, some of the most interesting claims and arguments regarding the proper
role of time in the theory were made during the early history of the theory (approximately
pre-WWII) when those tools were often not available or, if they were, not under widespread
use. In evaluating and interpreting these arguments, therefore, we must take care to ensure
that we do not project onto these early authors a modern view of quantum mechanics that
they either could not or did not possess.
These, then, are some of the costs of this work: if we want to gain a genuine understanding
of the insights of our forebears, we must be prepared to approach their work on their own
terms. But in bridging this conceptual gap between their era and our own, we also come
to understand the conceptual possibilities that were open to those for whom the theory
was nascent and as yet unfixed. If these possibilities were closed off by the development of
quantum mechanics into the form in which we know it today, we should not judge harshly
those whose momentary opinions and expectations were hostage to fortune. Examining their
thwarted expectations may even bring us to see the formalism and interpretation of quantum
theory we possess today in a new light: as a conceptual artifact that not only bears signs of
the struggles of its discovery and refinement, but that also may be open to further refinement
or extension.
The first part of this chapter provides what I call a pre-history of time in quantum
mechanics, which respects the fact that these authors were often drawing conclusions from
a theoretical formalism that is not the one in use today. I begin with what is often marked
as the birth of quantum mechanics (from its ancestor the ‘old quantum theory’ of Bohr
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and Sommerfeld): Heisenberg’s famous Umdeutung (Reinterpretation) paper of 1925. The
history I have to tell concerns the role of time in the theory, how the expectations of early
authors regarding that role came about, and how those expectations were thwarted (or not)
by what came to be known as ‘Pauli’s Theorem.’
The details of my account conflict with the recent history provided by Hilgevoord (2005),
since Hilgevoord argues that there was a fundamental confusion that lay behind many of these
expectations. I address this conflict in Section 2.2, arguing that Hilgevoord’s interpretation
misrepresents the views of the historical actors. In addition, I contend that Hilgevoord’s
complaint misrepresents the diverse roles that time can play in classical mechanics, and that
attending to these distinctions in the classical context leads to a revised expectation of the
role that time might play in quantum theory. In particular, in Section 2.3 I argue that
Hilgevoord ignores the reasonable expectation that the role played by the time of an event
in classical mechanics might come to be played by an observable of quantum theory. This
leads to a brief discussion of some specific cases, and thence, in Section 2.4, to an analysis
of time covariance in modern (analytical) classical mechanics.
2.1 A PRE-HISTORY OF TIME IN QUANTUM MECHANICS
The early years of quantum mechanics (1925-1927) were a period during which close links to
classical mechanics were routinely posited and exploited, and then discarded if they conflicted
with the further development of the theory. Some of these links were very suggestive of a
role for time as an observable (or operator, or q-number) of the theory. The ‘modern era’
for time in quantum mechanics begins with the influential dismissal of this idea by Wolfgang
Pauli in 1933 in a footnote appearing in the second edition of his Encyclopedia of Physics
article on quantum mechanics. This argument came to be known as ‘Pauli’s Theorem.’
Chapter 4 provides an ahistorical assessment of the argument he provides, couched in our
modern language of functional analysis. Here, I am concerned with assessing the historical
origins of the claims against which Pauli was arguing, and the important antecedent of
his argument in the work of Erwin Schro¨dinger on the ideal quantum clock. I also point
out, in Section 2.1.5, that one of the supposed targets of this argument (Paul Dirac) had
motivations and methods that are entirely untouched by Pauli’s argument. Dirac’s concern
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was with the quantum analogue of a particular form of classical mechanics in which the
dynamical variables were extended to explicitly include time, and Pauli’s argument is silent
about the role of time in this quantum formalism.
Although when Pauli was writing Dirac had already abandoned those methods, he was
to return to them much later in his work on the quantization of constrained Hamiltonian
systems (Dirac, 1964). In Chapter 7 I will introduce another reason to consider the extended
formalism in quantum mechanics: giving an account of the time of an event. The idea that
the time of an event would be an observable quantity of the theory also arose in the early
history of the theory. In particular, advocates of matrix mechanics initially suggested that
the dynamics of the the theory would consist of a series of discrete ‘quantum jumps’ between
states of fixed energy, reminiscent of the orbital transitions of an electron in Bohr’s early
atomic model. For a brief period in 1927, Heisenberg and Jordan advocated an interpretation
of the time-energy uncertainty relation in these terms. This is addressed in Section 2.1.2.
2.1.1 The Road to Pauli’s Theorem
This section aims to give a limited account of the origins of Pauli’s Theorem against the
backdrop of the development of the Dirac-von Neumann formalism of quantum mechan-
ics. The development of quantum mechanics is neatly book-ended by Heisenberg’s famous
Umdeutung of 1925 on one end, with Dirac and Jordan’s transformation theory in 1927 (in
two distinct forms) at the other. Notably, 1927 also saw von Neumann’s trio of papers intro-
ducing the Hilbert space formalism and the 1927 Solvay conference (famed for the legendary
Bohr-Einstein debate). This two year period 1925–1927 saw the rapid development of the
formalism along several different directions. This period is often characterized as a two-
pronged development of Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics and Schro¨dinger’s wave mechanics,
which were unified in Dirac’s and Jordan’s transformation theories and subsequently given
a firm mathematical foundation by von Neumann. For our purposes here, this neat picture
will suffice.1
Despite the revolutionary implications of quantum mechanics, its development was made
possible by maintaining a close eye on its relationship with parts of classical mechanics.
One of those parts, which played an essential role in the initial development of matrix
1To add some detail and depth to this barebones sketch, see (e.g.) the classic account of Jammer (1966).
For recent noteworthy additions and amendments see Darrigol (1993) on Dirac, Joas & Lehner (2009) on
Schro¨dinger, Duncan & Janssen (2013) on Jordan and von Neumann, and references therein.
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mechanics by Heisenberg, Born and Jordan (Born & Jordan, 1925; Born et al., 1926) was
the action-angle form of Hamiltionian dynamics. In classical mechanics, the action-angle co-
ordinates are introduced by means of a canonical transformation and result in a remarkable
simplification of the dynamics. In the periodic systems that matrix mechanics began by
treating, the action variable J (with units of energy) was constant in time while the angle
variable w (with units of time) varies linearly with time. Writing a (real) solution of the
equations of motion x(t) in terms of action and angle variables meant specifying a Fourier









In the matrix mechanics of Born & Jordan (1925) kinematical quantities are represented by
Hermitian matrices whose time dependence takes the same form,
p(t) = p(nm)e2piiv(nm)t; q(t) = q(nm)e2piiv(nm)t.
The crucial difference was that these equations now gave the time development of the dynam-
ical variables p(t) (momentum) q(t) (position) rather than the time development of a single
solution of the classical equations. Nonetheless, the dynamics for these matrix operators

















[Hq − qH ].
This suggested the following general dynamical equation for an arbitrary matrix g, the so-




[Hg − gH ] = i
~
[H , g], (2.1)
where [·, ·] is the quantum commutator.
Working independently in Cambridge, Dirac recognized in Heisenberg’s original paper a















where {·, ·} is the Poisson bracket and H is the classical Hamiltonian. In classical mechanics,
the relationship between a configuration variable qr and its conjugate momentum pr leads
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to their Poisson bracket being unity, {q, p} = 1. This relation of conjugacy was replicated
in quantum mechanics by replacing the Possion bracket with the quantum commutator,
[q,p] = i~.
This is the Canonical Commutation Relation (CCR) of quantum theory. In classical me-
chanics, a canonical transformation of conjugate variables is one that preserves their Pois-
son bracket. (Another way of saying this: the Poisson bracket is a canonical invariant).
Thus action-angle variables, reached by a canonical transformation, are canonically conju-
gate {J, w} = 1. Given the close resemblance of the quantum commutator to the Poisson
bracket, there was a strong suggestion that quantum mechanics would likewise allow for an
expression in action-angle form.
In the matrix mechanics of Born et al. (1926), a “canonical transformation” was defined
as a matrix transformation S that preserves the quantum commutation relation, i.e.,
[SqS−1,SpS−1] = i~.
To solve the dynamical equations of matrix mechanics, the crucial mathematical problem was
to find a matrix transformation that brought the Hamiltonian matrix H(q,p) (a function
of the position and momentum matrices) into diagonal form, SHS−1 = W . In turn, this
transformation gave the time evolution of an arbitrary matrix by means a complex phase








The similarity of form to the classical solutions of the equations of motion in action-angle
form encouraged the idea that SHS−1 corresponds to the quantum equivalent of the classical
action variable.2 Classically, the canonically conjugate variable, angle, can be defined by
means of the Poisson bracket as the variable conjugate to action. The equivalent quantum
variable w would, therefore, obey the equation [SwS−1,SHS−1] = i~. Since the relation
of conjugacy is preserved under the transformation S, we have [w,H ] = i~ and thus w is




[H ,w] = 1.
2See in particular Born et al. (1926, p. 330).
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However, the analogy is less than perfect. While the classical action variable was reached
by a canonical transformation of the configuration variables qr and their conjugate momenta
pr, the “quantum action” W was reached by a “canonical” matrix transformation that takes
the Hamiltonian H into a special form. In particular, the transformation to a basis in which
the Hamiltonian operator is diagonal (i.e. the energy representation). This means that S is a
unitary operator.3 The same transformation applied to the quantum position and momentum
operators leads not to a distinct set of canonical variables but the same operators written in
a different basis of vectors.4 So the quantum “angle” operator w defined above is canonically
conjugate to the Hamiltonian operator H , which represents the energy of the system, not
some other “action operator”.
This is a crucial distinction between the situation in classical and quantum mechan-
ics. Whereas in classical mechanics the action variables and the Hamiltonian are distinct, in
quantum mechanics the “action variable” is nothing but the Hamiltonian operator expressed
in a different basis. In defining the “quantum angle variable” through the relation of conju-
gacy to the Hamiltonian, it is therefore conjugate to energy rather than action. This makes
it tempting to regard energy and time as conjugates in quantum mechanics, whereas the
analogous situation in classical mechanics maintains a sharp distinction between the notions
of action and energy, and—crucially—angle and time. Recall that, classically, angle (the
conjugate variable to action) covaries with time. However, a variable that covaries with time
is not therefore an angle variable. In the quantum case this distinction is lost: a quantum
operator conjugate to energy (or “angle”) covaries with time, and an operator that covaries
with time is conjugate to energy.5
2.1.2 Heisenberg’s Time-Energy Uncertainty Principle
As we have seen, the quantum version of the action-angle variable form of mechanics led
directly to (and was indistinguishable from) a relationship between energy and time. On the
other hand, in classical mechanics the relationship was between a distinct quantity with units
3An operator is unitary if UU−1 = U−1U = I. We will investigate further the link between the existence
of such a unitary transformation and a corresponding self-adjoint operator in Chapter 3.
4The failure to recognize this distinction was endemic in early quantum mechanics. See Duncan & Janssen
(2013) for details of how this confusion played out.
5This is a rough and ready statement of a fact about conjugate observables that will be explored in detail
in later chapters. Also note that there is a directly analogous situation in classical mechanics, i.e. if we
demand of a classical observable that it is conjugate to the Hamiltonian then it also covaries with time, and
vice versa. This is not the same thing, however, as introducing action-angle variables. See Section 2.4.
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of action, and a quantity that covaries with time (angle). In his famous uncertainty paper of
1927 Heisenberg introduces separate expressions Et− tE = −i~, relating energy and time,
and Jw −wJ = −i~, relating action and angle. These are given distinct interpretations in
his explanations of the physical content of these expressions. Since these ultimately express
the same relation, this undoubtedly leads to confusion, and Heisenberg’s initial discussion
of the time-energy uncertainty principle is justly criticized on these grounds by Hilgevoord
(2005). This confusion arises prior to (and independently of) the fact that the existence of
any such operator t is thrown into doubt by Pauli’s Theorem.
Despite these confusions, I contend that the physical core of Heisenberg’s interpretation
of the time-energy principle (circa 1927) may nevertheless be discerned without much diffi-
culty. What is absolutely crucial to bear in mind is that, at this time, Heisenberg was still
deeply wedded to the basic physical picture of Bohr’s atomic model. According to Bohr’s
semi-classical model (and later developments by Sommerfeld going under the name ‘the old
quantum theory’) the possible states of an atomic system—for hydrogen just a single orbiting
electron—were quantized into a discrete series of orbits (or stationary states) each associated
with a definite energy of the system. At any given time, the system was to be found in one
of those states.
By 1927, it was realized that solutions of the time-independent Schro¨dinger equation
corresponded to stationary states of definite energy.6 However, such a system was believed
to also display the characteristic quantum behavior of ‘jumping’ from one state to another
unpredictably and (apparently) instantaneously. Thus, on this picture, there was no doubt
that a closed system had a definite stationary state at all times. We could, however, be
uncertain as to which state the system takes at any particular time and, correspondingly,
about the time at which the system jumped between two stationary states.
It is only with this simple physical picture in place that we can make sense of Heisen-
berg’s interpretation of the energy-time uncertainty principle (as opposed to the action-angle
principle), which he expresses as follows:7
According to the physical interpretation of quantum theory aimed at here, the
time of transitions or “quantum jumps” must be as concrete and determinable
6By Heisenberg, in fact. See the discussion of Darrigol (1993, pp. 329-331).
7It is also of interest that Jordan’s view at this time is very similar to Heisenberg’s, and one imagines that
this is something that they had discussed together. In his Habilitation lecture (later published in English as
a Nature article of 1927) Jordan chose to address the question of indeterminism with reference to the time
of a single quantum jump. See the footnote of Duncan & Janssen (2013, pp. 187–188).
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by measurement as, say, energies in stationary states. The spread within which
such an instant is specifiable is given according to [Et− tE = −i~] by ~/∆E, if
∆E designates the change of energy in a quantum jump. (Heisenberg, 1927, pp.
76–77. author’s translation)
He then proceeds to describe a simple experiment to demonstrate this relation, which he calls
“quite in the spirit of the old formulation of quantum theory founded by Planck, Einstein and
Bohr when we speak of the discontinuous change of the energy.” However, the theoretical
basis for this relation relies on the existence of appropriate operators t and E, for which
an uncertainty relation can be derived along the lines that Heisenberg sketched for position
and momentum. Another (somewhat archaic) way of saying this is that, for the time-
energy uncertainty relation to have a theoretical basis, t must be a q-number rather than a
c-number.8
Now, in identifying the stationary states of Bohr’s theory with the energy eigenstates of
Schro¨dinger’s wave mechanics, this amounts to the supposition that a closed system has a
definite value for energy at all times, a supposition that was rejected by Schro¨dinger (and
quite rightly).9 As we know today, a closed system is not restricted to an eigenstate of
energy, and its instantaneous state will in general correspond to a superposition of such
states. A system in a stationary state (i.e. in an energy eigenstate) will remain in that state
indefinitely. Remarkably, this fact was later recognized and embraced by Heisenberg, leading
to the view that quantum theory served to eliminate time (Bacciagaluppi & Valentini, 2009,
p. 185).
According to this view, ‘quantum jumps’ correspond to energy exchanges between inter-
acting systems, and it is this behavior alone that is responsible for our experience of time,
which is a statistical phenomenon that only emerges at a macroscopic level, like temperature.
Thus for a closed system, like the universe, there could be no time. But, as Schro¨dinger recog-
nized, this dramatic conclusion rests on a false presupposition: an isolated quantum system
does not have a definite value of energy at all times. This realization brought about the end
of the quantum jump interpretation of the time-energy uncertainty principle, although the
language of quantum jumps was to re-emerge in later discussions of measurement.
8This claim is cast into doubt by the existence of time-energy uncertainty relations that do not rely on
a time operator for their derivation (Hilgevoord, 1996). However, there remains a distinction to be drawn
with position and momentum, which provide two families of uncertainty relations (corresponding to shifts
in momentum and in position) whereas there is only a single time-energy relation corresponding to shifts in
time (Uffink & Hilgevoord, 1985).
9See the introduction of his presentation at Solvay (Bacciagaluppi & Valentini, 2009, p. 409).
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2.1.3 Quantum Clocks
What, then, was the meaning of the energy-time uncertainty relation? Schro¨dinger was led
to examine this question through consideration of the complications that quantum uncer-
tainty relations would introduce when setting up an inertial frames of reference.10 According
to Einstein’s clock synchronization protocol, to set up a common notion of time requires a
collection of distant ideal clocks exchanging light signals with one another. Schro¨dinger
(1931b) argued that the uncertainty relations of quantum mechanics would lead to in princi-
ple limitations on the accuracy to which this procedure could be carried out. Ultimately, he
called for a revision of the Lorentz transformations, which should be ‘quantized’ by replacing
time and space co-ordinates with operators. As Hilgevoord (2005) convincingly argues, this
last claim derives from a conceptual error: in the transition to quantum mechanics position
variables are quantized, not spatio-temporal co-ordinates, nor transformations thereof.
However, there is nothing misguided about an investigation of the epistemic limits quan-
tum theory may place on our ability to know that we are in an inertial frame.11 In this
vein, Schro¨dinger (1931a) was led to explore the characteristics of an ideal quantum clock:
a system that evolves through a succession of states that mimic the values of the external
time parameter to which the instantaneous state of the system (i.e. the state of the clock)
is referred. He objects that such a system would be unphysical on the following grounds:
since the clock is ideal, its state at each time would have to be perfectly distinguishable
from every other state, i.e. the successive states of the system must be mutually orthogonal.
However, because of the relationship between energy and time, this entails that the energy
of the system is completely uncertain: all values of energy from +∞ to −∞ are equally
probable. This leads him to conclude that:
Such a state of the system is physically meaningless; the ideal clock, that quantum
mechanics uses by the application of the variable t, is in contradiction with the
foundations of quantum mechanics. (From Hilgevoord (2005, p. 50).)
This brings us to Pauli’s (1933) discussion of time in quantum theory, which is confined to
two footnotes of his Handbuch article on quantum mechanics. Although it is to this article12
that citations for ‘Pauli’s Theorem’ invariably refer, as it happens neither of these footnotes
10The following two paragraphs rely heavily on Hilgevoord’s presentation, (Hilgevoord, 2005, §3.4).
11In this connection, see Salecker & Wigner (1958).
12Or its English translation, (Pauli, 1958), later published as a book.
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contains the proof of a theorem. However, one of them contains the outline of an argument
for the conclusion discussed above, that time is a parameter (or c-number) not an operator
(q-number). As it stands, unfortunately, that argument is not strictly valid. Nonetheless,
there are closely related results (for which see Chapter 4), and we will encounter Pauli’s
argument as it appeared in 1933 in due course.
The first of Pauli’s footnoted comments is specifically directed towards Schro¨dinger’s
analysis of the ideal clock. I will quote from the main text for context before giving the
remark. Following a discussion of measurement uncertainty in the Compton effect (involving
the stimulated emission of x-rays by a moving electron), Pauli concludes:
The measurement of position with great accuracy is always possible since the
wave-length of the material particle [varies inversely with its mass]. At least in
non-relativistic quantum mechanics, where v << c, the following basic assump-
tion is, therefore, natural: In every state of a system and indeed for free particles
there exists, at each instant of time t, a probability W (xi; t)dxi that the particle
is found in the volume interval (xi, xi + dxi). This basic assumption is neither
self-evident nor is it a direct consequence of the uncertainty relations. . . . In the
formulation of [this basic assumption], a distinction is made between space and
time since the position co-ordinates are considered within a margin dxi while
the time co-ordinate is exactly fixed. Actually, as we have seen, this time point
cannot be fixed more accurately than ∆t = ∆x/c. (Pauli, 1958, p. 10)
It is the penultimate sentence to which the footnote refers.13 In the footnote, Pauli addresses
the problem of knowing what time it is, and so Schro¨dinger’s worry about the ideal clock:
In this connection, it is stressed [by Schro¨dinger] that an ideal clock, i.e. one which
gives the time exactly, will possess an infinitely large uncertainty in energy and
hence also an infinite energy. According to us, this does not mean that the use of
the usual time concept contradicts quantum mechanics, since such an ideal clock
can be approximated arbitrarily. (Pauli, 1958, p. 10–11, original emphasis)
He draws an analogy here with his earlier argument regarding the uncertainty in position of
a massive particle, and what we might call the ‘ideal quantum rod’: an infinitely massive
material particle. On the face of it, this seems quite reasonable. However, possessing an
13It is worth remarking that the probabilities introduced by Pauli here do not concern how accurately
one could know one’s position in space (as would be required to set up a system of inertial co-ordinates),
but rather the likelihood of ‘finding’ something in a spatial region at a time. When uncertainty in time is
introduced here, it is as a consequence of relativistic concerns, and so corresponds to a notion of finding
something within a spatio-temporal region rather than a spatial region.
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“infinitely large uncertainty in energy” and possessing “an infinite energy” are resolutely not
the same thing in quantum mechanics, and in this the ideal quantum clock differs crucially
from the ideal quantum rod. Possessing an infinite energy in quantum mechanics means,
roughly, that a system has the expectation value∞ for its energy observable. But having an
infinitely large uncertainty in energy corresponds not to having a large energy, but having a
completely uncertain energy: essentially, being in a state in which no value of energy is more
likely than any other. Thus the expectation value of energy for Schro¨dinger’s ideal clock,
having possible values of energy that run from −∞ to +∞, is zero (if defined). This is quite
different to the situation concerning a (free) massive particle, which can have energy values
from 0 to ∞.
Whether or not Pauli’s conclusion may be supported by other means, the fact remains
that an ideal clock in quantum mechanics is not on a par with an infinitely massive particle.
Again: Schro¨dinger’s problem with the ideal quantum clock is that its energy spectrum is
unbounded, not that it may possess infinite energy. Most (if not all systems) in quantum
mechanics possess a ground state, a state of lowest energy below which the energy of the
system cannot drop. Famously, the ground state of the quantum harmonic oscillator corre-
sponds to an energy greater than zero (the zero point energy). The ideal clock, however, is
not like this. Its energy can take any value, positive or negative. There is a simple argument
for why this leads to a violation (in spirit, if not in letter) of that central canon of modern
physics, energy conservation. Take a system which has no lower bound for its energy, and
extract from it enough energy to power the whole of Pittsburgh for a day. Do the same thing
tomorrow, and the day after, and so on. No matter how much energy you extract from the
system, there is always more to be extracted. Since there is no lower bound on the energy
of this system it can be used as an energy source indefinitely, and there is thus no total
quantity of energy that can be assigned to that system.14
This is certainly grounds to be suspicious of the ideal quantum clock. But, according to
Schro¨dinger, something even more alarming is true of this system: not only does the value
of energy that the system can possess fail to have a lower bound, but the ideal clock has a
completely uncertain value for energy. This means that on interaction with another system,
like the poor lab tech who tries to use it to read the time, it can exchange an arbitrarily large
amount of energy—either positive or negative. This would make the ideal clock something
14This argument is adapted from Malament (1996).
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like a ticking bomb. Fortunately, there is a common understanding in quantum mechanics
today that such systems are unphysical. The spectrum condition states that any physical
Hamiltonian must have a spectrum bounded from below, i.e. a lower bound for the value of
energy that the system whose evolution it describes can take.15
If this principle is accepted, then Schro¨dinger’s ideal clock is automatically ruled out.
However, the status of Pauli’s claim that “an ideal clock can be approximated arbitrarily”
may be unaffected by these arguments. If Pauli is right about this, then there should be a
series of physically allowed systems whose behavior approaches that of an ideal clock while
avoiding the difficulties of the unbounded energy spectrum that this concept seems to entail.
This is the topic of a Chapter 6, where I argue that Pauli’s claim may be substantiated,
but that Schro¨dinger’s ideal clock does not lie at the limit of this sequence. It is a further
question how the existence of such a family of systems bears on the claim that “the use of
the usual time concept contradicts quantum mechanics.”
The problem for “the usual time concept” posed by Schro¨rdinger’s ideal clock seems to
be one for an operationalist, who believes that physical quantities must be associated with
concrete experimental procedures. For the operationalist, therefore, the concept of time
is meaningless without the means to measure it. Pauli’s argument, it seems, is that the
operationalist can be content with a procedure that provides the means to measure time
approximately, with an accuracy that may be increased without limit. This seems to be
a fair response, particularly in the context of quantum theory, which (as Pauli points out)
introduces a similar problem for measurements of position in space. Whether or not this is
ultimately a satisfactory analysis of time will depend on one’s philosophical bent, but it does
seem that Pauli and Schro¨dinger were onto something here: a satisfactory notion of time
in physics should provide some relation to the means by which it may be measured, even if
time itself is ultimately to be defined independently of the means of its measurement. See
Section 9.2 for further discussion of these topics.
15The history behind the use of quantum Hamiltonians that do not obey the spectrum condition is fasci-
nating, and begins with Dirac’s relativistic electron equation of 1928. In the ‘hole’ theory that Dirac used
to predict the existence of antimatter, the Hamitonian of the entire system has no lower bound, but the
Hamiltonian of a single particle or antiparticle (a ‘hole’ in the completely filled negative energy ‘sea’) has
a positive energy. In the field theoretic formalism that replaced it, the Hamiltonian is written as a sum of
positive energy terms that are combinations of creation and annihilation operators, each corresponding to
a particle or antiparticle with positive energy. See Pashby (2012) for more details of this episode (and its
implications for the realism debate).
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2.1.4 Introducing Pauli’s Theorem
We are now ready to discuss Pauli’s famous ‘theorem,’ the detailed discussion of which is
the subject of Chapter 4. The argument appears in a footnote to a passage that presents a
derivation of Heisenberg’s equation of motion. I quote in full:
In the older literature on quantum mechanics we often find the operator equation
Ht− tH = ~
i
I, (2.2)
which arises from [~
i
F˙ = HF − FH] by substituting t for F . It is generally not
possible, however, to construct a Hermitian operator (e.g. as a function of p and
q) which satisfies this equation. This is so because, from the C.R. [Commutation
Relation] written above, it follows that H possesses continuously all eigenvalues
from −∞ to +∞ (cf. Dirac, Quantum Mechanics, First edition (1930), 34 and
56) whereas on the other hand, discrete eigenvalues of H can be present. We,
therefore, conclude that the introduction of an operator t is basically forbidden and
the time t must necessarily be considered as an ordinary number (“c-number”) in
Quantum Mechanics (cf. for this Schro¨dinger 1931). (Pauli, 1958, p. 63, original
emphasis)
The sketch that Pauli provides here can be fleshed out into a fully formed argument by
following the references to Dirac’s Principles of Quantum Mechanics. However, this argu-
ment cannot be strictly valid since there exist counterexamples to Pauli’s claim. That is,
(to mention just one class) there exist pairs of self-adjoint operators (H, t) that satisfy the
commutation relation given by Pauli (which, given the Heisenberg equation of motion, en-
tails that that the rate of change of t is unity) even though H is a Hamiltonian with a
discrete spectrum. These pairs of operators can be thought of as describing periodic clocks:
a discrete Hamiltonian is conjugate to a phase or angle observable, which is periodic.16
One might suppose that Pauli’s argument could be rescued by replacing the mistaken
assumption he uses for his attempted reductio. In particular, we might suppose that the
spectrum condition (see Section 2.1.3) provides a more robust foe for a time operator than
the existence of a Hamiltonian with discrete spectrum. However, even this does not suffice
to guard against counterexamples, since there exist pairs of self-adjoint operators (H, t)
obeying (2.2) where H is the Hamiltonian for a quantum harmonic oscillator, and t is the
phase observable. This Hamiltonian has a discrete spectrum that is bounded from below
16This will be analyzed in great detail in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
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since a harmonic oscillator has a ground state. (See Chapters 4 and 5). In Chapter 6 I will
argue that the existence of such pairs of operators provides just the sort of approximation
to an ideal clock that Pauli appeals to in his footnote considered previously. But what of
the physicist’s folklore that Pauli proved conclusively that ‘time is not a q-number but a
c-number’?
It turns out that there is a closely related argument that may be reached by strengthening
the premises of Pauli’s proof, and so it seems plausible that it is this argument (which follows
from a single foundational result: the Stone-von Neumann Theorem) that physicists refer
to when they speak of ‘Pauli’s Theorem.’ That is, the conclusion that a conjugate pair
H, t can only exist if “H possesses continuously all eigenvalues from −∞ to +∞” (i.e.
has the spectrum of the reals) can be reached from the stronger assumption that H and t
are conjugate in the Weyl sense, as well as the Heisenberg sense given by (2.2). Given this
strengthened premise, the proof proceeds much as Pauli had envisioned and returns precisely
this conclusion. This claim will be explained in full in Chapter 4.
For now, note that this result (i.e. the one that follows from a valid argument) must be
reckoned with by anyone who wishes to introduce a time operator into quantum mechanics,
and I will argue there is good cause to do so. Indeed, we have already met the idea that
such operators are required to give an operational definition of time through the use of
quantum clocks. It is worthy of note, however, that one of the likely intended targets
of Pauli’s argument, Paul Dirac, had introduced time operators into quantum theory in
a way that was left untouched by this result. The approach taken by Dirac in his early
papers on quantum theory was to introduce time as an additional canonical variable in
classical mechanics and then promote it to an operator through his quantization procedure.
By following this procedure, he obtained a time operator that was not conjugate to the
Hamiltonian, and so this method is left untroubled by Pauli’s Theorem.
2.1.5 The Path Less Traveled: Dirac’s Extended Phase Space
To see how things could have been different, that is, how quantum theory could have come
equipped with a canonical time operator, we turn to Dirac’s first papers on quantum theory.
There we find a heavy reliance on the hypothesized close correspondence between quantum
theory and the action-angle form of classical mechanics. This led to Heisenberg’s confusion
about the roles of action, angle, time and energy in quantum mechanics. However, Dirac
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(1926b) does not display the same confusion in exploring forms of classical mechanics that
explicitly promote time to the position of a dynamical variable. This technique involves
extending the phase space of the classical theory by two dimensions, corresponding to the
time variable t and its canonical conjugate −W , i.e. minus the (numerical value of) energy.
This variable −W is quite distinct from the Hamiltonian H that is defined on the unextended
phase space, and H takes on a new role within the extended phase space.
In particular, fixing the energy of the system involves fixing the value of −W . The
dynamical equations are obtained by setting H equal to W , that is, by introducing what is
known as the constraint equation17
H −W = 0.
Dirac used this extended dynamical equation to treat relativistic dynamics, but also regarded
it as necessary when introducing time-varying Hamiltonians that could not be addressed by
perturbative methods.18 As a matter of more than historical interest, it was by this route that
Dirac (1926a) introduced the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation into quantum mechanics.
From Schro¨dinger’s wave mechanics Dirac had learned that values of energy (eigenvalues
of the Hamiltonian matrix) corresponded to eigenfunctions, i.e. functions on configuration
space. He had also learned that q-numbers with a matrix representation could be written as
operators on those functions. The relationship of conjugacy that held between position and
momentum was revealed to correspond to a particular relationship between the operations by
which they were represented. In particular, when position acts by multiplication, momentum
acts by differentiation, and vice versa.19 This correspondence licensed Dirac’s substitution
of differential operators for classical momentum variables as follows:
p = −i~ ∂
∂x
; −W = −i~ ∂
∂t
.
Writing the constraint equation (above) as a wave equation acting on functions ψ(x), and
making this substitution for −W , Dirac (1926a) obtained
Hψ(x, t)− i~ ∂
∂t
ψ(x, t) = 0, (2.3)
17For technical reasons that we will not go into here, this is not a strict equality. Instead, we require that
dynamical solutions lie on the constraint surface of the extended phase space on which this equality holds.
For a philosophical introduction to Dirac’s constrained Hamiltonian formalism (a product of his later work
on this topic) see Earman (2003).
18See Pashby (2014) for more on this topic, and a more detailed analysis of Dirac’s approach to time.
19Take an arbitrary (well-behaved) function f(x). Making the substitutions Q = xf(x) and P =
−i~df(x)/dx it is easily seen that [QP − PQ]f(x) = i~f(x) holds, as required.
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which we recognize as the time-dependent Schro¨dinger equation.
However, this is not (repeat, not) the Schro¨dinger equation of standard quantum me-
chanics, as it is presented in textbooks today. Dirac’s equation involves a partial derivative
that acts on functions of time and space. The dynamical equation of contemporary quantum
theory does not concern functions of time and space but functions of (configuration) space





where Ut = e
iHt is the unitary group uniquely generated by H, the (self-adjoint) Hamiltonian
operator. Note the difference: the differentiation of t concerns the unitary group Ut alone
and the function ψ(x) is left alone by this differential operation. In contrast, (2.3) involves
a partial derivative acting on functions of x and t.20
Physical relevance (or otherwise) of (2.3) notwithstanding, this distinction is worth noting
because, by introducing −W as an operator distinct from the Hamiltonian, Dirac provides
the means to resist Pauli’s Theorem. Classically, W represents the (numerical value of the)
energy of the system, whereas H is a function of the other phase space variables. In standard
quantum mechanics, the Hamiltonian operator H does double duty as both the generator of
time translations and the energy operator, whose spectrum determines the possible values of
energy which the system may take. As we will see in Chapter 4, the fact that the Hamiltonian
operator is (a) required to be self-adjoint, and (b) has a semi-bounded spectrum rules out
the existence of a canonically conjugate time observable (with the spectrum of the reals).
However, in Dirac’s extended phase space the variable conjugate to −W is t, time. The
generator of time translations is, therefore, not H but −W , and there is nothing to stop t
and −W from being promoted to canonically conjugate quantum observables on an extended
Hilbert space.
This procedure is well-established today as a means to reach a quantization of a con-
strained classical system. In fact, some of these procedures are due to Dirac’s later work
on this topic, motivated by the desire to quantize general relativity (Dirac, 1964). However,
the extended Hilbert space (often referred to as the auxiliary or kinematical Hilbert space)
is not the final destination of Dirac’s later quantization procedure, and it is typical to seek
20As an aside, I note here that the equation on Schro¨dinger’s gravestone involves ψ˙ i.e. (d/dt)ψ whereas,
on the other hand, the Dirac Equation appears on Dirac’s gravestone (in Westminster Abbey) with a partial
derivative.
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a ‘physical’ Hilbert space containing only functions f that are annihilated by the quantum
constraint operator Hˆf = (H − W )f = 0. Applying this procedure in the present case
would result in a Hilbert space equipped with an orthonormal basis of momentum states,
but without a time operator.21 One way to avoid Pauli’s Theorem, then, is to do physics
in the extended Hilbert space, without seeking a reduced space of physical states. I explore
this possibility in Chapter 8.
2.2 A STORY OF CONFUSION?
In telling the story of time and energy in the pre-history of quantum mechanics I am fol-
lowing the lead of Hilgevoord (2005), who provides (to my knowledge) the first such history.
Hilgevoord, however, takes rather a dim view of the actors involved. He even goes so far
as to entitle his essay, “Time in Quantum Mechanics: A Story of Confusion.” I am not
sure that the subtitle is entirely justified by its content, and I am inclined to take a rather
more favorable view of the motivations and interests of those early quantum pioneers, and
the researchers who followed their trail.22 Hilgevoord’s motivations, however, are admirable:
he wishes to provide a dissolution of the problem posed by Pauli’s Theorem, which has
been called ‘the problem of time in quantum mechanics’ (Olkhovsky, 2011; Hilgevoord &
Atkinson, 2011).
The idea is this: the non-existence of time observables in quantum mechanics is a prob-
lem only if there is a legitimate need for them. Hilgevoord seeks to dissolve the problem
by arguing that there is no need for time observables in quantum mechanics. There are
several components to this project. First, and most impressive, is the understanding of the
time-energy uncertainty relations supplied by the Hilgevoord-Uffink analysis of the uncer-
tainty principle (Hilgevoord, 1996). These time-energy uncertainty relations do not require
a time observable since the only operators involved are the unitary operators that imple-
ment time shifts, which together form a unitary group generated by the Hamiltonian. With
21The state of the art is essentially given by Ashtekar et al. (1995), where they explicitly address the
example of a free particle.
22This may come down to merely a choice of emphasis. Hilgevoord writes: “When I criticize some of their
work of this period, I am fully aware, of course, that these were the heroic years when modern quantum
mechanics was taking shape. I have confined myself to what was known at the time and have refrained from
discussing important later developments.” (Hilgevoord, 2005, p. 30).
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these relations in hand, there is good reason to suppose that we can understand the time-
energy uncertainty principle without recourse to a canonical (or general, or external) time
observable.
Second is the analysis Hilgevoord provides of ‘internal times’ through an analysis of
quantum clocks—quantum systems that possess time observables that function like the hands
of a clock. Since Hilgevoord chooses systems that do not obey the spectrum condition,
Pauli’s Theorem poses no problem for these clock observables, which are thus self-adjoint.
These observables are also intended to supply an operational meaning to time in quantum
mechanics, in line with the discussion of quantum clocks in Section 2.1.3. This operational
understanding of time is thought by Hilgevoord to suffice for understanding the role of time in
the theory, and these systems supply concrete instances of time-energy uncertainty relations
(however, in failing to obey the spectrum condition, they represent exceptional systems).
On my view, the spectrum condition is not optional, and I devote Chapter 6 to the problem
of defining clock observables in quantum theory while respecting Pauli’s Theorem.
The third component of Hilgevoord’s attempted resolution of this problem of time, and
the issue that concerns us here, involves his rejection of a mistaken analogy supposed to
hold between time and space. Hilgevoord’s argument is essentially this: there is nothing
problematic about time being represented by a parameter rather than an operator since
space is represented by a parameter rather than an operator as well. Hilgevoord claims that
the expectation of the authors of quantum mechanics that time should be an observable
was due to a confusion between space and position: looking at the role of position as an
observable of the theory, they were mistakenly led to the idea that time should be observable
too. He traces the source of the confusion to the frequent use of the spatial co-ordinates
(x, y, z) to denote the spectral values of the position observable of a single particle (qx, qy, qz).
When presented with an operator whose spectral values appear to correspond to points of
space, it is natural to expect also an operator whose spectral values correspond to instants of
time. And given the expectation of these authors that quantum mechanics would ultimately
be a relativistic theory, it seemed reasonable to demand of a theory set in space-time that
time and space should appear on the same footing. However, as Hilgevoord points out, the
spectral values of position are not identical with spatial points—this correspondence is only
valid for a system consisting of a single particle. In general the dimension of configuration
space (and so the spectrum of the position observable) is 3n, where n is the number of
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particles. Once this confusion is made apparent, and it is realized that time t (a parameter)
is to be contrasted with space (x, y, z) (also parameters), the apparent asymmetry is removed
and so the justification for defining a time operator (i.e. a canonical time observable) is
removed, or so Hilgevoord claims. This leads him to dismiss later developments, such as
the recent use of POVMs (Positive Operator Valued Measures) to define (generalized) time
observables, as conceptually confused for the same reason (Hilgevoord & Atkinson, 2011).
Now, with regard to this particular justification for regarding time as an operator, I agree
that Hilgevoord offers an apt diagnosis: what is being contrasted here is not time and space,
but time and position. But while I agree wholeheartedly that it would be a mistake to
confuse space, time and position in this way, I am not convinced that this was a confusion
to which many (or perhaps any) of the authors of quantum theory were prone. Indeed,
Hilgevoord (2005) acknowledges that there were other reasons which led to the expectation
that temporal properties were apt for representation by operators. It is my view that these
other reasons for defining time operators were more important to those authors—I will claim
that some remain compelling today—and are not so easily dismissed as resulting from a
simple conceptual error.
Of the authors discussed above (Heisenberg, Schro¨dinger, Pauli and Dirac) only Schro¨din-
ger fell victim to this particular confusion, and he redeemed himself through his perspicacious
discussion of quantum clocks. Even von Neumann, apparently regarded by Hilgevoord as an
exceptionally egregious offender, does not make this particular mistake, or so I now argue.
Here is the passage Hilgevoord quotes:
. . . we must admit that this objection [against the possibility of instantaneous
measurements] points to an essential weakness which is, in fact, the chief weakness
of quantum mechanics: its non-relativistic character, which distinguishes the
time t from the three space coordinates x, y, z, and presupposes an objective
simultaneity concept. In fact, while all other quantities (especially those x, y,
z closely connected with t by the Lorentz transformation) are represented by
operators, there corresponds to the time an ordinary number-parameter t, just
as in classical mechanics. Or: a system consisting of 2 particles has a wave
function which depends on its 2 × 3 = 6 space coordinates, and only upon one
time t, although, because of the Lorentz transformation, two times would be
desirable. (From Hilgevoord (2005, p. 51))
There are several aspects of this passage that can be brought to von Neumann’s defense.
First, the problematic aspect of the non-relativistic character of quantum mechanics lies in
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the requirement that measurement is instantaneous, not the absence of time observables.23
While von Neumann’s claim that all other quantities, including the spatial co-ordinates, are
represented by operators does display the mistake that Hilgevoord alleges, the paraphrase
he gives of the problem provides the means to exonerate him.
If von Neumann truly regarded a putative time operator as a partner to the ‘spatial
operators,’ why would he assert that two times would be desirable, one per particle? It
seems far more plausible that he is taking the point of view that was to lead to Dirac’s
(1932) ‘many-time’ theory. The idea here is that a (classical) system of many relativistic
particles would require 4n variables, rather than 3n. The fourth co-ordinate describing each
particle parameterizes the world-line followed by the particle, and can be thought of as the
time read by a co-moving clock, displaying the ‘age’ of the particle.
This appeal to a need for 4n co-ordinates, then, does display a sensitivity to the distinction
between the position of a particle in space-time (given classically by its progress along its
worldline) and the background spatio-temporal co-ordinates. It is not clear that there is any
conceptual confusion in such an idea and, although as a theory of physics it turned out not
to be especially useful, there nothing conceptually problematic here, or so I would claim.24
Admittedly (as Hilgevoord reports) history was not kind to such relativistic particle theories,
even in the classical context, and they became something of a niche concern in theoretical
physics.
However, there is another reason to expect time observables to find a home in quantum
theory. The crux of my argument is the idea that time observables in quantum theory need
not ‘measure time’ (as would a physical clock) but may instead serve to provide probability
measures for the occurrence of events at particular (sets of) times, just as the position
observable provides probability measures for the occurrence of events at particular (sets of)
spatial points. This provides the means to resist Hilgevoord’s accusation of pursuing a false
analogy since if ‘the’ time observable concerns the location of an event in time, then it is no
false contrast to draw an analogy with the position observable, which concerns the location
of an event in space (the event in question being, at first blush, something like ‘the particle’s
23In Chapter 8 I consider a way in which this requirement is troublesome in non-relativistic quantum
theory too.
24Dirac’s many-time theory was an attempt to find an alternative to the quantum field theoretic approach
to interacting matter. He later showed, with Fock and Podolosky, that these approaches are equivalent.
Note, however, that Dirac’s many-time relativistic quantum mechanics was the inspiration for Tomonaga’s
‘super-many-time’ formulation of quantum field theory, so it did possess some theoretical fecundity, at least.
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being here’). This possibility is excluded from consideration by Hilgevoord, even in classical
mechanics.
2.3 TIMES, CLOCKS, EVENTS
As we have seen, there is some considerable potential for confusion in making sense of the
role of time in quantum mechanics. The root of the problem is the fact that the word ‘time’
is multivalent in the context of a theory of mechanics. To avoid confusion, it will be useful
to sharply distinguish these separate roles for time. This can be done most straightforwardly
in the classical context. Here is a simple tripartate classification of the ways that time arises
in classical mechanics:25
External External (or parameter) time corresponds to the co-ordinate t that parameterizes
the temporal dimension of the co-ordinates with respect to which the motion of the
system is given. Its natural partners are the spatial co-ordinates x, y, z. The co-
ordinates (x, y, z, t) are usually taken to correspond to an inertial frame, in which the
dynamical equations take a particularly simple form.
Clock A system may be thought of as a clock to the extent that it possesses a variable
whose values over time are functionally related to the value of external time. A system
may possess many such variables. A clock variable is ideal if it varies linearly (covaries)
with the value of external time.26
Event An event time is the value of the time parameter that corresponds to the possession
of some property of the system. To the extent that we can associate particular values
of the time parameter (external time) with particular values of the variables describing
the system (or with relations to other variables or external parameters) we may say
that the system has event times. Given the specification of an event in these terms,
we should be able (given the initial data) to determine the time(s) at which that event
occurs.
25Inspired by Busch (1990, 2007).
26Note that this definition may also be turned around so that external time can be operationally defined
as the time read by an ideal clock.
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With these distinctions on the table, we can see that external time is to be given inde-
pendently of the dynamics of the system in question. Operationally, the time co-ordinate
corresponds to something like the time read by a good clock, with respect to which the
dynamics of the system of interest may be defined. Analogously, the spatial co-ordinates
correspond to an independent system of rigid rods with respect to which the position of
the system at a time may be given. This is not to say, however, that we shouldn’t use our
dynamical theory to describe the clocks and rods by means of which these co-ordinates are
defined. The point is, rather, that in describing a particular dynamical system in classical
mechanics, we must set up some external system of co-ordinates with respect to which the
dynamics of the system of interest may be given.
Assuming our dynamical theory to be deterministic, the equations of motion will deter-
mine the values of the dynamical variables at all times (given sufficient initial data). The
tripartate analysis above reserves two distinct roles for how times may be given in terms of
those dynamical variables: clocks and event times. The distinction is important, and turns
on the way that clock times and event times vary with the relevant dynamical symmetry, in
this case time translation symmetry. The defining characteristic of an ideal clock variable is
the correlation of the time read by the clock with the value of external time; an ideal clock
will covary with external time. That is to say that the values of an ideal clock variable τ(t)
will display the simple linear relationship τ(t) = τ(0) + t. Thus, ‘reading the clock’ at times
t′ and t′′ to obtain values τ(t′), τ(t′′) will return the corresponding (positive) interval of time,
t′′ − t′ = τ(t′′)− τ(t′).
An event time, on the other hand, does not vary with time since it picks out the time
at which some relation between the dynamical variables and/or external co-ordinates ob-
tains. The value that an event time takes depends on the dynamics of the system, but it
is not therefore a dynamical variable. Event times are defined in terms of the initial data,
qi(0), pi(0), which does not vary with time; an event time (qi(0), pi(0)) has units of time
but does not depend on the value of the time co-ordinate. There is, therefore, no sense
in which an event time is a clock time since, for a given solution of the equations of mo-
tion, the event time is the same at all times. Nonetheless, there is also a sense in which 
covaries with time translations, but it does so through its dependence on the initial data,
(qi(t), pi(t)) = (qi(0), pi(0))− t. It is easiest to illustrate this contrast in a specific case.
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2.3.1 The Classical Free Particle
Classically, the dynamics of the free particle (in one dimension) may be given by its Hamil-
tonian function h = 1
2m
p2, where p is its momentum and m its mass. Solving the equations
of motion, we find that momentum is constant, p(t) = p(0) and the position varies with
time as q(t) = q(0) + p(0)
m
t. Thus the dynamical curves are straight lines with gradient p(0)
m
,
intersecting the x-axis at q(0). It is straightforward to invert this relationship to obtain the
time as a function of position. Call this function τ , which depends on the position and the
initial data as follows




Holding the initial data fixed, we may easily see that the value of τ acts as a clock variable
since
















= t′′ − t′.
In other words, the function τ acts as a clock because it covaries with time through its
dependence on q(t), the position of the particle at time t.
In contrast, an event time varies with time through its dependence on the initial data
q(0), p(0). A simple example is provided by considering the time at which the particle crosses
a point in space x = 0, i.e. the value of t at the intersection of q(t) with the t-axis. At this
point, the value of the position variable q(t) = 0. So we have 0 = q(t) = q(0) + p
m
t.
Rearranging this expression gives a function of the initial data x=0 which returns the time
at which q(t) = 0,
x=0(q(0), p(0)) = − m
p(0)
q(0).
This is known as the time of arrival of the particle at the point x = 0. It is easy to see
that this expression, although it does not depend on the value of the time co-ordinate, will
covary with time through its dependence on the initial data,
x=0(q(t0), p(t0)) = − m
p(0)








= x=0(q(0), p(0))− t0.
This is intuitively exactly what we would expect: by shifting the initial data forward in time
by t′ we have reduced the time it takes the particle to reach the point x = 0 accordingly.
In contrast to a clock variable, we are not considering two points along the same dynamical
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trajectory, but rather comparing two dynamical trajectories related by a time translation so
that the second trajectory passes through the point (q(t0), p(t0)) at time t = 0 rather than
time t = t0.
2.3.2 Introducing Event Time Observables
Let us return to Hilgevoord’s (2005) rejoinder that time already has an appropriate represen-
tation in the theory as a parameter, and so the use of extended phase space is misguided. In
order to understand (and sidestep) these complaints it will be helpful to outline Hilgevoord’s
classification of the ways that time may arise in a physical theory (his Section 1.1). The main
distinction that Hilgevoord draws is between external time and internal times. External (or
co-ordinate) time t is the partner of the spatial co-ordinates x, y, z in a co-ordinatization of
the space-time in which the system is situated, (x, y, z, t). Hilgevoord contends that this role
for external time suggests that it should remain a parameter rather than a variable, and re-
gards the use of the extended phase space in classical mechanics as ‘unnatural’ (Hilgevoord,
2005, p. 36).
Internal times, by contrast, are to be found among
. . . the internal spatial and temporal variables connected with the specific physical
systems the theory aims to describe, such as the position variables of particles and
time variables of clocks. These variables are dynamical: they obey equations of
motion. . . . if we look for time operators we must look for internal times provided
by special physical systems, ‘clocks.’ (Hilgevoord, 2005, p. 31)
Thus, for Hilgevoord, the only valid motivation for defining time operators comes from the
canonical quantization of variables that describe physical clocks. However, this ignores a
large body of foundational work in quantum theory regarding what I will term event time
observables.
For example, in a recent review of the time-energy uncertainty relation Busch (2007)
describes another role for time in addition to external and internal (or intrinsic) time, which
he calls observable time. He motivates this definition as follows:
[T]he study of dynamics often involves experimental questions about the time
of an event, the time difference between events, or the duration of a process
associated with the object system. This [also] raises the quest for a treatment of
time as an observable. (Busch, 2007, p. 76)
31
Note that this motivation is quite distinct from the idea that external time should be pro-
moted to a variable (for whatever reason). In this case, we begin with an experimental
quantity—the time of an event, such as the moment that a Geiger counter clicks, or the
duration of a process, such as tunneling time—and demand that the theory provide a suit-
able prediction for the distribution of these events in time (or durations). This motivation
is, therefore, most closely related to Heisenberg’s notion of the time of a quantum jump,
regarded as an event occurring at a definite moment of time (discussed in Section 2.1.2).
However, there is an important difference since proponents of event time observables do not
purport to be measuring the time of a quantum jump, or collapse, or what have you. The
idea is that the events in question correspond to determinable outcomes of an experiment,
which are considered to be distributed in time rather than, say, space.
In this case, then, the analogy to position is a good one: an event time observable concerns
the position of an event in time just as the position observable concerns the position of an
event in space. In this connection it may help to visualize a standard diffraction experiment,
in which the experimentally determinable positions concern the location of a dot on, say, a
photoluminescent screen. In this context, the event time observable concerns the distribution
of times at which a dot appears (after emission), whereas the position observable concerns
the distribution of spatial locations at which a dot appears. In modern quantum theory,
to derive such a distribution from the system state we are required to define a suitable
observable, customarily a self-adjoint operator. In effect, Pauli’s Theorem serves to show
that this cannot be done in this case, and thus measurement of an event time observable
cannot correspond to measurement of a self-adjoint operator. It is towards this ‘problem of
time’ that this dissertation is addressed, culminating in a positive account of event times as
conditional probabilities in Chapter 8.
2.3.3 Event Times and Clocks in Quantum Mechanics
Although the distinction between clocks and event times is easily drawn and recognized
in classical mechanics, there has been an unfortunate tendency to conflate these cases when
considering quantum mechanics. The source of this confusion is often a failure to properly
distinguish between the Heisenberg and Schro¨dinger pictures when considering how an event
time observable should act on the state. In the Schro¨dinger picture, states vary with time
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and observables remain fixed; in the Heisenberg picture, observables vary with time and
states remain fixed. The equivalence between the two pictures can be expressed as follows,
where A is a Schro¨dinger picture observable and A(t) its Heisenberg picture equivalent:
〈ψt|Aψt〉 = 〈Utψ0|AUtψ0〉 = 〈ψ0|U−tAUtψ0〉 = 〈ψ0|A(t)ψ0〉.
Here ψ0 is the Heisenberg state of the system or, equivalently, the Schro¨dinger picture state
ψt at time t = 0. The unitary group of time translations Ut implements the time translation
symmetry of quantum mechanics, and it is through this group that the equivalence is defined.
When considering clock times, either picture will suffice since the value of the clock
observable can either be seen to vary as the state changes, or itself can be seen to vary with
time. Let Tc be a Schro¨dinger picture ideal clock observable, then through the corresponding
Heisenberg picture observable we may express its time covariance as follows:
Tc(t) = U−tTcUt = Tc + It.
However, if event times are of interest then the dependence on the state arises through depen-
dence on the initial data, not the time. Only the Heisenberg picture suffices to capture this
idea. Let E0 be an event time observable. Then 〈ψ0|E0ψ0〉 gives the probability distribution
for the time of the corresponding event, with ψ0 being the Heisenberg state of the system.
If we vary the initial state to ψt0 = Ut0ψ0 then we should expect to see a corresponding shift
in the distribution, 〈ψt0|E0ψt0〉 = 〈Ut0ψ0|E0Ut0ψ0〉. Calling this operator Et0 = U−t0E0Ut0,
we can see that Et0 = E0− t0I since the initial state ψt0 amounts to a reparameterization of
the family of Schro¨dinger picture states ψt = Utψ0 such that ψt0 now gives the state at time
t = 0. Thus we have,
E0(t) = U−tE0Ut = E0 − It,
and we see again that an event time observable covaries in the opposite sense. While this
relationship may be numerically identical to a corresponding relationship expressed in the
Schro¨dinger picture, the important conceptual dependence of the distribution on the initial
state is lost once the Heisenberg picture is abandoned. The value of an event time observable
does not covary with the external time co-ordinate, it only covaries with the initial state of
the system. Each entire evolution of the system through time corresponds to just one event
time distribution; thus there is no Schro¨dinger picture event time observable, which would
(in effect) have to be measured at an instant of time, and whose value would change with
time.
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2.3.4 The Quantum Free Particle
To illustrate this point, and the confusion that a failure to appreciate it may lead to, let us
consider the quantum equivalents of the free particle clock and event time functions. Here
we consider the (Heisenberg picture) position observable Q(t) and momentum observable
P (t) as the equivalents to the classical position and momentum q(t), p(t). The Hamiltonian
is H = 1
2m
P 2. As before, the momentum is constant, P (t) = P . The position varies in much
the same way,




where Ut = e
−iHt is the (one-parameter strongly continuous) unitary group generated by
the Hamiltonian H.27 Let us begin with the event time observable corresponding to a
quantization of the classical time of arrival,  = − m
p(0)
q(0). Simply transcribing the expression
in quantum form won’t suffice, since this would introduce an ordering ambiguity of Q and





This is commonly described as the time of arrival operator, and has been the subject of
much foundational study (and controversy) over the years.28 What concerns us here is the
behavior of this operator under time shifts of the Heisenberg state ψ0. It can easily be seen
that (formally, at least) we have29
Ta(t) = U−tTaUt = Ta − It,
as expected. Let us turn to the quantum version of the free particle quantum clock τ(t). By
transcription we have
T ′c = mP
−1 (Q(t)−Q(0)) = mP−1 (U−tQ(0)Ut −Q(0)) .





U−t(P−1Q(0) +Q(0)P−1)Ut − (P−1Q(0) +Q(0)P−1)
)
= Ta − Ta(t).
27We will consider these notions in quite a bit more detail in subsequent chapters. For now, the idea is
just to get enough on the table so we may discuss the quantization of a classical system.
28For more on the quantum time of arrival see in particular Chapter 5.
29This follows from the rule [Q, f(P )] = f ′(P )[Q,P ].
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But since Ta covaries with time translations, this merely says that Tc(t) = t. While this is
undoubtedly a function that covaries with time, it is in no sense a quantum observable.
This is not intended as a proof that there is something wrong with the idea of a quantum
clock, but rather an indication that we should be wary of blindly following a classical to
quantum transcription procedure. In this case, there is a legitimate quantum clock in the
vicinity, but it must be expressed in terms of expectation values rather than operators.




we can express the quantum clock corresponding to τ as follows:
〈Q(t′′)〉 − 〈Q(t′)〉 = 〈ψt′′ |Qψt′′〉 − 〈ψt′ |Qψt′〉 ≈ t′′ − t′,
where the accuracy of the clock will depend on the spread in position of the states ψt′ and
ψt′′ .
However, note that this clock works by taking the difference of two separate measurements
of position at distinct times, which (being incompatible) must be performed on different
systems in the ensemble. If a description in terms of a single system is required then the
effect of the initial measurement of position on the later measurement must be taken into
account. Considered as two separate measurements, the difference in the statistical averages
of the two measurements of Q will provide an approximate indication of the elapsed time.
But such a ‘clock’ is very little use in setting up a system of inertial co-ordinates, for example.
For that purpose, we would prefer a clock observable that can be measured on a single system,
at a particular time. Chapter 6 is devoted to the definition of such clock observables.
With the example of a free particle in mind, it is worth briefly discussing one of the
earliest attempts to define a quantum clock by Aharonov & Bohm (1961). They consider








This differs from Ta, the time of arrival, only by a difference in overall sign. This is enough
to ensure that TAB covaries in the direction of a clock, but that does not suffice to make




expression has no dependence on time, and so doesn’t describe a clock. A closely related
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classical clock is τc =
m
p
q(t), arrived at from our earlier expression by choosing q(0) = 0. But
the quantum analogue of this expression is again T ′c (as above) since in quantum mechanics
we cannot set an observable to zero by choosing a particular initial state.30
Finally, it has often been suggested that a particle falling freely in a uniform gravitational
field supplies a good example of a clock variable in classical and quantum mechanics (Busch
et al., 1994; Hilgevoord, 2002; Busch, 2007). However, the same argument as above shows
that the formal similarities between the two cases are illusory, and that such a system does
not provide a good example of a quantum clock, in the sense considered here.31 The classical
Hamiltonian is hg =
1
2m
p2−mgq. The equations of motion, therefore, are p(t) = p(0) +mgt




gt2. The following function provides a good clock, irrespective of





This has led some to suggest that, given a Hamiltonian H = 1
2m
P 2 − mgQ, the following





However, this ignores the dependence of the classical expression on p(0), which corresponds





(P (t)− P (0)).
But, as with the free particle clock, this involves incompatible measurements of P (0) and P (t)
which (obviously) cannot be performed at the same time, nor on the same system (without
taking into account the effect of the first measurement on the second). This is again an
ensemble level expression, which should properly be expressed in terms of the expectation
values 〈P (0)〉 , 〈P (t)〉 for measurements performed at different times on distinct systems.
2.4 LOCAL AND GLOBAL COVARIANCE IN CLASSICAL MECHANICS
The expressions for clocks and event times we have met so far have had the characteristic
that covariance with time holds for all values of t (if not all values of p). This can be seen,
30We may, however, set an expectation value to zero by this means.
31See Chapter 5 for further reasons to be suspicious of this purported clock observable.
36
therefore, as a global condition on such time functions. However, a periodic system, which
may make for an excellent clock, will nonetheless fail to provide a time function that meets
this global condition. For example, the phase of a simple harmonic oscillator provides a good
periodic clock, whose value faithfully tracks time through a single period of oscillation. The
same value of phase will, however, correspond to many values of the time parameter.





2), so that the dynamical motions of the particle describe a family of ellipses in phase
space. For a given value of energy, the state of the system at a time is a point lying
on the corresponding ellipse. The equations of motion yield q(t) = q(0) + p(t)
m
t, p(t) =
p(0) − mω20q(t)t, but in this form the periodic motion of the point about the ellipse is
obscured. This problem is displayed prominently by the following candidate time function:






We can see that τ is linear in time, τ˙ = {τ, hosc} = 1, but the range of this function is just
−pi/2 ≤ τ ≤ pi/2. There is, therefore, a sense in which this is a local time function, but not
a global time function.
Since the system is conservative, the energy of the particle is fixed, and we should be able
to describe the motion of the system state about the ellipse solely in terms of an angular co-
ordinate. We seek, that is, action-angle co-ordinates J, v such that the energy is proportional
to J and v˙ = const. With this in mind, we define J such that hosc = ω0J . Now define q, p in




sin v and p(J, v) =
√
2mω0J cos v, thus ensuring
that hosc = ω0J . This gives our canonical transformation, and we can see that the equations
of motion in the new canonical co-ordinates (J, v) read J˙ = 0, v˙ = ω0, as desired.
If we integrate these equations we have J(t) = J0, a constant, while v increases linearly
with time v(t) = v(0) + ω0t. However, the linearity of this relationship is illusory since the
position (or momentum) of the particle depends on v(t) through the cosine (or sine), which
gives the motion its natural periodicity of 2pi/ω0 seconds. Thus the same state (q(t), p(t))
will be occupied by the system at all times t′ = t + m2pi/ω0, with m ∈ Z. To make this
periodicity explicit, we may introduce complex ‘quadrature’ variables






q and P = 1/
√
2mω0Jp. This gives us a description of the motion in terms
of a real amplitude A =
√
ω0J and a complex phase e
iφ = cos v + i sin v = P + iQ, so that
φ(t) = v0 + ω0t.
This suggests another candidate time function, τosc(v(t); J0, v(0)) = −i ln(eiφ(t))/ω0. This
function has as its range −pi/ω0 ≤ τ ≤ pi/ω0, i.e. a full period of the motion (with units of
time). As the time t increases the function τ forms a characteristic sawtooth with gradient
one and period 2pi/ω0. However, there is a sense in which the discontinuity in this time
function is not matched by a discontinuity in phase. It is easy to see that at each time the
rate of change of the phase parameter φ is linear, φ˙ = ω0. The Poisson bracket of τ with
hosc provides the means to express this local covariance: τ˙ = {τ, hosc} = 1. It also provides
an expression of their conjugacy, analogous to the Heisenberg CCR in quantum mechanics.
This approach differs crucially from Hilgevoord’s approach to defining classical “time
variables” (Hilgevoord, 2002, 2005; Hilgevoord & Atkinson, 2011). The defining character-
istic of Hilgevoord’s time variables is a global covariance condition τHil → τHil + t, for all
t ∈ R. This global covariance condition implies local covariance, {τHil, hHil} = 1, but the
global condition is stronger since it is not satisfied by our τosc, while the local condition
is. It is, however, satisfied by φ, considered as a physical variable rather than a phase. In
fact, Hilgevoord (2005) suggests that we treat φ and J as the position and momentum of a
physical system (an ideal clock) instead of canonical co-ordinates that describe the periodic
motion of a harmonic oscillator.
In that case, we have as before {φ, J} = 1, but we can give this relation a global expression
in terms of the Hamiltonian vector fields Xφ, XJ associated with φ and J .
32 First consider
the Hamiltonian vector field of J , XJ = IdJ . At each point (φ, J) of our phase space we
have φ˙ = 1, while J˙ = 0. Evidently the dynamical motions of such a system are given by
curves φ(t) = φ(0) + t, and the corresponding one-parameter group that takes one along the
curves is just ht : φ→ φ+ t. The Hamiltonian vector field of φ, Xφ = Idφ yields φ˙ = 0 and
J˙ = 1. The dynamical motions of this system are J(s) = J(0) + s and the corresponding
one-parameter group is hs : J → J + s.
The Poisson bracket, considered as an operation on Hamiltonian vector fields, associates
with two vector fields Xφ, XJ a third vector field X{φ,J} = [Xφ, XJ ] = ω(Xφ, XJ), where ω
is the canonical symplectic form. In this case, the vector field just associates the unit vector
32See, e.g., Arnol’d (1989).
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with each point (φ, J). This provides a global expression of conjugacy, which describes
the mutual covariance of the two variables φ and J under the transformations associated
with their respective Hamiltonian vector fields. If we follow Hilgevoord in regarding J as a
physical Hamiltonian, then it describes a system with a variable φ whose value covaries with
time shifts along the dynamical curves, φ(t) = φ(0) + t. But this ideal clock has an odd
characteristic: its Hamiltonian is unbounded above and below.
As a conservative classical system, this is perhaps not too worrying a characteristic for
an ideal clock. We have already met such a system: the freely falling particle. But the
consequences of an unbounded quantum Hamiltonian are quite alarming, as was discussed
in Section 2.1.3. What concerns us here is the fact that many systems we care about do
not have an unbounded Hamiltonian, and yet we were able to define quite satisfactory time
functions. In the case of the free particle (Section 2.3.1), this function varied with time
linearly, but in the case of a harmonic oscillator the covariance was periodic. This is one
sense in which Hilgevoord demands global time covariance (i.e. covariance with time shifts
covering the whole real line, rather than just an interval). There is also a sense in which φ is
globally defined rather than locally: the Hamiltonian vector field generated by J is defined
at every point (φ, J) of the phase space.
Note how our time function τosc differs from φ, therefore, in two respects: τosc is undefined
at (q, p) = (0, 0), and, although τosc varies linearly with t at every other point, τosc does not
globally covary with t since its range is periodic. That is, as we go about a dynamical
curve (a closed ellipse) there is no way to continuously assign values in R to each point
in the curve (without a periodic discontinuity). On the other hand, the time function τ
we defined for the free particle is undefined when p = 0, but covaries with time globally.
Evidently a periodic time function cannot be said to covary with time globally, yet a globally
covariant time function must therefore increase linearly with t at every point at which it is
defined, {τ, h} = 1. This is an important distinction, but the two time functions also have
an important feature in common: they cannot be defined at every point of phase space.
This means that there is no Hamiltonian vector field associated with τ or τosc, where
a Hamiltonian vector field X assigns to every point x ∈ Q a vector in the tangent bundle
X(x) ∈ TQx. Clearly τ does not associate a vector with a point when p = 0, since then the
value of τ(q(t)) = m
p(0)
(q(t)− q(0)) is undefined. The fact that τ is not a smooth function
f : Q → R also disqualifies it from membership of the Hamiltonian functions, which are
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uniquely associated with a Hamiltonian vector field. This characteristic smoothness may be
taken to be the defining feauture of an observable of classical mechanics, in which case our
time functions are not time observables. Note how this is a consequence of the failure of
global definition, not global covariance.
This seems to be a general characteristic of the time functions we have met so far: they
are not Hamiltonian functions, i.e. smooth functions f : Q → R. This suggests that this
might be a generic feature of time functions associated with semi-bounded Hamiltonians.
The following result of Roberts (2014) shows that there is a sense in which this is indeed the
case.
Proposition 2.1. (Roberts). If τ and h are smooth functions f : Q → R such that {τ, h} = 1
then either h is unbounded or τ generates an incomplete vector field.
This proposition has the consequence that if h is semi-bounded then either there is no
such τ , or τ generates an incomplete vector field. A vector field is complete if every maximal
integral curve has the entire real line as its domain, otherwise it is incomplete.
This last clause is required to avoid potential counterexamples of the following sort, first
suggested by John D. Norton.33 Let h = ep and τ = q/ep. Then τ and h are smooth
functions with h semi-bounded and {τ, h} = 1. In this case, τ generates an incomplete
vector field. Hamilton’s equations return q˙ = −qe−p and p˙ = −e−p. The integral curves are
everywhere tangent to this vector field, and the following curves satisfy this requirement:
q(s) = q(q − s/ep), p(s) = ln(eP − s). We can see that the curve passing through (q, p) = 0
is incomplete since then q(s) = 0 and p(s) = ln(1 − s), which is defined for s < 1. More
generally, p(s) is not defined for s < e−p.
It is not clear what physical significance incompleteness could have since it concerns
the Hamiltonian vector field generated by τ rather than h. In addition, the semi-bounded
Hamiltonians we have examined in detail thus far have not had smooth time functions.
What the above proposition shows, then, is that cases where smooth time functions can be
associated with semi-bounded Hamiltonians are exceptional. To return to the case of the
free particle, the time function τ fails to be smooth as there is a stationary point at p = 0.
At such a point the Hamiltonian vector field of h vanishes, and an integral curve passing
through this point is constant, q(t) = q(0). It is this feature which prevents us from inverting
the equation of the curve to obtain a time function. This is a generic feature of stationary
33Personal communication.
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points, which rule out the possibility of defining a (monotonically increasing) time function
along such a curve.
The Hamiltonian h = ep was chosen so as to avoid the existence of stationary points, and
thus led to a smooth time function. The Hamiltonians we encounter in practice, however,
tend to involve the familiar p2 squared term associated with kinetic energy. A generic
Hamiltonian featuring such a term along with a finite potential term that depends linearly
on q, h(p, q) = (1/2m)p2 + V (q), is guaranteed to have stationary points, and therefore
does not possess an (everywhere defined) smooth time function. In the context of classical
mechanics, this is no obstacle to using the motion of such a system as a clock. So long as
the particular dynamical curve picked out by the motion of the system is a curve that does
not pass through a stationary point, the equations of motion will provide a time function.34
In classical mechanics, in fact, the existence of a locally valid time function in such
circumstances is essentially guaranteed. Consider a classical particle with a potential, h =
(1/2m)p2 + V (q). In this example energy is conserved since {h, h} = 0, and thus the
Hamiltonian is time independent.35 Therefore, at every point on a dynamical curve the
energy is the same h(q(0), p(0) = h(q(t), p(t) = E. Inverting the Hamiltonian, we have
p = ±√2m(E − V (q)). Hamilton’s equations yield p˙ = dV/dq, p˙ = p/m. Since we have a
definition of p in terms of E and V (q), we may integrate p˙ to obtain
τ(q(t)) = C ±
∫
dq√
2m(E − V (q)) .
Even if this integral cannot be performed, this serves as an implicit definition of a time
function which covaries along the dynamical curves.
This idea applies quite generally to systems in classical mechanics. Roberts (2014) argues
that the existence and uniqueness of solutions to ordinary differential equations imply that
any such Hamiltonian yields a locally defined time function, at least in the neighborhood of
a non-stationary point.
Proposition 2.2. (Roberts). If the integral curve generated by h passes through a point
x ∈ Q that is not a stationary point, then there exists a function τ : B → R such that
τ(ct) = τ(c0) + t in a neighborhood B of x.
34In quantum mechanics, however, these problems will become considerably more acute since in general a
system will not possess a definite value of momentum.
35Note that a smooth function f is associated with a first integral, and so a conservation law, if {f, h} = 0.
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Similarly, one could use Louville’s Theorem (Arnol’d, 1989, p. 283) to demonstrate that,
locally at least, there is always a transformation available to action-angle co-ordinates (so
long as the conditions of the theorem are met).36 The defining characteristic of an angle
variable is its linear evolution with time, φ˙ = ω0, and so these are good local time functions.
This, therefore, provides a generalization appropriate to our earlier discussion of the harmonic
oscillator.
This discussion of the situation regarding time functions in classical mechanics has served
to illustrate some of the subtleties that arise in quantum mechanics, without the additional
conceptual difficulties that the quantum transition brings. We will see that the distinction
between local time covariance (in terms of the Possion bracket of two functions on phase
space) and global time covariance (in terms of the Possion bracket of Hamiltonian vector
fields) is replicated in the distinction between the Heisenberg and Weyl Canonical Commu-
tation Relations. If classical observables are required to be smooth functions f : Q → R then
Proposition 2.1 can be thought of in analogy to Pauli’s Theorem. There are also methods of
generating generic symmetric quantum time operators that can be thought of as analogous
to Proposition 2.2. However, the interpretative and formal differences that arise in quantum
theory are important, and reasoning by classical analogy will only take one so far.
36To apply Louiville’s Theorem requires that a system defined on a 2n-dimensional phase space has n
independent first integrals in involution, i.e. associated with (independent) smooth functions fn such that
{fn, fm} = 0 for m 6= n. In case the phase space is of the form R2n, the dynamics of the system are confined
to a sub-manifold of the phase space where the dynamical motions describe a torus invariant under the
Hamiltonian flow. In that case, the angle variables provide ideal periodic time functions. More generally,
there always exists a canonical transformation to action-angle variables in the region of a point on the
sub-manifold.
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3.0 ORDINARY QUANTUM MECHANICS, AND BEYOND
This chapter introduces some crucial elements of the formalism of modern quantum me-
chanics, within which our further investigations into time and time operators will take place.
This presentation is not intended to be complete, and its purpose is rather to highlight some
of the more specialized formal and interpretative apparatus that successive chapters will
depend on, or bring into question.1 The particular focus is the Spectral Theorem, and its
role in securing a probabilistic interpretation of the state of a quantum system. The interest
for us here lies in the use of the Spectral Theorem to justify the common restriction of the
observables of the system to just the set of self-adjoint operators.
Put roughly, Pauli’s Theorem (the topic of Chapter 4) prohibits the definition of self-
adjoint time operators. However, as Chapters 5 and onward will show, it does not thereby
prevent one from defining time operators that fail to be self-adjoint while having other
desirable properties. The extent to which Pauli’s Theorem serves as a prohibition on the
existence of time observables, then, will depend on the extent to which the set of observables
of a system must be limited to operators that are self-adjoint. I will argue here for the
emerging consensus that this restriction is unnecessary, i.e. that the grounds for this in
principle limitation on the observables of a system are less firm than was once thought, and
that there is good reason to suppose that a full account of the empirical consequences of
quantum mechanics requires a richer set of operators.
With this restriction removed, Pauli’s Theorem is less of a prohibition on the existence
of time observables and more of a restriction of their form, in which case there is reason
to believe that the time operators of later chapters may have empirical significance despite
their non-self-adjoint status. In turn, evidence of their empirical significance would also
underline the necessity of expanding the set of observables to include these operators which,
1The sort of textbook treatment that lies in the background here is exemplified by the classics of Jauch
(1968) and Jordan (1969), or more recently, say, Sakurai (1994) and Ballentine (1998).
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of necessity (i.e. as a consequence of Pauli’s Theorem), cannot be self-adjoint. This concludes
this brief preview of upcoming attractions.
Let us now turn to the quantum mechanics immortalized in textbooks of the recent
past, what I will term Ordinary Quantum Mechanics (often called the Dirac-von Neumann
formalism). Ordinary Quantum Mechanics (hereafter Ordinary QM) is characterized by the
following commitments:
State Space The pure states are the vector states of unit norm a (complex, separable)
Hilbert space ψ ∈ H (equivalently, the elements of the projective Hilbert space PH,
i.e., the one-dimensional subspaces (rays) of H.) The state of a system can be mixed,
in which case the state is given by a density operator ρ =
∑
iwi|ψi〉〈ψi|.2
Observables The observables of a system are the self-adjoint operators on H, or equiva-
lently the set of Projection Valued Measures (PVMs). By the Spectral Theorem (below)
every self-adjoint operator A uniquely corresponds to a PVM PA : ∆ 7→ PA(∆), where
∆ ∈ B(R) are the Borel subsets of R.
Dynamics The dynamics of a system are given by a self-adjoint operator H. H is the
unique generator a unitary group Ut = e
iHt parameterized by time t.3 If the state of
the system is ρ at time t = 0 then the state at any time t is ρt = UtρU−t (Schro¨dinger
Picture). Equivalently, if an observable at time t = 0 is given by the operator A then
the observable at any time is At = U−tAUt (Heisenberg Picture).
Predictions The expectation value of an observable A in the state ρ is given by the trace
〈A〉ρ = tr [ρA], which in the case of a pure state reduces to 〈A〉 = 〈ψ|Aψ〉 = |Aψ〉|2.
The probability measure pAρ = tr [P
A(∆)ρ] describes the results of an experiment in
which A is measured.
State Update In situations where an observable A is known to take an eigenvalue ak, the
state is to updated by means of the corresponding projection Pk according to the
von-Neumann-Lu¨ders Rule, ρ→ ρ˜ = PkρPk/(tr [ρPk]).
2Here |ψ〉〈ψ| is the one-dimensional projection onto the ray spanned by ψ. A state is pure if and only if it is
not mixed, which is to say that a pure state cannot be written as sum of projections λ|ψ1〉〈ψ1|+(1−λ)|ψ2〉〈ψ2|
with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1.
3Stone’s Theorem guarantees the converse, such that the specification of a one-parameter unitary group
Ut serves to uniquely defines a corresponding self-adjoint operator H.
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These commitments are meant to distill the essence of the consensus that emerged from
the construction of Dirac’s Transformation Theory, following the work of von Neumann that
grounded those results in a Hilbert space setting, and thus functional analysis. These formal
commitments are not without their empirical, mathematical, and theoretical justifications,
and they do fit together into a more or less coherent whole (bracketing the usual concerns
about their ability to return a consistent description of the measurement process).
However, there is a sense in which quantum mechanics provides the most compelling ex-
ample of a case of theory choice that is underdetermined by the empirical evidence: compet-
ing interpretations of non-relativistic quantum theory differ radically in their metaphysical
commitments while accommodating the same empirical evidence and supplying the same
empirical predictions, at least up to current experimental capabilities and interests. Deter-
mining the precise theoretical referent of “quantum mechanics” is thus somewhat problem-
atic, and in making a particular choice one is apt to take a stance on issues of interpretation
that remain controversial.
In starting with Ordinary QM I am attempting to keep matters as interpretation neutral
as one could hope, but there remains some degree of arbitrariness in this choice. In its favor,
there is generally an asymmetric relationship between other formalisms for quantum theory
and the Hilbert space formalism of Ordinary QM, in that rival interpretations are required
to recover the results of Ordinary QM but not vice versa. There is also a sense in which
Ordinary QM fails to take a stand on the metaphysical issues with which other formulations
are concerned. This may be thought to be a defect, philosophically speaking, but it is also
an asset since it thereby remains interpretation neutral (to some extent).
3.1 WHY (NOT) ORDINARY QUANTUM MECHANICS?
The point of view I will take in this chapter is that quantum mechanics is first and foremost
a theory of experimental results, and that before discussing matters of interpretation it is
necessary to arrive a formalism that can provide detailed predictions for any possible exper-
imental determinable quantity. This means that quantum mechanics will give predictions
relative to a particular experimental arrangement, which minimally consists of a state prepa-
ration and a registration device. Ideally, the state preparation serves to produce a unique
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state that characterizes the relevant properties of the identically prepared individual systems
which together constitute the experimental ensemble. The registration device provides some
means to discriminate between various outcomes of the experiment by means of a permanent
record.
Minimally, then, quantum mechanics should provide the means to describe the results
of these experiments in terms of: (i) a language containing propositions that describe the
possible outcomes of an experiment, (ii) a set of probability measures over those outcomes,
and (iii) laws that serve to derive those probability measures from the system state. Since
the theory is inherently probabilistic, the validity of its predictions is to be evaluated in
terms of the statistics of the results of an ensemble, i.e., by consideration of the limit of the
relative frequencies of experimental outcomes.4 Nonetheless, we will take it as axiomatic
that the system state applies to the description of individual systems, and thus describes
single case probabilities, although this is itself somewhat controversial.5
Mathematically, we define the possible experimental outcomes in terms of a measurable
space (Σ,X ), where X is a σ-algebra defined on Σ, a nonempty set. An assignment of
probabilities to each outcome X ∈ X is given by a map p : X → R. This leads to the
following definition.
Definition 3.1. The triple (Σ,X , p) is a probability space and p is a (generalized) probability
measure if the following conditions are met:
1. p(X) ≥ 0 for all X ∈ X (positivity)
2. p(Σ) = 1 (unity)
3. p(∪iXi) =
∑
i p(Xi) for countable, mutually disjoint families Xi (σ-additivity)
These probabilities are to be determined empirically by conducting an appropriate series
of experiments, holding the state preparation and the entire experimental arrangement con-
stant. If quantum mechanics is to be an empirically adequate probabilistic theory, then it
needs to provide the correct probabilities in any given experimental situation.6
4This is the minimal or operational interpretation of (e.g.) Busch et al. (1996, p. 4).
5This should be read as an attempt to provide as an account of the sort of empirical description that,
minimally, any interpretation of the theory must ultimately provide. An interpretation of quantum mechanics
being an account of the theory that goes beyond the mere prediction of experimental results.
6The treatment here owes much to that of Busch et al. (1995a).
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The way that this is done in Ordinary QM is through the trace prescription. The trace
prescription says that the quantum state provides an assignment of probabilities to the
experimental outcomes (represented by an appropriate set of operators) through the trace.
That is,
pρ(X) = tr [E(X)ρ], (3.1)
where ρ is the density operator representing the state (a trace-class operator of unit trace),
and E(X) is the operator representing the experimental outcome X.7 To ensure that pρ is
a valid probability measure, we need to lay down some conditions that the operators E(X)
must satisfy.
First, since ρ has unit trace, we require that E(Σ) = I, which ensures that Pr(Σ) = 1.
Similarly, to ensure that Pr(X) ≥ 0 we require that E(X) is a positive operator, E(X) ≥ O.8
The final condition we need to ensure is σ−additivity, which is achieved as below, which
provides the definition of a (normalized) Positive Operator Valued Measure (POVM).
Definition 3.2. A normalized Positive Operator Valued Measure (POVM) E is a map from
a measurable space (Σ,X ) to the bounded operators on a Hilbert space E : X → B(H) such
that
1. E(X) ≥ O for all X ∈ X (positivity)





iE(Xi) (in the weak operator topology) for countable, mutually disjoint
families of Xi (weak σ−additivity)
So long as the E(X) are elements of a POVM, then, the trace prescription provides a
probability measure. Considered together as a POVM, the E(X) provide a description of
the experimental outcomes in terms of the Hilbert space associated with the system. The
requirements suffice to determine that E(X) is a self-adjoint operator with spectrum [0, 1]
since, therefore, I ≥ E(X) ≥ O.
Ordinary QM associates experimental arrangements with the measurement of an observ-
able, represented by a self-adjoint operator on H. Historically, this association was estab-
lished by von Neumann’s Spectral Theorem, which established that unbounded operators
7The trace of an operator F in H is tr [F ] = ∑k〈ek|(F ∗F )1/2ek〉, where {ek} is an orthonormal basis for
H. Essentially, an operator is of trace class if its trace is finite.
8An operator A is positive, A ≥ O if 〈ψ|Aψ〉 ≥ 0 for all ψ ∈ H. If bounded, A is therefore self-adjoint.
This defines a partial order on (bounded) self-adjoint operators A,B, i.e. A ≥ B if and only if A−B ≥ O.
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(such as position and momentum) could be given a so-called spectral resolution in terms of
projections on H.9 A spectral resolution is a POVM, but it is a POVM of a special sort
known as a Projection Valued Measure (PVM).
Definition 3.3. A Projection Valued Measure (PVM) P is a POVM, P : X → L(H), where
L(H) is the lattice of projections of a Hilbert space H, such that
4. E(X)E(Y ) = E(Y )E(X) = 0 for all X, Y such that X ∩ Y = ∅ (orthogonality)
This extra condition is enough to ensure that if E(X) is a element of a PVM then it
is an orthogonal projection, E(X)2 = E(X).10 The key distinction is that the elements
of a PVM must associate disjoint measurable sets with mutually orthogonal subspaces of
H. This distinction is important since it separates POVMs that have spectral resolutions
(corresponding to a self-adjoint operator) and those that do not. It also underlies the common
interpretation of the E(X) as potential properties of a system, which relies on just those
characteristics that separate a PVM from a POVM. Namely, (i) repeatability (from E(X)2 =
E(X)), and (ii) mutual exclusivity (from E(X)E(Y ) = E(Y )E(X) = 0 if X ∩ Y = ∅).11
Theorem 3.1. [Spectral Theorem (von Neumann)] Let A be an (unbounded) operator self-
adjoint on a dense domain DA ⊆ H. Then there exists a unique Projection Valued Measure






for all φ, ψ ∈ DA, where PAλ = PA((−∞, λ]), λ ∈ R.
Conversely, given a PVM PA : B(R)→ L(H) there exists a unique self-adjoint operator




λ2 d〈ψ|PAλ ψ〉 <∞.
The Spectral Theorem, then, shows that if the observables of the theory are restricted to
the set of self-adjoint operators, as by Ordinary QM, that this amounts to a restriction of
the allowed POVMs to just the set of PVMs PA.12 This means that the trace prescription
9See Duncan & Janssen (2013) for some historical background.
10This is because bounded positive operators are automatically self-adjoint.
11Note again that these are logically equivalent if E(X) is an element of a POVM.
12See Teschl (2009, Theorem 3.7, p. 97) for a proof.
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serves to associate a probability measure to a measurement of an observable A (a self-adjoint
operator) in any state ρ (a density operator) as follows
pAρ (∆) = tr [P
A(∆)ρ],
where ∆ ∈ B(R) is a Borel subset.
The empirical adequacy of Ordinary Quantum Mechanics thus amounts to the following
claim: for every experimental situation there exists an observable A (a self-adjoint operator)
such that (R,B(R), pAρ ) correctly describes the probabilities for the experimental outcomes
∆ ∈ B(R) for a system in the state ρ.
One might well wonder to what extent some other rule could serve to provide these
probabilities from the state ρ, and thus provide a competitor to Ordinary QM. Assuming that
the experimental outcomes are to correspond to elements of the lattice of projections, P ∈
L(H), it turns out that the trace prescription provides a unique assignment of probabilities
(for a Hilbert space of dimension greater than 2).
Theorem 3.2 (Gleason). Let µ : L(H) → [0, 1] be a (generalized) probability measure such
that
1. 0 = µρ(0) ≤ µ(P ) for all P ∈ L(H),





i µ(Pi) for mutually orthogonal Pi
Then, so long as dim(H) ≥ 3, every such probability measure µ defines a positive trace class
operator ρ with unit trace such that µρ(P ) = tr [ρP ] and, conversely, every such operator ρ
uniquely determines a (generalized) probability measure on L(H), µρ(P ) = tr [ρP ].
Gleason’s Theorem has rightly been regarded as the foundation underlying the use of
the trace prescription in Ordinary QM. It says that, through the trace prescription (and so
long as the Hilbert space has dimensionality greater than two), any probability measure on
the lattice of projections of a system uniquely determines the state of the system, and every
state of the system uniquely determines a (generalized) probability measure on the lattice
of projections.
The trace prescription, then, serves to determine the possible states of a quantum system.
The trace A 7→ tr [A] ∈ R is a positive linear functional on H, the trace functional. Let us
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denote the set of trace class operators by T (H) and the positive trace class operators with
trace one by S(H). The one-dimensional projections |ψ〉〈ψ| are positive operators of trace
one which are the extremal elements of S(H), a convex set. Any element of S(H) may be
expressed as a convex combination of these extremal elements, i.e. as a mixed state, so that




From here, we are in easy reach of the idea that a pure state |ψ〉〈ψ| (which cannot
be written as a linear combination ρ = (1 − λ)|ψ1〉〈ψ1| + λ|ψ2〉〈ψ2|) must correspond to a
ray, the one-dimensional subspace onto which |ψ〉〈ψ| projects. From there the association
with a unit vector ψ ∈ H such that 〈ψ|ψ〉 = 1 quickly follows, and thence to the Born rule
Prψ(∆) = 〈ψ|P (∆)ψ〉. There is thus a clear sense in which the probabilistic interpretation of
quantum mechanics according to Ordinary QM corresponds to the first clear interpretive rule
of quantum mechanics, as it arose in the late 1920s. But Gleason’s Theorem also provides
a sense in which the minimal interpretation of quantum mechanics as a probabilistic theory,
combined with the restriction of state valuations to the projections, appears to compel the
use of both the trace prescription.
Nonetheless, one can still question whether or not the trace prescription suffices to de-
termine that the experimental outcomes must be described by elements of the lattice of
projections L(H). That is, one can ask: is there a sense in which the operator that appears
in the trace prescription alongside ρ must be a projection if it is to provide an appropriate
probability measure? Remarkably, the answer to this question is no, since (as we have seen)
POVMs as well as PVMs suffice to associate a state ρ with a probability measure through
the trace prescription. Correspondingly, Busch (2003) shows that a state valuation on the
effects E(H) (the set of positive operators E such that I ≥ E ≥ O) suffices to determine
a (further generalized) probability measure through the trace prescription, which in turn
suffices to uniquely determine a density operator.
Theorem 3.3 (Busch). Let ν : E(H) → [0, 1] be a (generalized) probability measure such
that
1. 0 = νρ(0) ≤ ν(E) for all E ∈ E(H),






i ν(Ei) for countable families of Ei such that
∑
iEi ≤ I.13
Then each probability measure νρ determines a unique state ρ ∈ S(H) such that ν(A) =
tr [ρE] for all E ∈ E(H) and, conversely, every state ρ determines a unique probability
measure ν(E) = tr [ρE].
Whereas a projection P has spectrum {0, 1}, an effect E is a positive operator with
spectrum [0, 1]. A positive operator A ≥ O is an operator such that 〈φ|Aφ〉 ≥ 0 for all
φ ∈ A. The (bounded) self-adjoint operators on H are partially ordered by the relation
≥, where A ≥ B ↔ A − B ≥ O. The projection operators are also self-adjoint, and are
thus partially ordered by ≥. For projections, this partial order coincides with the partial
order of subspace inclusion, defined by the range of the projection. (Note that an effect is
a projection exactly when it is idempotent, E2 = E.) However, positive operators need not
be defined by their range, and the set of effects E(H) = {A ∈ B(H) : O ≤ A ≤ I} does not
have the structure of a lattice.
Nonetheless, the set of effects provides a straightforward generalization of the lattice
of projections, in the sense the state space S(H) naturally defines probability measures
ν : E(H)→ [0, 1] through the trace prescription via Busch’s Theorem. Given the availability
of this conservative extension of Ordinary QM, we are apt to ask: why should Ordinary
QM restrict the observables that can be measured in an experiment to the set of PVMs
rather than the POVMs? This question can be made more pressing by considering that
the empirical adequacy of Ordinary QM (as stated above) requires that every experimental
arrangement can be described in terms of PVMs.
That is, there is a sense in which Ordinary QM is empirically adequate only if the
PVMs suffice to describe every experimental arrangement by an assignment of projections
to possible experimental outcomes. If state valuations on the effects required to secure the
empirical adequacy of the theory, then this is evidence that the observables of Ordinary
QM are overly restricted. This result would not be too alarming, however, since in that
case the theory could be made empirically adequate simply by expanding the definition
13Note that in case E2 = E for all Ei then these conditions reduce to those of Gleason’s Theorem, as they
must. Also note that there is some subtlety required here in understanding the relationship of the probability
measure given here to that of Gleason’s Theorem. While Gleason’s Theorem returns a probability measure
defined on some subset of E(H) (i.e. L(H)) the probability measure supplied by Busch’s Theorem is defined
on all of E(H). Further note that, unlike Gleason’s Theorem, Busch’s Theorem applies to a Hilbert space of
two dimensions. It is also considerably easier to prove.
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of the observables of the theory to include the effects, i.e. the POVMs. Nonetheless, this
observation should serve to illustrate to the philosopher of science just what is at stake here.
The recent consensus in the foundations of physics community is, it seems, that POVMs
are required to reach a description of all possible quantum experiments. Following the
development of the POVM formalism by Davies & Lewis (1970), Holevo (1973), Kraus
(1983), Ludwig (1983) and others in response to various concerns in quantum measurement
theory, it has been convincingly argued that even canonical quantum experiments, such as
the original demonstration of discrete electron spin by Stern and Gerlach, require the use
of POVMs for their description.14 This state of affairs does not obtain so widely among
philosophers of physics, who have perhaps preferred to idealize away such difficulties.15 But
some of the concerns that might lead one to to the importance of POVMs have less to do
with the messiness of empirical fact and more to do with the abstract characterization of the
possible quantum states of a quantum system.
The key observation here is that the space of states S(H) is convex, whereas the lattice
of projections L(H) does not form a convex set. However, the set of effects E(H) is convex,
in the sense that if E1, E2 are effects then E3 = λE1 + (1− λ)E2, with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1, is another
effect. This makes the set of effects the natural partner of the state space S(H) in a sense
that the lattice of projections is not. The ‘naturalness’ of this partnership can be given a
precise mathematical characterization, by observing the set of effects is dual to the state
space in the following sense.
To see this, we consider the state space in a more abstract setting. The trace class
operators T (H) form a real Banach space V under the trace norm.16 The states S(H) form
a positive norm closed cone K in V . The dual of V is a Banach space V ∗ which is isomorphic
to B(H), and the dual cone K∗ is isomorphic to the set of positive operators B(H)+.17 This
duality leads again to an association of probabilities with POVMs rather than PVMs.
14See (Busch et al., 1996, pp. 165–174) for this example.
15Here I cannot help but quote Ruetsche’s memorable aside on the sociology of philosophers of physics in
the late twentieth century, whose “treatments (generally) address foundational questions that can be raised
in the context of finite dimensional Hilbert spaces . . . Indeed, for a dark and macho while, the main game
in philosophy of quantum mechanics was to find the smallest Hilbert space in which a certain foundational
point—a “no go” result—could be made.” (Ruetsche, 2011, §3.1). In this connection, it is worthy of note
that the routine use of POVMs in quantum information theory takes place in the finite-dimensional context.
However, there is evidence of a recent groundswell of recognition that the use of POVMs in measurement
contexts may have implications for the philosophy of physics, see, e.g., (Dickson, 2006; Wallace, 2007).
16See (Holevo, 2011, pp. 63–68). The trace class operators can also be thought of as products of Hilbert-
Schmidt operators, which form a Hilbert space.
17See Davies & Lewis (1970) for details.
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Consider the outcome space (Σ,X ) belonging to a particular experiment. The trace
prescription associates every X ∈ X with a positive number pρ(X) ∈ [0, 1] representing the
probability of outcome X in the state ρ. Thus X 7→ pρ(X) corresponds to a linear functional
on K which represents the state valuation for the experiment to which the outcome space
corresponds. Assuming that pρ is convex linear in the state space, so that pλρ1+(1−λ)ρ2 =
λpρ1+(1−λ)pρ2 , then pρ may be extended to a linear functional on T (H) which lies in V ∗ and
which is of the form pρ(X) = tr [ρE(X)], where E(X) is a positive operator O ≤ E(X) ≤ I,
i.e. E(X) ∈ E(H).18 This leads to the following result.
Theorem 3.4 (Davies & Lewis). Let pρ ∈ V ∗ by a state valuation on (Σ,X ) such that
1. 0 ≤ pρ(X),





i pρ(Xi) for countable families of disjoint Xi with convergence in the
weak∗ topology of V ∗.
Then X 7→ E(X) is a normalized POVM.19
What this shows is that while every PVM uniquely determines a state valuation pρ
through the trace, the converse does not hold: a state valuation in general determines a
POVM rather than a PVM. This is, in effect, a restricted form of Busch’s Theorem that serves
to associate a particular experiment with outcome space (Σ,X ) to a POVM X 7→ E(X).
Again, this strongly suggests that the entire set of effects is required to fully spell out the
empirical consequences of quantum mechanics rather than its restriction to the lattice of
projections L(H). Since the set of PVMs is a proper subset of the POVMs, the existence
of experiments whose outcome space does not correspond to a PVM also demonstrates
(through the Spectral Theorem) that there are experiments that do not correspond to the
measurement of an operator self-adjoint on the system’s Hilbert space.20
18See (Kraus, 1983, pp. 21–30) for details of this procedure.
19See (Davies & Lewis, 1970, Thm. 1) or (Holevo, 1973, Prop. 3.2).
20The question remains, however, of whether those experiments really do involve the measurement of an
operator that is not self-adjoint. They could correspond to the joint or repeated measurement of a collection
of self-adjoint operators, or an operator self-adjoint on a distinct Hilbert space (of, e.g., a supersystem), or
of something else. In Chapter 7 I argue that Pauli’s Theorem creates difficulties for the interpretation of
event time measurements in this manner.
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3.2 POVMS AND THE SPECTRAL THEOREM
While von Neumann’s Spectral Theorem provided a correspondence between the set of self-
adjoint operators and the projection operators (to which he had given a probability inter-
pretation through the trace) he was quick to note that not all symmetric operators could be
given a spectral representation.21 This problem cannot arise in a finite dimensional Hilbert
space since there every symmetric operator has a spectral resolution. Let’s briefly see how
this works. We need a n-dimensional complex vector space V equipped with an inner product
(this is also a Hilbert space since it is therefore complete). A linear operator A : V → V is
defined by an n×n matrix of scalars ajk, which are in general complex. Taking the adjoint A†
of the operator results in a new matrix with elements a∗kj. A is self-adjoint (or Hermitian or
symmetric) if A = A†, that is if ajk = a∗kj. Every Hermitian operator is normal, A
†A = AA†,
and a unitary operator U is one whose adjoint is equal to its inverse U †U = I = UU †,
u∗kjujk = ujkukj
∗ = 1. In this context, we have the following ‘baby’ spectral theorem.
Proposition 3.1 (Spectral Theorem (Finite Dimensional)22). Let V be an n-dimensional
complex vector space with an inner product (φ, ψ). Let A be an n× n self-adjoint (normal)
matrix. Then there exists an orthonormal basis for V consisting of eigenvectors of A with
real (complex) eigenvalues ai. Equivalently, A is unitarily diagonalizable, i.e., there exists a
unitary matrix U such that U †AU is a diagonal matrix with ai as its diagonal entries.
Let’s put this result into bra-ket notation. If we denote the eigenvectors of an operator








Where on the right the orthonormal basis of eigenvectors form a resolution of the iden-












This resolution of the identity also defines a Projection Valued Measure, essentially just the
map between the eigenvalues ai and the projections |ai〉〈ai|. In a introductory physics class,
21See (Von Neumann, 1955, ft. 105).
22See, e.g., (Riesz & Sz.-Nagy, 1990, p. 260).
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this may be as far as exposition of the spectral theorem goes. This attitude is encapsulated by
the following passage, taken from the notes of a contemporary graduate quantum mechanics
course:
We are, as usual, employing the rules for finite-dimensional Hilbert spaces, relying
on the experts to assure us that they will (usually, anyway) work for the infinite-
dimensional cases we may be interested in.23
The cases of interest here will be, unfortunately, just those cases where the rules for finite-
dimensional Hilbert spaces fail to work out.
In a finite-dimensional (complex) Hilbert space, there is essentially no distinction to be
drawn between the set of self-adjoint operators and the symmetric operators; they amount to
precisely the same thing. In an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space, however, the two notions
come apart. This is because of the existence of unbounded operators, which are often of
vital importance for quantum theory. An operator B is bounded on a domain DB ⊆ H if
||Bψ||2 = 〈Bψ|Bψ〉 < k||ψ|| for some k ∈ R+ for all ψ ∈ DB.
The domain of a bounded operator can always be extended to the entire Hilbert space. That
is, if B is an operator bounded by k on domain DB then there exists an extension B′ ⊇ B
bounded by k with domain H such that B′ agrees with B on DB ⊆ H. This means that
there is no need to speak of a domain of a bounded operator, since it can always be extended
to the whole space.
Of particular interest to us are the symmetric operators. An operator is symmetric on a
domain DA ⊆ H if 〈ψ|Aψ〉 = 〈Aφ|ψ〉 for all φ, ψ ∈ DA. If A is bounded and symmetric then
there exists an interval [m,M ] ⊂ R such that m is the greatest lower bound m||ψ|| < ||Aψ||
and M is the least upper bound M ||ψ|| > ||Aψ||, for all ψ ∈ H. Then A has a spectral
representation as follows
Theorem 3.5 (Spectral Theorem (Bounded)24). Corresponding to a bounded symmetric
operator B in a Hilbert space H there is a spectral family of projections PAλ on the interval





for all φ, ψ ∈ H.
23The author will remain nameless.
24See, e.g., (Riesz & Sz.-Nagy, 1990, p. 275). This theorem was first proved by Hilbert, thus justifying the
appellation ‘Hilbert space’.
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The Spectral Theorem of von Neumann achieves the same feat for unbounded self-adjoint
operators, but the properties of being symmetric and being self-adjoint are not coextensive.
To see why, first observe the following remarkable fact that only bounded symmetric opera-
tors can be defined on the entire Hilbert space.
Theorem 3.6 (Heillinger & Toeplitz25). Every symmetric operator B in H such that Bψ ∈
H for all ψ ∈ H is necessarily bounded.
This implies that any unbounded symmetric operator A cannot be defined on the entire
Hilbert space, i.e. DA ⊂ H, and so there can be no extension of an unbounded symmetric
operator to another such operator, everywhere defined.
For a brief insight into the difficulties that ensue, consider the fact that every closed
symmetric operator A has a matrix representation aij = a
∗
ji on an orthonormal (countably
infinite) set of basis vectors taken from its domain. So far, so much like the finite dimensional
case. But if A is unbounded then there is no guarantee that the application of a unitary ma-
trix uij will result in an operator in H. That is, the matrix a′rs = u∗riaijujs will not necessarily
meet the necessary condition for defining a closed symmetric operator,
∑∞
i=1 |aij|2 <∞. And
even if it does, the symmetric operator A′ that results may have a domain DA′ such that
DA′ ∩ DA = ∅ (Akheizer & Glazman, 1993, p. 101–102).
I introduce these concerns here to highlight to following issue: given an operator A
symmetric and unbounded on a domain DA ⊂ H it is a often non-trivial matter to determine
whether or not A has an extension to a self-adjoint operator on H (and, indeed, it may not).
For an unbounded symmetric operator A to be self-adjoint, its domain must be equal to the
domain of its adjoint, DA = DA† . If the domain of A is dense in H,26 then it has an adjoint
operator A† whose domain is closed, DA† = DA† , but it is not therefore self-adjoint, A = A†,
since it may be the case that DA ⊂ DA† .27
The reason that this issue becomes particularly pressing is that, in general, a POVM
determines a symmetric operator, which thus does not necessarily have a self-adjoint exten-
sion.
25See, e.g., (Riesz & Sz.-Nagy, 1990, p. 296).
26A domain D ⊂ H is dense if for all ψ ∈ H there exists a sequence of vectors ψn ∈ D such that ψn → ψ.
27See, e.g., (Jordan, 1969, pp. 30–31).
28See Werner (1986).
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Proposition 3.2 (Werner28). Let EA : B(R) → E(H) be a POVM. Then EA defines a




λ2 d〈ψ|EAλ ψ〉 <∞,
where EAλ = E
A((−∞, λ]).
The problem of deciding whether or not an unbounded symmetric operator has a self-
adjoint extension (or many) was a central concern of von Neumann’s original proof of the
spectral theorem. Roughly, von Neumann’s method of proof was to first demonstrate that
a unitary operator always has a spectral representation, and then show that a self-adjoint
operator A always corresponds to a unitary operator UA, defined by the Cayley transform
UA = (A− iI)(A+ I)−1.
We can see that if A is symmetric then UA is an isometry, U
†
AUA = I, but if A is in addition
self-adjoint then U †A = U
−1
A , i.e. UA is unitary. This provides a necessary and sufficient
condition for A to be self-adjoint since the converse is also true: if A is a symmetric operator
and UA is unitary (and thus defined on the whole of H) then A is self-adjoint (Riesz &
Sz.-Nagy, 1990, pp. 321–326). But not all symmetric operators are self-adjoint. This can be
seen as follows.
Let A be a closed symmetric operator with dense domain DA ⊂ H and range R(A) =
{Aψ ∈ H : ψ ∈ DA}. Then R(A − i) and R(A + i) are closed linear subspaces of H. The
dimensions of their orthogonal complements, m = dimR(A− i)⊥ and n = dimR(A+ i)⊥,
are called the deficiency indices of A. Evidently m,n may take any non-negative integer
value, including +∞. Since UA is unitary only if its domain is H, and UA is isometric if A
is symmetric, then for A to be self-adjoint we must have R(A + i) = R(A − i) = H, i.e.
m = n = 0. That is, a closed symmetric operator A is self-adjoint if and only if its deficiency
indices are (0, 0). In case A is symmetric but not self-adjoint UA will be isometric but not
unitary.
We now consider extensions of A; closed symmetric operators A′ ⊇ A. The inverse Cayley
transform defines a symmetric operator,
A = i(I+ UA)(I− UA)−1,
and thus the question of whether A has a self-adjoint extension (or many) reduces to the
question of whether UA has isometric extensions that are unitary (Riesz & Sz.-Nagy, 1990,
57
p. 327). If A is not self-adjoint, then at least one deficiency subspace R(A− i)⊥ or R(A+ i)⊥
has dimensionality greater or equal to one, (m ≥ 1) ∨ (n ≥ 1).
To reduce the deficiency index m (or n) we can introduce an isometry from R(A − i)⊥
to R(A + i)⊥ (and vice versa). If the deficiency indices are equal, m = n, then we will be
able to find isometries that reduce each deficiency index correspondingly. These isometries
are in one-to-one correspondence with the closed symmetric extensions of A (Reed & Simon,
1975, p. 140). Since an extension A′ ⊃ A is self-adjoint if and only if both of its deficiency
indices are zero, it follows that A will have a self-adjoint extension if and only if A has equal
deficiency indices. Moreover, the number of self-adjoint extensions is given by the value of
the deficiency indices of A (when m = n). Thus an operator with unequal deficiency indices
has no self-adjoint extensions. If, in addition, either n = 0 or m = 0 then there can be no
symmetric extension at all. The provides the following standard classification.
Proposition 3.3 (von Neumann29). Let A be a symmetric operator on a dense domain DA
then
1. A is essentially self-adjoint if and only if m = 0 = n.
2. A has self-adjoint extensions if and only if m = n, corresponding bijectively to the
isometries between the deficiency subspaces of A.
3. If either m = 0 6= n or n = 0 6= m then A has no nontrivial symmetric extensions and
A is maximal symmetric.
Combined with the Spectral Theorem, this already gives some important insights into
the relationship between symmetric operators and POVMs. First, a symmetric operator
uniquely corresponds to a PVM if and only if it is essentially self-adjoint. Second, if a
symmetric operator has self-adjoint extensions then it corresponds non-uniquely to a set of
PVMs, one for each extension. Note that a symmetric operator is maximal symmetric if
it cannot be extended to a larger domain. Every essentially self-adjoint operator is thus
maximal symmetric but, evidently, not every maximal symmetric operator is self-adjoint.
The the relation of the maximal symmetric operator to POVMs and PVMs is given by the
following theorem.
29See, e.g., (Reed & Simon, 1975, p. 142).
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Theorem 3.7 (Alkeizer & Glazman30). A symmetric operator A corresponds to a unique
POVM EA : B(R) → E(H) if and only if it is maximal symmetric. In addition, EA is a
PVM, EA : B(R)→ L(H), if and only if A is essentially self-adjoint.
This entails that a symmetric operator that is maximal symmetric but not essentially self-
adjoint (i.e. which has deficiency indices m = 0 6= n or n = 0 6= m) corresponds to a POVM
that is not a PVM. We will call such operators maximally symmetric. This suggests the
following generalization of the spectral theorem, adapted to include all maximal symmetric
operators.
Theorem 3.8 (Generalized Spectral Theorem). Let A be a maximal symmetric operator on





for all φ, ψ ∈ DA. Conversely, given a POVM EA : B(R) → E(H) there exists a unique




µ2 d〈ψ|EAµ ψ〉 <∞.
One of the interesting characteristics of a POVM corresponding to a (non-self-adjoint)





We will call B, the first moment of the POVM EB, the expectation operator of EB since
〈B〉ρ = tr [Bρ] gives the expectation value of EB in the state ρ in the same sense that
〈A〉ρ = tr [Aρ] gives the expectation value of PA for A self-adjoint. However, whereas
〈A2〉ρ = tr [A2ρ] is the expectation value of of the second moment of PA, the expectation
value of B2 concerns the probability measure pB
2
ρ (X) = tr [ρE
B2(X)] which is evidently not





µ2〈φ|dEBµ ψ〉 − 〈Bφ|Bψ〉2,
30See (Akheizer & Glazman, 1993, p. 135).
31The slightly restricted form of the converse is required to acknowledge the fact that a POVM might
define a symmetric operator with (e.g.) many self-adjoint extensions.
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for φ, ψ in the domain of B. Note that if EB is a PVM then ∆B = 0 for all φ, ψ ∈ DB,
conversely if ∆B > 0 then B corresponds to a POVM rather than a PVM.
One of the better known results concerning POVMs of this type is the Naimark Dilation
Theorem. Naimark demonstrated that although a maximally symmetric operator B may not
have a self-adjoint extension on H, it always has an extension to an operator B′ self-adjoint
on a ‘larger’ Hilbert space H˜ ⊃ H.32 By the Spectral Theorem there exists a unique PVM
PB
′
: B(R)→ L(H˜), and the POVM EB is obtained again by projection onto H.
Theorem 3.9 (Naimark’s Dilation Theorem33). Let EB : B(R)→ E(H) be a POVM on H.
Then these exists a unique (up to unitary equivalence) minimal Hilbert space K ⊇ H and a
PVM PB
′




for all ψ ∈ H and all X ∈ B(R). The Hilbert space K is minimal if it is the smallest such
Hilbert space containing the union of the closed subspaces EB(X)H.
We can see that a PVM provides a trivial case of this theorem, since the minimal Hilbert
space is identical to the original and the projection is thus the identity. Considering the
converse of this theorem, we see that a PVM PA defined on the whole ofH becomes a POVM
when projected to a subspace of H. This may have a physical interpretation, e.g., if we
perform a measurement on an object system entangled with its environment then we calculate
the results via the reduced density matrix obtained by ‘tracing out’ the environmental degrees
of freedom. In that case the correlations between the system and environment remain at
the level of the combined states and manifest in a lack of orthogonality of these ‘smaller’
subspaces, and thus an operator self-adjoint on the entire Hilbert space will correspond to a
POVM rather than a PVM on the subspace of the object system.
3.2.1 Technical Interlude: Abstract Algebraic Insights
Before concluding our discussion of Naimark’s Theorem, it is worth remarking on its gen-
eralization to Stinespring’s Theorem (following Landsman (1999)), particularly since this
theorem will be of interest to us later on. This will lead to a discussion of the relation of
32The scare quotes are intended to indicate that both Hilbert spaces will often both have the same (infinite)
dimensionality.
33See, e.g., (Busch et al., 1995a, p. 32).
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Stinespring’s Theorem to the Spectral Theorem. However, this subsection can be readily
skipped by the reader without losing the thread of the overall argument. By defining the
terms appearing in Stinespring’s Theorem, and observing that the relata of Naimark’s Dila-
tion Theorem fall under those definitions, we will see that Naimark’s Theorem follows as a
special case of Stinespring’s Theorem.
Theorem 3.10 (Stinespring34). A mapping φ : A→ B(H) of A, a C∗-algebra with identity,
into B(H), the bounded operators of a Hilbert space H, is completely positive if and only if
there exist a Hilbert space H˜, a unitary isomorphism U : H → H˜, a Hilbert space K ⊃ H˜, a
projection P : K → H˜ and a representation pi : A→ B(K) of A on K such that
pi : A ∈ A→ Uφ(A)U−1 = Ppi(A)P
for all A ∈ A.
An abstract C∗-algebra A is a ∗-algebra over the complex numbers C, complete with
respect to a norm || · || such that ||A∗A|| = ||A||2 and ||AB|| ≤ ||A||||B|| for all A,B ∈ A.35
For our purposes, we will need to consider two examples of a C∗-algebra. First, and probably
the most familiar to philosophers of physics, isB(H), the bounded operators on a (separable)
Hilbert space H. The involution is provided by the adjoint operation on B(H) and the norm
is the Hilbert space operator norm, sup |〈Aψ|Aψ〉|1/2, where A ∈ B(H) and ψ ranges over the
unit vectors. Since operators A,B ∈ B(H) need not commute (i.e. in general AB−BA 6= 0)
B(H) is a non-Abelian C∗-algebra.
The second example of a C∗-algebra we will consider is the algebra of continuous complex-
valued functions which vanish at infinity) C0(X) on a topological space
36 X equipped with the
supremum norm ||f ||∞ = supx∈X |f(x)|, with addition and multiplication defined pointwise37
and involution given by (pointwise) complex conjugation, f ∗ = f . This algebra is thus
Abelian (i.e. commutative). A topological space X defines a Borel σ-algebra X , which is
34See Stinespring (1955).
35A ∗-algebra A is an algebra closed under an involution ∗ : A→ A, and an algebra over C is a collection
of elements on which the operations of binary addition, binary multiplication and multiplication by complex
numbers are defined, which is closed with respect to those operations. See Chapter 3 of Ruetsche (2011) for
an accessible introduction to these notions.
36A topological space is a non-empty set Σ given an open set topology, i.e. a collection of open sets (subsets
of Σ) such that (i) the empty set and Σ is open (ii) Any union of open sets is open (iii) the intersection of
any finite number of open sets is open. We will consider topological spaces that are locally compact and
Hausdorff.
37Such that (f + g)(x) = f(x) + g(x) and (f)(x)(g)(x) = (fg)x for x ∈ X.
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the σ−algebra generated by the open sets of X. Equipped with this σ−algebra, it is a
measurable space.
With these examples in hand, we can see that a POVM E : X → E(H) defines a map
ω : C0(X)→ (H). The properties of a POVM ensure that µψ := 〈ψ|E(∆)ψ〉 is a probability
measure for each unit vector ψ ∈ H. By integrating a function f ∈ C0(X) over the entire





which defines a bounded positive operator ω(f) ∈ B(H).38 That is, E : X → E(H) defines
a positive map ω : C0(X) → B(H).39 Furthermore, it is a completely positive map, since
any positive map from an Abelian C∗-algebra to any C∗-algebra is automatically completely
positive.
Since the map provided by any POVM thus satisfies the conditions of Stinespring’s The-
orem, there exists a Hilbert space K and a representation40 pi : C0(X) → B(K) such that
Uω(A)U−1 = Ppi(A)P . In order to recover Naimark’s Theorem, we need to show that this
representation defines a PVM on K, related to the POVM on H by projection.
Characterized abstractly, a (normalized) POVM E : X → H is equivalent to a positive
map ω : C0(X) → B(H) which takes sequences of functions fi → 1X to sequences of
operators ω(fi) → I, where 1X is the function x 7→ 1, for all x ∈ X. Given such a map the
functional 〈ψ|ω(f)ψ〉 defines a probability measure µψ for each ψ ∈ H (for functions of X
with compact support). The positive operators of the corresponding POVM ∆ 7→ E(∆) are
defined by setting 〈ψ|E(∆)ψ〉 := µψ(∆) for each ψ ∈ H. If, in addition, ω is a representation
then ω(∆1∆1) = ω(∆1)ω(∆2) = ω(∆2)ω(∆1), in which case ω defines a PVM on H. Thus we
can see that Stinespring’s Theorem also serves to provide the PVM promised by Naimark’s
Theorem through the representation pi : C0(X)→ B(H).
This more general point of view also gives a perspective from which to see more fully
the correspondence between PVMs and self-adjoint operators announced by the Spectral
Theorem. First note that an important use of the spectral theorem is in defining the spectral
38See Pedersen (1989, pp. 165–166) for more details of this procedure.
39A linear map φ : A → B(H) is positive if A ≥ 0 implies φ(A) ≥ 0, for all A ∈ A. An element A ∈ A is
positive, A ≥ 0, if A = B∗B, for some A ∈ A. For each positive operator B ∈ B(H)+ there exists a unique
positive operator B1/2 ∈ B(H)+ such that (B1/2)2 = B.
40A linear map pi : A → B(H) is a ∗-homomorphism or representation if it preserves the algebraic
operations and involution, i.e. pi(A + B) = pi(A) + pi(B), pi(AB) = pi(A)pi(B), and pi(A∗) = pi(A)∗. A
representation is always a positive map since pi(A∗A) = pi(A)∗pi(A).
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calculus for measurable functions f : B(R) → R which, in terms of the spectral family for




λ . A bounded operator
B ∈ B(H) is a function of A, B = f(A), if and only if B commutes with every bounded
operator that commutes with B (Jordan, 1969, p. 70). The set of all such operators is a von
Neumann algebra W ∗(A) ⊂ H, reached by taking the double commutant W ∗(A) = {{A}′}′,
i.e. W ∗(A) is the set of all bounded operators that commute with all the bounded operators
that commute with A. Therefore, B ∈ W ∗(A) if and only if B = f(A) for some f . Evidently,
then, W ∗(A) is a commutative subalgebra of B(H), W ∗(A) ⊂ W ∗(A)′.
We can now show that the Spectral Theorem can be formulated as a special case of
Stinespring’s theorem, in the following sense. First we define the multiplication operators
for a topological space X, which are operators Mf ∈ B(L2[X]) such that
Mfg = fg, g ∈ L2[X].
Consider the set of Mf such that f is a function with compact support, {Mf : f ∈ Cc(X)}.
The strong closure of this set is a maximal commutative subalgebra A ⊂ B(L2[X]), and
there exists a *-isomorhism φ : C0(X) → A (Pedersen, 1989, Thm. 4.7.6). A PVM defines
a completely positive map ω : C0(X) → B(H) into a subalgebra of commuting operators
D ⊂ B(H). If this subalgebra is maximal commutative, i.e. D = D′, then there exists an
isometry U : L2[X] → H such that f : C0(X) → D is a representation, where f(D) =
UMfU
−1 (Pedersen, 1989, Thm. 4.7.7). This is thus a special case of Stinespring’s Theorem
in which the projection is the identity.
This result is closely related to the Halmos (1963) form of the spectral theorem that says,
briefly, that every self-adjoint operator is unitarily equivalant to a multiplication. In more
detail,
Theorem 3.11 (Spectral Representation (Halmos)). If A is an unbounded self-adjoint op-
erator on H then there exists a (real-valued) bounded measurable function M ∈ L2[X , dµ] on
a measurable space X with measure µ and an isometry U from L2[X , dµ] onto H such that
(U−1AUf)(x) = M(x)f(x) for x ∈ X
for each f ∈ L2[X , dµ].
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From this version it is possible to prove the von Neumann form (Theorem 3.1), but it
is noteworthy that the existence of a spectral representation does not uniquely determine a
multiplication operator M .41
It remains for us to show that we can set up a correspondence between the self-adjoint
operators and the PVMs by the means above. First we note that if S ∈ B(H) is self-
adjoint then there exists a *-homomorphism f : Bb(X) → B(H) from the bounded Borel
functions of X into W ∗(S) (Pedersen, 1989, Thm. 4.5.4). Since we are also interested in
unbounded operators, we need to consider the operators affiliated with W ∗(S), where an
operator A is affiliated with W ∗(S) if and only if W ∗(A) ⊂ W ∗(S). Note that neither A
nor S need be bounded for this relation to hold. If W ∗(S) is maximal commutative42 in
B(H) then there is a *-isomorphism f : L(X) → B(H) between the measurable functions
on X and the class of normal operators in L2[X] affiliated with A = {Mf : f ∈ C0(X)}
(Pedersen, 1989, Thm. 5.3.2). In addition, there exists an isometry U : L2[sp(S)] → H
such that f → f(S) = UMfU−1 is a *-isomorphism between the measurable functions on
the spectrum of S and the class of normal operators affiliated with W ∗(S) (Pedersen, 1989,
Thm. 5.3.3).43 This highlights the importance of the spectrum of S in setting up a spectral
representation. The Spectral Theorem, in von Neumann form, can then be stated as follows:
Theorem 3.12 (Spectral Theorem (Pedersen)44). Every self-adjoint operator S on H defines
a ∗-isomorphism from f ∈ L(sp(S)) onto the ∗-algebra A of normal operators affiliated with




f(λ)dP (λ); S = id(S) =
∫
sp(S)




where L(sp(S)) is the C∗-algebra of measurable functions on the spectrum of S, and W ∗(S) =
{{S}′}′ is the double commutant of S (and thus a von Neumann algebra). This defines a
PVM P S : B(sp(S)) → W ∗(S), such that P (∆) ∈ W ∗(S) is a projection, for all ∆ ∈
B(sp(S)).
41See the Appendix of Berezin & Shubin (1991) for a detailed proof and discussion.
42This is equivalent to the requirement that S be multiplicity free. A self-adjoint operator in H is mul-
tiplicity free if there is a vector ψ ∈ ∩nDSn for n ≥ 0 such that the vectors {Snψ : n ≥ 0} are dense in H
(Pedersen, 1989, p. 211).
43These operators are normal rather than self-adjoint since they will include (e.g.) unitary operators.
44See for this Pedersen (1989) Theorems 4.5.7, 5.3.8, and 5.3.10.
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Conversely, to a PVM P S : B(X) → L(H) there corresponds a ∗-alegbra of normal






f(λ)dP (λ) with S =
∫
X




This appears to be the most general form in which the correspondence between PVMs
and self-adjoint operators can be given.
3.3 CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES AND MEASUREMENTS
Many of the initial results concerning POVMs arose out of the application to quantum
mechanics of the operational (i.e. algebraic) approach to quantum field theory of Haag &
Kastler (1964). This emphasis on operations gave the approach a greater generality than
just the consideration of projective measurements, covered by the Projection Postulate of the
Dirac-von Neumann formalism. However, projections have a special role to play in defined
conditional probabilities, it seems. The form of the expression for a conditional probability
on the lattice of projections L(H) is uniquely determined by a generalization of Gleason’s
Theorem.
Theorem 3.13 (Cassinelli & Zanghi45). Let µ(A) = tr [Aρ] be a probability measure on
L(H), and let E ∈ L(H) be a projection such that µ(E) 6= 0. Define a functional Pµ(·|E) on
L(H) such that
1. Pµ(·|E) is a probability measure on L(H) and,
2. for all F ∈ L(H) such that F ≤ E
Pµ(F |E) = µ(F )
µ(E)
Then the functional is uniquely given by
Pµ(F |E) = tr [EFEρ]
tr [Eρ]
.
45See (Cassinelli & Zanghi, 1983, Thm. 2).
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This provides a compelling justification for Lu¨ders’ Rule, ρ→ ρ˜ = PkρPk/(tr [ρPk]), since
the trace proscription applied to ρ˜ takes the form
Pµ(F |Pk) = tr [PkFPkρ]
tr [PKρ]
,
using the cyclic property of the trace. This clearly has an interpretation as a conditional
probability: given that the result of the previous measurement corresponds to Pk, this ex-
pression provides the probability for F .
The extension of the observables to the POVMs suggested above stands in need of a
interpretation for conditional probability on the effects E(H). The fact that a positive
operator B ≥ O has a unique positive square root (B1/2)2 = B leads to the standard
generalization of Lu¨ders’ Rule to effects, the so-called Lu¨ders operation46




which reduces to Lu¨ders’ rule when B2 = B. By following the example above we would be
led to define




as a conditional probability for the effect A given the effect B. But it is easily seen that
this does not have the form of a conditional probability (unless B is a projection) since if
B2 6= B then W (B|B) 6= 1.
Effects, then, although apt to play the predictive role of a projection, are not apt to
update the state (at least not in a way that leads to a meaningful conditional probability).
There is nonetheless a close association between effects and state transitions, or operations.
This is given by the Kraus representation, which associates effects with operations, maps
φ : S(H)→ S(H). Evidently Lu¨ders’ Rule and the (aptly named) Lu¨ders operation provide
examples of an operation.
Lu¨ders’ Rule, conditionalized on the observation of a particular outcome Pk, is known
as a selective operation. The closely related non-selective operation, known as a Lu¨ders
transformation, can be thought of as taking place at the ensemble level without any condi-
tionalization on the outcome of a measurement that would remove a system from consider-
ation as part of the ensemble. That is, the equivalent non-selective Lu¨ders’ transformation
is ρ 7→ ρ¯ = ∑k PkρPk. Kraus’ Representation Theorem shows that any operation at all can
be put into that form.
46See Busch et al. (1995a, p. 37).
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Theorem 3.14 (Kraus47). For any operation φ : S(H) → S(H) there exist operators Ak ∈















kBAk for all B ∈ B(H)




kAk is an effect i.e. E ∈ E(H).
Conversely, any such collection of operators Ak defines an operation φ whose corresponding
adjoint φ∗ and effect E are defined as above.
This theorem demonstrates that to each effect E = (E1/2)2 there corresponds an op-
eration which maps a state ρ to another state E1/2ρE1/2. In fact, there exist many such
operations, since E = A∗A does not uniquely correspond to an operator A unless A is
positive, in which case A = E1/2. Even then the application of a unitary transformation,
A = UE1/2, leads to a distinct operation associated the same effect E = A∗A. This may
suggest that an effect is best thought of as being associated with an equivalence class of
operations. What these operations correspond to physically, however, is less than clear.
To this end, however, Kraus (1983) provides another representation theorem which ap-
parently demonstrates that every POVM on the object system can be measured by means
of (a) an ancilla (a apparatus system to be coupled to the object system) initially in a pure
state; (b) a unitary interaction between the ancilla and object system; (c) a projective mea-
surement on the ancilla which leaves the object systems state unchanged. Before considering
this complete description of the measurement situation provided by Kraus (1983), it will be
instructive to address the interpretation of the preliminary result derived by Holevo (1973).
Making use of Naimark’s Theorem, Holevo was able to show that every POVM on the object
system can be measured as a PVM on a larger system that includes the object system as a
subsystem (i.e. by including an ancilla).
Theorem 3.15 (Holevo48). Let the Hilbert space of the object system be H. Then any POVM
E(X) on H defines a Hilbert space H0, a pure state ψ0 ∈ H0 and a PVM P (X) on H⊗H0
47See Kraus (1983).






for any state ψ ∈ H. Conversely, any triple (H0, ψ0, P ) gives rise to the unique POVM in
H satisfying (3.5).
This shows how, in a sense, any measurement of a POVM on an object system can be
thought of as the measurement of a PVM on a larger system, of which the object system is a
subsystem. This measurement, however, must take place on the entire system. In contrast,
Kraus (1983) was able to show that the measurement of the POVM on the object system
could be completed by means of a projective measurement on the ancilla alone.
Theorem 3.16. [Kraus] Let (H, ρ) be the initial state of the object system, and let φ : ρ 7→
ε(ρ) be an operation on the object system. Then there exists an ancilla system with Hilbert
space H0, a pure state ρ0 ∈ H0 of the ancilla, a unitary operator U on H ⊗ H0, and a
projection Q0 on H0 such that
ε(ρ) = tr ′[(I⊗Q0)U(ρ⊗ ρ0)U−1(I⊗Q0)] where tr ′ is the partial trace on H0. (3.6)
Conversely, any Hilbert space H0, pure state ρ0 ∈ H0, unitary operator U on H ⊗ H0,
and projection Q0 on H0 defines an operation φ : ρ 7→ ε(ρ) with ε(ρ) as above.
Since each effect is associated with an operation (or rather an equivalence class of them)
this theorem appears to have the meaning that any effect on the object system can be
measured with a projective measurement on the ancilla alone, by means of a correlation
with the states of an ancilla set up by a unitary interaction. Kraus (1983) considers only
complimentary effects F1, F2 such that F2 = I− F1 but it is clear that the result applies to
discrete sums of effects such that
∑
i F ≤ I, as before. This result, which underpins the so-
called Standard Model of Measurement (Busch et al., 1996), apparently demonstrates that
the inclusion of POVMs into the formalism of Ordinary QM requires very little interpretative
extension.49 In Chapter 7, I will argue that the measurement of event time observables (i.e.
time shift covariant POVMs) cannot be so easily accommodated by these conventional means
due to Pauli’s Theorem, to which I now turn.
49However, some valid concerns have been expressed regarding the interpretation of POVMs as joint
measurements of incompatible observables by Uffink (1994).
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4.0 ROUGH GUIDE TO PAULI’S THEOREM
We have already met Pauli’s ‘theorem’ in its historical context in Chapter 2. There I men-
tioned that the argument which Pauli gave in his 1933 footnote is, strictly speaking, invalid
since it admits a large class of counterexamples. But there are valid results in the vicinity of
Pauli’s proposition, and it is to these (I hope) that the phrase ‘Pauli’s Theorem’ is taken to
refer. These results were either stated and proved by later authors or follow as immediate
corollaries from other well-known foundational results, which were not known to Pauli at the
time (and often must be given in a further refined mathematical language). The purpose of
this chapter is to provide a self-contained introduction to the correct statement and inter-
pretation of ‘Pauli’s Theorem’ by providing details of these putative counterexamples and
the later results that avoid them.
We begin with a brief analysis of Pauli’s original argument, which begins by positing
the existence of a time observable T , canonically conjugate to the Hamiltonian H. Pauli
succinctly stated his argument as follows:
It is generally not possible, however, to construct a Hermitian [i.e. symmetric]
operator (e.g. as a function of p and q) which satisfies this equation [HT −TH =
i]. This is so because . . . it follows that H possesses continuously all eigenvalues
from −∞ to +∞ (cf. Dirac, Quantum Mechanics, First edition (1930), 34 and
56) whereas on the other hand, discrete eigenvalues of H can be present. (Pauli,
1958, p. 63)1
Using the equalities found in Dirac’s textbook one can easily write a formal argument that
appears to establish Pauli’s conclusion. That is, an argument given without regard to the
domains of the operators involved and the validity of the operations on their domains and
co-domains.2
1I have dropped the factor of ~ from the expression here, i.e. we are using natural units in which ~ = 1.
That will be the case from hereon in.
2Here I essentially follow the reconstruction offered by Galapon (2002a).
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Using the putative time observable T we define the unitary shift operator eiβT as an







where β ∈ R. Now iterate this relation to obtain the equality [H,T n]φ = −inT n−1φ. Thus
we have3
[H, eiβT ] = βeiβT . (4.2)
Acting from the left with e−iβT we obtain
e−iβTHeiβT = H + β, (4.3)
which shows that eiβT acts to shift the spectrum of H by β. But (4.3) also states that H and
H + βI are unitarily equivalent operators, which implies that they have the same spectrum.
If β can take any value in R, it follows that the spectrum of H is R. So Pauli’s argument,
as it appears in this footnote, takes the following form:
1. Assume that there exists a Hermitian (i.e. symmetric) operator T such that [H,T ] = i.
2. From this relation it follows that e−iβTHeiβT = H + β, for β ∈ R.
3. This implies that H has as its spectrum the entire real line.
4. But physical Hamiltonians do not have such a spectrum.
5. Therefore, the introduction of such an operator T is basically forbidden.
For reductio Pauli considered a Hamiltonian with discrete spectrum (e.g. a simple harmonic
oscillator), but he might also have considered the condition that the spectrum of H be
bounded from below (as did later authors).4 However, no matter which assumption about
the spectrum of H is made, there exist several classes of putative counterexamples to Pauli’s
‘theorem,’ as stated.5
3This also follows from the relation [H, f(T )] = f ′(T )[H,T ].
4That he didn’t may be explained by the prevalence and apparent success of Dirac’s ‘hole theory’ at the
time Pauli was writing. The Hamiltonian of Dirac’s theory had a spectrum unbounded in both directions,
and the negative energy states were filled by an uncountable infinity of negative energy electrons. This meant
that if one of those electrons came to have a positive energy, it would leave vacated a ‘hole’ in the negative
energy states, eventually interpreted by Dirac as an ‘anti-electron’ (i.e. a positron).
5See Galapon (2002a) for a detailed analysis of how Pauli’s argument fails. For us, it suffices to see that
it has counterexamples and is thus invalid.
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These counterexamples arise from difficulties with the formal nature of the argument
given above. By formal, we mean given without regard to the domain of definition of the
operators involved. The problem with a purely formal argument is that concrete exempli-
fications of the formally defined operators may fail to obey the formal relations supposed
to hold of them. As early as Garrison & Wong (1970) it was known that counterexamples
to Pauli’s Theorem could be found for discrete Hamiltonians with a semi-bounded spec-
trum.6 Recently, Galapon (2002b) gives a method that applies to any H self-adjoint with a
semi-bounded, discrete spectrum, resulting in a bounded, symmetric (and thus self-adjoint)
operator T conjugate to H. That is, there exist counterexamples of the following sort:
1. H is a operator with a discrete, semi-bounded spectrum (i.e. non-empty point spec-
trum), self-adjoint on a dense domain of H, a (separable) Hilbert space.
2. T is a bounded operator, self-adjoint on H.
3. The commutation relation [H,T ]ψ = iψ holds for ψ ∈ H such that the set of such ψ is
dense in H.
These time operators are periodic, and arise in familiar examples such as the quantum
harmonic oscillator. In these examples the time operator T is bounded and symmetric, and
thus self-adjoint. However, there is another class of examples in which T is unbounded and
symmetric (or Hermitian), but fails to be self-adjoint.7 That is, there exist pairs (H,T ) such
that8
1. H is a self-adjoint operator with a semi-bounded spectrum, H ≥ cI, self-adjoint on a
dense domain of H, a (separable) Hilbert space.
2. T is a unbounded operator with a continuous spectrum R, symmetric on a dense
domain of DT ⊂ H.
6See Galindo (1984) for the explicit construction of such pairs.
7One may be inclined to attribute to Pauli a usage of the word ‘Hermitian’ to mean self-adjoint rather than
symmetric, as is common in the physics literature. However, Pauli’s Handbuch article includes a detailed
discussion of a case where a ‘Hermitian operator’ fails to be self-adjoint (Pauli, 1958, p. 65) so he was clearly
aware of the distinction, yet used the word ‘Hermitian’ to mean ‘symmetric.’
8The best known example is the time of arrival operator, which was already introduced in Section 2.3.4.
Chapter 5 contains a detailed discussion of this operator. Hegerfeldt & Muga (2010) provide a recipe for
generating such time operators, conjugate to an arbitrary Hamiltonian.
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3. The commutation relation [H,T ]ψ = iψ holds for ψ ∈ DT such that the set of such ψ
is dense in H.
Pauli’s argument, therefore, fails to secure his conclusion that ‘the introduction of an operator
T is basically forbidden.’ The failure is not absolute, however, and there is an argument in the
vicinity that serves to justify (at least in part) the received wisdom that ‘time is quantum
mechanics is not an observable but a parameter.’ Before deciding how best to patch up
Pauli’s argument, it would be wise to first consider exactly how the premises were intended
to justify Pauli’s conclusion.
Recall that the Heisenberg equations of motion state that the rate of change of an ob-




Thus, by requiring that T be canonically conjugate with H, [T,H] = −i, the rate of change
of T is determined to be 1. Integrating this formal relation, we obtain:







dt = T (0) + t.
This is an expression of the covariance of T with time shifts, which we met in Chapter 2 as the
defining property of a clock observable. But note how in integrating the expression we went
from a local expression of covariance, referring to the rate of change at an instant, to a global
expression, which holds for all t ∈ R. These two formal expressions are not equivalent, as we
saw in the case of classical mechanics in Section 2.4 (where the global covariance condition
implied the local, but not vice versa). The same is true in quantum mechanics: the local
covariance condition (given in terms of the Heisenberg equation of motion) can hold in the
absence of the stronger global covariance condition.
In addition, recall that the requirement that a classical observable must be a smooth
(everywhere defined) function on phase space was enough to disqualify the time functions
that we did find from membership of the set of classical observables. The counterexamples
to Pauli’s argument mentioned here have a similar characteristic: they are associated with
(locally) time covariant POVMs rather than PVMs, and thus according to Ordinary QM are
not to be thought of as observables. As expressed above, Pauli’s argument is blind to this
distinction, and the proper expression of Pauli’s Theorem will make this prohibition clear.
That is, Pauli’s Theorem proper will demonstrate the inconsistency of time covariance (both
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local and global) with the requirement of Ordinary QM that an observable be associated
with a PVM.
4.1 FINDING PAULI’S THEOREM: GLOBAL COVARIANCE AND
CANONICAL CONJUGACY
Before proceeding to give a version of Pauli’s Theorem formulated in terms of global time
covariance, we will first attempt to get straight on the distinction between local and global
time covariance. We will say that T is locally time covariant if dT (t)
dt
= k for all t, in which
case the expectation value of T varies linearly with time, d
dt
(〈ψ|T (t)ψ〉) = k, for all ψ in the
domain of T .9 We will express the global covariance condition in terms of the expectation
value of T as follows:
〈ψ|T (t)ψ〉 = 〈ψ|T (0)ψ〉+ t,
for all t ∈ R and ψ in the domain of T .
The critical operator expression that we are required to give a definite meaning to here
is the time-dependent operator T (t). To simplify matters, we will begin by assuming that
the time operator T in question is self-adjoint with an unbounded spectrum. In that case,
we can think of T (0) = T as a Schro¨dinger picture observable in the usual way, so that T (t)
is just the Heisenberg picture family of observables reached by means of the one-parameter
family of unitary operators generated by H, Ut = e
iHt. That is, T (t) = U−tTUt, valid on the
entire domain of T . This provides the following precise expression of global covariance,
T (t) = U−tTUt = T + It, (4.4)
valid for all ψ in the domain of T and all t ∈ R. First let us confirm that this global condition
implies the local time covariance condition, i.e. the canonical conjugacy of H and T . The
global covariance condition (4.4) can be written as a sum of nested commutators by means
of the Baker-Campbell-Hausdorf identity, that is
e−iHtTeiHt = T − it[H,T ] + (−it)
2
2!
[H, [H,T ]] +
(−it)3
3!
[H, [H, [H,T ]]] + . . . .
9Note that if T (t) is symmetric then this is the pointwise differentiation of a real valued function of t,
f(t) = 〈ψ|T (t)ψ〉.
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Evidently, it is only the first commutator term that is non-zero in this case, so that t =
−it[H,T ], i.e., [H,T ] = i. This is, however, a merely formal expression.
We can also achieve the same result with more rigor by an application of Stone’s Theorem,
which guarantees the existence of a unique self-adjoint generator for such a unitary family.
Theorem 4.1 (Stone). A one-parameter strongly continuous unitary group Us, with s ∈ R,






(Us − I)ψ = Aψ,
where ψ is in the domain of A if the limit exists.
At this juncture, it is worth remarking on the relation of the global to the local (i.e.
instantaneous) form of the unitary dynamics, given to us by Stone’s Theorem. Take the
Schro¨dinger picture family of instantaneous states ψt = Utψ, where ψ ∈ H is the state at











(Uδt+t − Ut)ψ = −i d
dt
Utψ.
Likewise, the Heisenberg equations of motion can be obtained by considering the instan-











= i (A(t)H −HA(t))
= i[A(t), H]
using the Schro¨dinger equation to get the second line from the first.
Now we will derive local covariance of T , expressed by the commutation relation [H,T ] =
i, from global covariance (4.4). First we apply Ut from the left to obtain (4.4) as a com-
mutation relation, [T, Ut] = Utt. Using this relation, along with an application of Stone’s
10This difference in sign here from, e.g., (Jordan, 1969, p. 98) is just due to a choice of convention for the
exponent of the unitary group Ut.
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Theorem to Ut, we have

















Thus global covariance implies local covariance of T through the Heisenberg equation of mo-
tion. The use of Stone’s Theorem here shows the precise sense in which the local covariance
condition is just the instantaneous form of the global condition.
In the presence of the assumption that T is self-adjoint, we can also use the global
covariance of T with the unitary group Ut to derive a relationship between H, the generator
of Ut, and Us, the unitary group uniquely generated by T . This allows us to recover the
last line of Pauli’s argument, (4.3) above, and the last steps of the proof go through as he
intended. (See below.) This provides us the global form of Pauli’s Theorem, as given by
Butterfield (2013).11
Theorem 4.2 (Pauli’s Theorem (Global)). Let H and T be self-adjoint operators on H,
a separable Hilbert space. If T obeys a global covariance relation with Ut = e
iHt, the one-
parameter unitary group uniquely generated by H, that is
T (t) = U−tTUt = T + It
for all t ∈ R, then H and T have the spectrum of the reals, R = sp(H) = sp(T ).
Although this conclusion may be reached directly, using only Stone’s Theorem and the
Spectral Theorem, there is an illuminating route to the conclusion via the Stone-von Neu-
mann Theorem, which concerns the Weyl form of the Canonical Commutation Relations
(CCRs).
Any pair of self-adjoint operators that together obey a Weyl CCR we will call a Weyl
pair, defined as follows.
Definition 4.1. Weyl pair. A pair of self-adjoint operators (A,B) on a (separable) Hilbert
space H are a Weyl pair if and only if the one-parameter unitary groups they generate,
Uα = e
iAα and Uβ = e
iBβ, obey the Weyl CCR
UαUβ = e
iαβUβUα (4.5)
11It is hard to find an explicit statement of this result in the literature elsewhere, perhaps because it almost
goes without saying. Exceptions include Srinivas & Vijayalakshmi (1981) and Galapon (2002a).
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for all α, β ∈ R.
Every Weyl pair is also a Heisenberg pair, which we define as a pair of symmetric, densely
defined operators that obey the Heisenberg CCR.
Definition 4.2. Heisenberg pair. A pair of symmetric operators (A,B) densely defined on
a (separable) Hilbert space H are a Heisenberg pair if and only if they obey the Heisenberg
CCR
[A,B]ψ = iψ (4.6)
on a dense domain ψ ∈ DAB ∩ DBA ⊆ H.
However, a Heisenberg pair will often not be a Weyl pair: all the counterexamples to
Pauli’s original argument given in the previous section are Heisenberg pairs that are not
Weyl pairs.12
It turns out that if T is self-adjoint then obeying the global time covariance condition
(4.4) is sufficient to ensure that T forms a Weyl pair with H. Here is an argument to that
effect. Since T is self-adjoint, by the Spectral Theorem there is a unique spectral family of
projections Pλ such that T =
∫
R λ dPλ, with P−∞ = 0 and P∞ = I. Thus we may write the
















where the last line involves a change of integration variable to λ + t. This equality implies
that the spectral measures defined by d(U−tPλUt) and dPλ−t are identical. (If they were not,
then by the Spectral Theorem the two sides would define distinct self-adjoint operators, in
contradiction with (4.4).) This implies that the PVM associated with T by the Spectral
Theorem, P T : B(R)→ L(H), is globally covariant in the following sense:










T (∆ + t),
for all t ∈ R, where ∆ + t is the set {λ : λ − t ∈ ∆}. This covariance condition, applied
directly to a PVM P T , suffices to ensure that the corresponding self-adjoint operator T is
12The significance of this fact for avoiding Pauli’s Theorem was first noted by Garrison & Wong (1970),
from whom this terminology is taken.
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globally covariant. In that case, we define Pλ = P










(λ+ t) dPλ′ = T + It.
This equality also demonstrates that (H,T ) form a Weyl pair. Let Us = e
iT s be the unitary





















⇒ UsUt = eistUtUs
which is the definition of a Weyl pair. To go back the other way we just apply Stone’s























= T + tI.
This discussion serves as a proof of the next proposition.
Proposition 4.1. The following conditions are equivalent:
1. Global Covariance (Self-adjoint). T , H are self-adjoint operators such that U−tTUt =
T + It, with Ut = eiHt, for all t ∈ R.
2. Global Covariance (PVM). P T (∆) is a time shift covariant PVM such that for every
P T (∆) and every t ∈ R there exists a unique projection P T (∆ + t) = U−tP T (∆)Ut.13
3. Conjugate (Weyl). (H,T ) are a Weyl pair.
13This uniqueness requirement excludes periodic PVMs from consideration.
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So we can see that, so long as T is self-adjoint, the condition of global covariance with
shifts in t, generated by H, leads inevitably to the requirement that T and H are a Weyl pair.
But the Stone-von Neumann Theorem shows that every Weyl pair is unitarily equivalent to
a Scho¨dinger representation, i.e. to the usual position and momentum operators.
Theorem 4.3 (Stone-von Neumann14). Let T,H be a Weyl pair, then there exists a unitary
transformation U such that U †TU = Q and U †HU = P form Schro¨dinger representation.
The unitary equivalence of two operators implies that they have the same spectrum, and
so H and T must both have the spectrum of the reals if Q and P do (which they do). This
argument lies behind the common wisdom that Pauli’s Theorem rules out the existence of
time observables in quantum mechanics.
To wrap up this section, and demonstrate that Pauli had the right idea, at least, I provide
a self-contained proof of the global version of Pauli’s Theorem, Theorem 4.2. This proof
bypasses the Stone-von Neumann Theorem, sticking closely to Pauli’s original argument
instead.15
Proof. By the above Proposition, (H,T ) is a Weyl pair. Thus we may use UsUt = e
istUtUs
and Stone’s Theorem to argue that




















= H − sI.
Since H and T are a Weyl pair, they have a common dense domain (Putnam, 1967, Thm,
4.8.1) on which this equality holds. Thus H and H − sI are unitarily equivalent, and hence
have the same spectrum (Blank et al., 2008, 4.4.6c). Let λ be in the spectrum of H, then
H − λI has no inverse. But since H − λI = (H − sI) − (λ − s)I it follows that λ − s is in
the spectrum of H − sI, and thus also in the spectrum of H. This holds for any s ∈ R and
so the spectrum of H is R.
14See, e.g., Putnam (1967).
15It is my pleasure to acknowledge the assistance of Bryan Roberts through many helpful conversations and
much correspondence about this version of Pauli’s Theorem. This section as a whole has greatly benefited
in many ways from this collaboration.
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Since this theorem is valid, the counterexamples to Pauli’s original argument must fail
to satisfy the premises. When T is symmetric but not self-adjoint, T may satisfy covariance
but avoid the conclusion. In this case, T and H do not form a Weyl pair. We have already
met such an operator, the quantum time of arrival, and we will investigate its properties
in due course. When T is symmetric and bounded, and thus self-adjoint, global covariance
must fail. As indeed it does in cases that concern periodic time operators.
4.2 REFINING PAULI’S THEOREM: PERIODIC COVARIANCE
CONDITIONS
The failure of this result to apply to Heisenberg pairs involving discrete Hamiltonians and
perodic, self-adjoint time observables leads one to suspect that there is something special
about such pairs, aside from their failure to form a Weyl pair. It is an interesting fact that
if a PVM P T covaries in a periodic manner then the Spectral Theorem fails to secure a
unique correspondence with a self-adjoint operator. While the spectrum of an operator T
with periodicity τ will be an interval [ϕ, τ +ϕ), involving an arbitrary choice of phase ϕ, the
Spectral Theorem (Thm. 3.1) supplies a PVM defined on the Borel subsets of the real line,
B(R).
Let T0 be the operator given by the Spectral Theorem for a periodic PVM P
T , and let
0 < ϕ < τ be an arbitrary phase. Then U−ϕT0Uϕ = Tϕ is a distinct self-adjoint periodic
time observable associated with a PVM P Tϕ whose projections P Tϕ(∆) = U−ϕP T (∆)Uϕ also












(λ− ϕ) dP Tλ +
∫ ϕ
0








= T0 − ϕI+ τP T ([0, ϕ]) := Tϕ.
This resembles the arbitrary choice of phase for a periodic time function in classical me-
chanics, and seems to be characteristic of a periodic time observable in quantum mechanics.
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This demonstrates how a periodic time observable can escape the global version of Pauli’s
Theorem by failing to satisfy the global covariance condition. However, there is a closely
related periodic covariance condition reached by allowing non-uniqueness of the elements of
the PVM related by a unitary transformation. This more permissive condition leads to a
version of Pauli’s Theorem which suffices to place severe restrictions on the existence of such
periodic PVMs, despite the self-adjointness of their corresponding expectation operators.
Furthermore, this version relies on the less restrictive (and so stronger) spectral con-
dition, which only requires that the Hamiltonian spectrum is semi-bounded, so including
Hamiltonians with discrete spectra in its scope. (In contrast to the results of the previous
section.) That is, the following version of Pauli’s Theorem directly addresses periodic time
observables.16
Theorem 4.4 (Srinivas & Vijayalakshmi (1981)). Let P T (∆) be elements of a PVM and let
Ut = e
iHt be the unitary group of time translations generated by H, such that
1. Spectrum. The Hamiltonian H is a self-adjoint operator bounded from below i.e. there
exists a number c > −∞ such that H ≥ cI.
2. Covariance. P T (∆) covaries with time translations. That is, for every time t ∈ R there
exists a projection P T (∆ + t) such that
UtP
T (∆)U †t = P
T (∆ + t).
Then P T (∆) = 0 for all ∆.
Through the Spectral Theorem, then, this result suffices to show that there is no self-
adjoint operator T obeying the global covariance condition with H semi-bounded. The result
also applies to periodic time observables, however, since this covariance condition allows for
identifications of projections corresponding to distinct periods. That is, if τ is the period
of a periodic time observable then projections P T (∆ + nτ), with n ∈ Z, are identical. But
this covariance condition is met by these projections, regardless. Moreover, Stone’s Theorem
guarantees that every self-adjoint Hamiltonian generates a unitary group Ut, with t ∈ R,
16This version of the theorem is closely related to the recent ‘no go’ results of Malament (1996) and Halvor-
son & Clifton (2002) concerning relativistic locality. There are two methods of proof: Srinivas & Vijayalak-
shmi (1981) make use of Borcher’s Lemma (like Malament), whereas Halvorson (2010) uses Hegerfeldt’s
Lemma (like Halvorson & Clifton). See Section 4.4 for details of the proofs.
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regardless of the periodicity of the system. Therefore, this result also suffices to show that
there is no self-adjoint operator T associated with a PVM whose projections obey a periodic
covariance condition with the unitary group generated by H, semi-bounded.17
This extension of Pauli’s Theorem to cover periodic time observables is significant because
it captures the counterexamples to Pauli’s original argument that escaped the global form
of the theorem. If H has a discrete spectrum and forms a Heisenberg pair with T , periodic
and bounded, they can both be self-adjoint and together form a Heisenberg pair without
forming a Weyl pair. This might lead one to believe that these self-adjoint time operators
correspond to a periodically time covarying PVM. The refined version of Pauli’s Theorem
shows that this cannot be the case: a counterexample to Pauli’s original argument involving
time covariance of a time operator must concern time covariant POVMs rather than PVMs,
even though the Spectral Theorem associates such an operator with a PVM.18
This reveals all the counterexamples referred to previously to have a very similar form,
despite the fact that some time operators forming a Heisenberg pair with the semi-bounded
self-adjoint Hamiltonian are maximally symmetric while some are self-adjoint. As we have
seen, a maximally symmetric operator associated with a POVM rather than a PVM. But
since no bounded symmetric operator can be the expectation operator of a PVM that co-
varies periodically with a unitary group generated by a self-adjoint Hamiltonian with a
semi-bounded spectrum, such operators must arise as the expectation operator of a POVM
instead. This does not stop such operators from being covariant, however. Take the time
of arrival, Ta, a maximally symmetric operator corresponding to a POVM E
Ta .19 The co-
variance of the underlying POVM ETa(∆ + t) = U−tTaUt still yields the global covariance
condition through the generalized spectral resolution Eλ = E







λdEλ+t = Ta − It
valid for all ψ in the domain of Ta.
Given the abundance of these time covariant symmetric operators, it is tempting to see
Pauli’s Theorem as less of a “no go” theorem and more of a “go on then, if you must” theorem.
That is, instead of preventing the introduction of time observables into quantum mechanics,
Pauli’s Theorem really just tells us something interesting about the time observables that
17Crucially, though, such an operator may also be associated with a time shift covariant POVM. See
Section 5.3.
18This issue is addressed more fully in the discussion of phase in Section 5.3.
19See Section 5.4 for further details.
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we can define: they will correspond to time covariant POVMs that are not PVMs. Given
the expansion of the set of observables of quantum mechanics to include such POVMs that
I argued for in Chapter 3, the question one needs to answer is interpretative: what is the
empirical relevance of these time covariant POVMs? That is, what experimental situations
do they correspond to (if any)?
Most of the rest of this dissertation can be seen as an attempt to answer this question
positively. Specifically, in Chapter 6 I advocate the use of periodic time covariant POVMs
as clock observables, and in Chapter 7 I argue that time covariant POVMs may be used to
provide event time distributions. In Chapter 5, I present a detailed examination of some
famous examples of such operators and how they differ from their PVM yielding brethren.
First, though, I consider some interpretative morals that may already be drawn from this
discussion of Pauli’s Theorem.
4.3 HOW (NOT) TO INTERPRET PAULI’S THEOREM
We have seen that there is a considerable degree of subtlety involved in stating and proving
‘Pauli’s Theorem.’ Now that our hunt for the results that lie behind Pauli’s skeptical con-
clusion is complete, the stage is set for some preliminary interpretative remarks. The first
definitive result that we obtained, Theorem 4.2, demonstrates that the following propositions
form an inconsistent trilemma:
1. T is a self-adjoint operator with spectrum sp(T ) = R.
2. T covaries with time translations generated by H, U−tTUt + T + It, for all t ∈ R.
3. H is a self-adjoint operator with spectrum sp(H) 6= R
This certainly goes some way to justifying the conventional wisdom that time is a parameter
rather than an operator in quantum theory. I will claim here that this rules out the existence
of (what I will term) a canonical time observable corresponding to external time. Let us first
consider the plausibility of these propositions in turn.
Since the dynamics of the theory is given by a one-parameter unitary group Ut, there
is certainly a sense in which the (external) time should be allowed to range over the reals.
This suggests that a canonical time observable T should be allowed to take any value in the
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reals, and thus have an unbounded spectrum. It is also hard to see how an operator T whose
expectation value doesn’t covary with time shifts could be regarded as a time observable.
To deny this would be (in effect) to deny the homogeneity of time.20
This is not to say that the homogeneity of time could not conceivably be denied, of course.
Time could indeed be discrete, or have a beginning (or an end).21 But it is hard to see how
the failure of quantum mechanics to allow the definition of a canonical time observable could
prejudice answers to metaphysical questions regarding the topology of time. Finally, since
Stone’s Theorem guarantees that a self-adjoint operator lies behind the unitary group giving
the dynamics of the theory it is hard to deny that H must be self-adjoint. But could it
plausibly have the spectrum of the reals?
First note that this requirement on the spectrum is really quite severe—as we have seen,
Pauli considered the mere existence of Hamiltonians with discrete spectra to be sufficient
to rule out the existence of a canonical time observable. It is straightforward to argue
from the fact that most (if not all) quantum systems have Hamiltonians that prevent a
canonical time observable for being defined to the conclusion that there is no canonical time
observable. All we need is the premise that if a canonical time observable exists then it can
be defined for every quantum system. Of course, one man’s modus tollens is another man’s
modus ponens: there is a perversion of this argument which instead takes the existence
of time observables as a premise and argues that, therefore, there exist quantum systems
with unbounded Hamiltonians. But while this argument may hold water in specific cases
(although I will contend that it doesn’t), the existence of one or two such operators cannot
compensate for the fact that the quantum systems we know and love feature Hamiltonians
which prevent the definition of a canonical time observable.
So let us take it as given that there is no such thing as a canonical time observable (what-
ever that would be). What follows from this fact? Arguably, very little. Here my sympathies
are with Hilgevoord (2005), who attributes demands for a canonical time observable to an
unfortunate confusion between the spectral values of the position observable (qx, qy, qz) and
space (x, y, z). If one were the victim of such a confusion, one could easily be led from the
apparent symmetry of time and space in a relativistic space-time to the desire to introduce
20See (Jauch, 1968, p. 197) for a parallel discussion regarding position and the homogeneity of space.
21If time itself is semi-bounded then Ut could be defined as a semi-group, i.e. a family of isometries rather
unitary operators. In that case H, the generator of the semi-group, would not be self-adjoint.
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a time canonical operator into quantum mechanics. Despite my reservations about Hilgevo-
ord’s attribution of such a confusion to the authors of quantum mechanics, (see Section 2.2),
I have no reservations about the confusion itself: this would be a poor reason to want a
canonical time observable.
But there is anyway something quite strange about the idea of a canonical time observ-
able, (e.g.) thought of in the same way as position according to the conventional ‘Copen-
hagen’ interpretation. In that case, one would be led to expect that measuring a projection
of the spectral resolution of T (say, the projection associated with the time interval corre-
sponding to the specious present) would correspond to the experimental question, ‘is the
system to be found in the present?’ Applying the usual interpretative rules, the possible
answers are binary alternatives corresponding to (a) the system existing at this time or (b)
existing at some other time. Either alternative is problematic. If (a), then the system is in
‘an eigenstate of existing at this time,’ which suggests that it will cease to exist very soon. If
(b), then where has it gone? In the conventional account, measuring such projections would
bring about gross non-conservation of probabilities.22
This brings me to Halvorson’s (2010) contention that a closely related no go result pro-
vides an argument against the existence of time. Admittedly, this paper of Halvorson’s is a
work in progress. But is worth remarking that, as it stands, Halvorson’s claim that “inso-
far as quantities are represented by operators, time is not a quantity at all— not even an
unobservable quantity” (1) is baseless since counterexamples to the claim that the quantity
“amount of time” cannot be represented by an operator are fairly plentiful. Such operators
are symmetric, and may even be self-adjoint. Charitably, we should read this instead as an
argument that the non-existence of a canonical time operator implies that there is no such
thing as the “amount of time” in quantum theory.
An obvious rejoinder to such an argument would be the claim that some quantities, such
as space and time, are represented by parameters rather than operators in quantum me-
chanics, but are real nonetheless. This is (roughly) the perspective offered by Hilgevoord
22Alternatively, one could explore an Everett-esque ‘no collapse’ account, in which case (by virtue of our
relative existence in the present) the relative state of the system changes with time. Or perhaps there is a
presentist-friendly ‘dynamical collapse’ account, whereby there is a continual collapse of the wavefunction (in
the ‘time-representation’) into eigenstates of the present moment. This would require an A-series account
of time, leading to (it seems) an extra time parameter with respect to which the time-dependent ‘moving
spotlight’ of this dynamical collapse could be defined, in which case infinite regress beckons (McTaggart,
1908). My point here, however, is that Pauli’s Theorem saves us from the mindless exploration of these
metaphysical rabbit-holes.
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(2005). Halvorson, however, preemptively dismisses this response as resting on a “merely
verbal” distinction. If we are taking this argument against the existence of time seriously,
however, the rejoinder should be considered with more care. In favor of the claim that being
represented by a parameter is sufficient to be taken seriously as a real quantity, consider the
problems surrounding the definition of a satisfactory position operator in relativistic quan-
tum mechanics. When philosophers of physics (including Halvorson himself) have used the
apparent non-existence of such position operators as an opportunity for existential modus
tollens, the chosen target has been the existence of a satisfactory quantum theory of rela-
tivistic particles set in space-time, rather than space-time itself.23
This suggests that there may considerable leeway to avoid the conclusion of this elimi-
nativist argument. That is, it does not follow from the fact that time fails to be represented
by an operator with desirable properties that time itself does not exist (at least not without
further argument). Now, this may be to take Halvorson’s argument sketch all too seri-
ously, after all he concludes the short note on a note of puzzlement: “What is the difference
between quantities that can be represented by operators, and those—such as ‘amount of
time’—that cannot? And why is time the only such parametric quantity? What is special
about time?” My inclination is to view his claim that “time [is] the only such parametric
quantity” as an indication that Halvorson has here fallen victim to the kind of confusion
outlined by Hilgevoord. By which I mean to say that time is not the only parametric quan-
tity in quantum theory, since there are directly analogous parametric quantities concerning
space.
Reflecting carefully on the role of the time parameter in quantum mechanics, we see that
it enters into the theory through its appearance in the unitary group of time shifts, Ut. From
there it comes to parameterize the states of the system (in the Schro¨dinger picture) through
the Schro¨dinger equation, which is just the instantaneous form of the equality ψt = Utψ that
determines the successive states of the system (where ψ is the state at t = 0). But there is,
of course, a directly analogous unitary group of spatial shifts Ua, generated by the (total)
momentum observable. One could equally write a family of spatially shifted states ψa = Uaψ,
and thereby derive a ‘spatial Scho¨dinger equation’ which concerns the infinitesimal variation
of the ψa (see Section 4.4). From this point of view, the additional significance of the group
of temporal symmetries derives from the fact that we (as observers confined to the present)
23See Halvorson & Clifton (2002) and in particular Malament (1996). It should be clear that the move to
quantum field theory won’t help here.
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are ourselves subject to an active transformation that takes us from our present to our future
(at a rate of one second per second, as it were).
That is, while one could argue that the temporal symmetries Ut are special in virtue
of their dynamical significance, they are certainly not special in virtue of involving a one-
parameter (strongly continuous) unitary family of symmetries. However, Pauli’s Theorem
does pick out the group Ut as special in the following sense: if H obeys the spectrum condition
then there is no self-adjoint operator T conjugate to H (in the Weyl sense) which could be
the generator in shifts of the spectrum of H, the generator of Ut. So what Pauli’s Theorem
demonstrates is that there is no one-parameter unitary group parameterized by energy. It is
not clear how this fact could bear on the existence of time.
However, it does entail that the time-energy uncertainty relation must be formally distinct
from the position-momentum uncertainty relation, despite the sterling work of Hilgevoord
(1996); Uffink (1990) to put them on the same footing. That is, Hilgevoord and Uffink’s
approach allows them to define two sets of relations for position and momentum: one set in
which variation in position under spatial shifts is considered, with momentum playing the
role of generator, and one set in which variation in momentum under shifts in momentum
(Galilean boosts) is considered, with position playing the role of generator. On the other
hand, when it comes to time and energy, only one set of relations may be defined (with energy
playing the role of generator) since, according to Pauli’s Theorem, there is no self-adjoint
generator of shifts in energy.
This is, it seems, the most significant fact that follows from the non-existence of a canoni-
cal time observable. But it is also the least unexpected since Pauli’s Theorem (global version)
rests on the fact that the existence of a canonical time observable is logically equivalent to
the existence of a unitary group of shifts in energy. Indeed, what we will see is that the cases
where time observables can be defined in quantum theory are precisely those where they
generate no such unitary group. For example, a maximally symmetric operator Tms is the
generator of a semigroup of isometries, parameterized by s ≥ 0, rather than a unitary group
parametrized by s ∈ R. The existence of such a semigroup is consistent with the energy
being bounded from below while the existence of a unitary group is not.
This observation, which also serves as a preview of upcoming attractions, concludes
this initial discussion of interpretative matters. I have argued for the deflationary conclusion
that the failure of quantum mechanics to allow for a canonical time observable has no special
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significance for the metaphysics of time. That is not to say that Pauli’s Theorem (particularly
in the refined form) has no metaphysical significance, however. For instance, in Pashby (2013)
I argue that there are implications for metaphysical views of persistence in time. Moreover, in
Chapter 6 I will argue that has an important application as a ‘no go’ result for the existence
of an ideal clock. In Section 8.1.2 I consider an interpretation of this result as concerning
the indeterminacy of the time of an event—the interpretation it was given by Srinivas &
Vijayalakshmi (1981).
4.4 APPENDIX: PROOFS OF PAULI’S THEOREM
This section contains details of the proof of the main result of this Chapter, Theorem 4.4.
There are two methods of proof, which we will consider in turn. The first method of proof
makes use of Borchers’ Lemma, which can be stated as follows:






for |t| < α where α > 0. Then FE = 0 implies that
FUtEU
†
t = 0 for all t ∈ R
The proof of Theorem 4.4 proceeds as follows.
Proof. Let ∆ be a bounded Borel subset ∆ ⊂ R with diameter |∆| < α. Since ET is a PVM
ET (∆) and ET (∆ + α) project onto orthogonal subspaces of H so that ET (∆)ET (∆ + α) =
0. It also follows that these projections commute, and that ET (∆ + α) commutes with
UtE
T (∆)U †t . Therefore the conditions of Borchers’ Lemma are satisfied, and so E
T (∆ +
α)UtE
T (∆)U †t = 0 for all t ∈ R. From Covariance we have ET (∆) = U−αET (∆ + α)U †−α
and so this implies that ET (∆)2 = 0 i.e. ET (∆) = 0 for every bounded ∆ ⊂ R. By taking
the limit |∆| → ∞ we obtain ET (R) = 0, which demonstrates that ET is not a PVM, for
which ET (R) = I.
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Roughly, if T is self-adjoint then it admits a PVM such that projection operators corre-
sponding to disjoint spectral subsets are orthogonal, while the covariance of the PVM with
time shifts entails that any projection P T (∆) is unitarily equivalent to its time translate
P T (∆ + t). These two properties are not in contradiction by themselves: the PVM of a
position observable PQ covaries with shifts in position generated by momentum; position
and momentum are a Weyl pair. It is the semi-boundedness of H that entails (by Borchers’
Lemma) that the product of such a projection with its time translate must be zero if they
are to correspond to orthogonal projections. But since the time shift is arbitrary, the only
way to ensure this is if P T (∆) is zero everywhere.
At this juncture, it is worth remarking on the relation of this proof to that of Malament
(1996), where it is demonstrated that there is no relativistic localization scheme for a single
quantum mechanical particle. There it is PQ which is under consideration (the PVM asso-
ciated with the position operator Q), and which is shown to equal zero, but the method of
proof relies again essentially on Borchers’ Lemma and the same spectrum condition. This
provides a hint that these two problems—the failure of quantum mechanics to provide a time
observable and the impossibility of providing a sharp relativistic localization scheme —are
related. We can think of Pauli’s Theorem as a no go result for a sharp temporal localization
scheme. Pauli’s Theorem is, then, essentially a time-like version of Malament’s theorem,
concerning time intervals rather than (instantaneous) spatial regions.
The second method of proof makes use of the following lemma, which plays the role of
Borchers’ Lemma in these proofs.
Lemma 4.2. [Hegerfeldt (1998)] Let H be semi-bounded and let Ut be the strongly continuous
group of unitary operators generated by H, where t ∈ R, and let P be a positive operator.
Then for all ψ ∈ H either
1. 〈ψ|U †t PUt|ψ〉 = 0 for all t, or
2. 〈ψ|U †t PUt|ψ〉 6= 0 for almost all t such that these t form a dense open set.
The lemma appears in more or less this form in Allcock (1969), Srinivas & Vijayalakshmi
(1981), Unruh & Wald (1989), and is used explicitly by Halvorson (2010). Since it often
features as an aside or a casual argument, it will be worthwhile to establish here a reasonably
careful proof of the Lemma, based on the proof supplied by Hegerfeldt (1998).
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Proof. The semi-boundedness of H implies that in its spectral resolution according to a
spectral family Eλ there is no contribution to the integral for the range λ < C. Without loss








Since the spectral resolution of H in terms of the spectral family Eλ also appears in our





Since P is a positive operator it has a unique positive square root P = (P 1/2)2. Define
p(t) = 〈ψ|U †t PUt|ψ〉 = ||P 1/2|ψt〉||2 ≥ 0. Since P 1/2 is positive, if p(t) = 0 then P 1/2ψt = 0.
As Ut is a strongly continuous unitary group, p(t) is a continuous function and so the set of
zeros N0 is closed. Its complement N c0 is thus open.
For fixed φ ∈ H consider the function Fφ(t) defined by the following inner product,




By the above argument, if p(t) = 0 then Fφ(t) = 0. Now we consider the same integral over
a complex variable z = t + iy which defines a complex function Fφ(z) which equals Fφ(t)








If P 1/2 is bounded the integral will converge so long as |eiλz| = |e−λy|, which is the case
for y ≥ 0 only (since Ut = eiHt). Therefore Fψ(t) is the boundary function of a complex
function Fψ(z) defined in the upper half of the complex plane which is continuous for y ≥ 0
and analytic for y > 0 (Rudin, 1987, p. 372).24
By the “edge of the wedge” theorem (Streater & Wightman, 1964, p. 74) there is a unique
analytic extension to the lower half of the complex plane. Fφ(t) is therefore the boundary
function of a unique, everywhere analytic extension Fψ(z) defined on the entire complex
plane.25
24Note how the semi-boundedness of H enters the argument here: if H had an unbounded spectrum, then
this integral would not exist.
25This follows also from the Riemann-Schwarz reflection principle, see (Titchmarsh, 1952, p. 155).
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Let the complement N c0 not be dense. Then there exists an open interval I such that
Fφ(t) = 0 for all t ∈ I. Then Fψ(z) vanishes on the whole of its domain and so Fφ(t) = 0 for
all t.26 This applies to any φ ∈ H and thus p(t).
So far we have shown that either Fφ(t) is identically zero, or it does not vanish on any
open interval. It remains to show that 1. is the case unless N0 is a set of measure zero.
Since Fφ(t) is the boundary value of a bounded analytic function it satisfies the following






If the set of zeros had non-zero measure then this integral would be −∞ (the natural log-
arithm being evaluated as the positive limit). Thus if Fφ(t) vanishes for a set of positive
measure it vanishes everywhere.
There is also a noteworthy corollary that follows from the proof:
Corollary 4.1. (No Successive Orthogonal States) Let P 1/2 = I and define the function
Fψ(t) = 〈ψt′|ψt〉 then 〈ψt′|ψt〉 6= 0 for almost all t, i.e., two dynamically allowed states
belonging to the same history of a unitarily evolving quantum mechanical system cannot be
mutually orthogonal, except for (at most) a set of instants of measure zero.
Making use of this lemma we have the following proof of Theorem 4.4 due to Halvorson
(2010), closely related to an argument given by Srinivas & Vijayalakshi (1981).27
Proof. Let f(t) = 〈φ|P∆+tφ〉 = 〈φ|U †t P∆Ut|φ〉 (by 1.), where φ is in range of P∆ and ∆ + t
is the subset ∆ shifted by t. Clearly f(t) satisfies the premises Hegerfeldt’s Lemma. From
Covariance we have 〈φ|P∆+t|P∆|φ〉 = 0 for all t > |∆|. Since P∆φ = φ we have that f(t) =
〈φ|P∆+tφ〉 = 〈φ|P∆+tP∆φ〉 = 0 for all t > |∆|, so that f(t) vanishes on a dense open interval.
Therefore, case 1. applies and f(t) = 0 for all t. Since we have 0 = f(0) = 〈φ|P∆φ〉 = 〈φ|φ〉
it follows that the range of P∆ is empty. The same argument applies for any ∆, thus P∆ = 0
for all ∆.
26This follows from the availability of power series representation for analytic functions. See (Rudin, 1987,
p. 208).
27It should be noted that Allcock (1969) appears to have been the first to make (essentially) this argument.
However, the argument he offers is invalid as he considers improper eigenstates of a time operator, which lie
outside of the Hilbert space and so fail to meet the conditions of the lemma.
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5.0 SOME CANDIDATE TIME OBSERVABLES
In Chapter 4 I introduced an investigation of Pauli’s Theorem by mentioning that the original
argument given by Pauli admits a significant class of counterexamples. This chapter provides
a detailed analysis of some of the better known examples of such pairs of operators. That is,
pairs which consist of a self-adjoint operator H with spectrum bounded from below, and a
symmetric operator T canonically conjugate to H, [H,T ]ψ = iψ, on a dense domain. These
are, therefore, Heisenberg pairs that are not Weyl pairs (i.e. pairs of operators that are
canonically conjugate in terms of their commutator without exponentiated unitary groups
that are canonically conjugate in the Weyl sense).
These operators have formed the basis of several attempts to introduce time observables
into quantum theory. For the most part, I will remain silent on the question of their in-
terpretation as time observables, and thus this chapter just contains an exposition of the
necessary technical details of the individual cases. Although these details will be referred
back to as needed, the reader who wishes only to engage with interpretative matters having
to do with time in quantum mechanics may skip this chapter with few ill effects. There
are, however, interpretative issues that arise which are of interest in their own right. For
example, in Section 5.3 I address the vexed issue of the phase observable of the quantum
harmonic oscillator.
I begin the chapter with an examination of the Schro¨dinger representation, which serves
as a model against which the atypical cases that follow can be judged. I then proceed
to consider periodic observables. First the ‘ideal clock’ of Hilgevoord, which involves a
unbounded Hamiltonian (modeled on angle and angular momentum) and then the phase
observables of the harmonic oscillator, which involves a semi-bounded Hamiltonian. In
Section 5.4 I provide a detailed analysis of the time of arrival operator Ta, which has already
come under discussion in Chapters 2 and 4. I conclude by offering a critical analysis of a
system that has often been proposed as providing a model of a linear quantum clock—a freely
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falling quantum particle. In Section 5.5 make use of the Equivalence Principle to provide an
alternative quantization of the classical system with a semi-bounded Hamiltonian, and thus
in which a candidate time observable does not arise.
5.1 COMMUTATION RELATIONS: THE SCHRO¨DINGER
REPRESENTATION
We will consider a system in one dimension, so the relevant space of functions is the square
integrable functions on the real line ψ(x) ∈ L2[R], a Hilbert space with inner product 〈φ|ψ〉 =∫∞
−∞ φ
∗(x)ψ(x)dx.1 We define operators for position Q and momentum P by, respectively,
multiplication and differentiation:
Qψ(x) = xψ(x) Pψ(x) = −i d
dx
ψ(x),
acting on square integrable functions on the the real line ψ(x) ∈ L2[R]. The domain of Q is
DQ = {ψ : xψ(x) ∈ L2[R]}, and the domain of P is DP = {ψ : ψ(x) is differentiable a. e.
}. It is easily seen that Q and P are symmetric on their respective domains.2 But since Q
and P are unbounded, their domains cannot be extended to the entire Hilbert space.3 This
makes the definition of their adjoints a somewhat delicate matter. For now, however, note
that Q and P form a Heisenberg pair since









= −ixψ′(x)− (−iψ(x) +−ixψ′(x))
= iψ(x)
on the domain D[Q,P ] = {ψ ∈ DQ : ψ(x) is differentiable a. e.; ψ′(x) ∈ DQ}. This is the
Schro¨dinger representation of the Heisenberg CCR, to which every irreducible representation
of the Weyl CCR is unitarily equivalent (by the Stone-von Neumann Theorem). This, then,
provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for a pair of self-adjoint operators to form a
Schro¨dinger representation.
1In terms of the inner product, the condition for inclusion of a function ψ in L2[R] is
∫∞
−∞ |ψ(x)|2dx <∞.
2Recall an operator A is symmetric on a domain DA when 〈φ|Aψ〉 = 〈Aψ|φ〉 for all φ, ψ ∈ DA.
3An operator A is bounded if ||Aψ|| = 〈Aψ|Aψ〉 < k||ψ|| for some k ∈ R+, for all ψ ∈ DA ⊆ H. If an
operator is defined everywhere and symmetric on all φ, ψ ∈ H, then it is bounded (Riesz and Nagy, p. 297).
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However, this does not tell us what it takes for a Heisenberg pair to form a Schro¨dinger
representation, since two densely defined symmetric operators A,B for which [A,B]ψ = iψ
holds on a dense domain are a Heisenberg pair, but may nonetheless fail to form a Weyl
pair. The following theorem, due to Dixmier, gives the necessary and sufficient conditions
for a Heisenberg pair to form, in addition, a Weyl pair.4
Theorem 5.1 (Dixmier). On a Hilbert space H suppose that A and B are densely defined
symmetric operators with a common dense domain DA∩DB such that [A,B] = iI on a dense
domain D[A,B] ⊂ DA ∩ DB with the following properties:
1. D[A,B] is invariant under A and B;
2. The restrictions of A, B, and A2 +B2 to D[A,B] are essentially self-adjoint.
Then A and B are self-adjoint and (A,B) is a Weyl pair (or a direct sum of such pairs).
Jauch (1968, p. 205) complains that these conditions are without an intuitive physical
basis, but the following physical interpretation is possible for Q and P . The Weyl CCR
states that Q and P are mutually covariant, and is logically equivalent to assuming the
covariance of Q under spatial shifts generated by P . In addition, Q is the generator of
shifts in momentum (Galilean boosts) and so both Q and P are closely linked to kinematic
symmetries arising from the homogeneity of the underlying space-time. Further, Q2 + P 2
is the generator of parity transformations Π = eipi(Q
2+P 2).5 Therefore, Dixmier’s conditions
can be interpreted as saying that a position operator covaries with spatial translations if and
only if it also covaries with spatial reflections (which is what the requirements on the domain
of the commutator amount to).6
4See Nelson (1959, pp. 602-3) Cor. 9.1 and 9.3 for a proof that these are necessary and sufficient, respec-
tively.
5This suggestion is due to Bryan Roberts (personal communication). We can see that this is the case
since Q2 +P 2 has a complete set of eigenfunctions |n〉, which are just the eigenstates of the number operator
N of the harmonic oscillator. Since, therefore, Π|n〉 = (−1)n|n〉, the effect of Π is to flip the sign of the odd
numbered eigenstates only, as expected. Moreover, Π is both unitary and self-adjoint as required (see, e.g.,
(Ballentine, 1998, p. 371)). Since Q = a†+a and P = −(a†+a), where a† and a are the raising and lowering
operators respectively, it follows by direct calculation in the number representation that ΠQΠ = −Q and
ΠPΠ = −P , as desired.
6This interpretation of these requirements is due to Bryan Roberts (personal communication). Since we
are only considering one-dimension of space, these are all the symmetry transformations available. Note,
however, that in a space of higher dimensionality we could compose spatial rotations from combinations of
parity transformations about distinct axes.
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We have seen that Q and P are self-adjoint in virtue of composing a Weyl pair, but
we may also show that they compose a Weyl pair in virtue of being self-adjoint. For an
unbounded symmetric operator A to be self-adjoint, its domain must be equal to the domain
of its adjoint, DA = DA† . If the domain of A is dense inH,7 then it has an adjoint operator A†
whose domain is closed, DA† = DA† , but it is not therefore self-adjoint, A = A†. A symmetric
operator A defined on a dense domain can only fail to be self-adjoint if its adjoint A† is an
extension of A to a larger domain, DA ⊂ DA† . If a symmetric operator cannot be extended
to a larger domain then it is a maximal symmetric operator. Every self-adjoint operator is
thus maximal symmetric. But every maximal symmetric operator is not self-adjoint, as we
shall see. We will now consider this question in detail for Q.
As the domain of Q is dense in H,8 it has an adjoint operator Q† defined for all vectors
Q†ψ ∈ DQ† ⊂ H such that 〈φ|Q†ψ〉 = 〈Qφ|ψ〉 for every φ, ψ ∈ DQ.9 Since Q is symmetric,
〈φ|Qψ〉 = 〈Qφ|ψ〉, we have Q†ψ = Qψ for all ψ ∈ DQ, and so the domain of Q† is an
extension of the domain of Q, DQ ⊆ DQ† . Therefore, Q is self-adjoint if the domain of Q† is
no larger that the domain of Q.
Consider a vector ψ ∈ DQ† . By the definition of Q†, there exists a vector χ = Q†ψ such
that 〈φ|χ〉 = 〈Qφ|ψ〉 for all φ, ψ ∈ DQ. Consider a sequence of vectors χn defined so that
χn(x) = χ(x) for −n ≤ x ≤ n and χn(x) = 0 for |x| < n, and the corresponding sequence of
vectors ψn defined likewise. Since ψn is therefore in the domain of Q, for each χn there is a
vector ψn ∈ DQ such that χn(x) = xψn(x). It follows that χ(x) = xψ(x), which implies that
xψ(x) is square integrable. Therefore ψ is in the domain of Q and the domain of Q† is not
larger that the domain of Q. Thus DQ = DQ† , and Q is self-adjoint.












7A domain D ⊂ H is dense if for all ψ ∈ H there exists a sequence of vectors ψn ∈ D such that ψn → ψ.
8For each ψ ∈ H define a sequence of vectors ψn such that ψn(x) = ψ(x) for −n ≤ x ≤ n, ψn(x) = 0
for |x| > n. Since xψn(x) is square integrable for all n, ψn is in DQ, and ψn → ψ as n → ∞, i.e.





|ψ(x)|2dx→ 0 as n→∞. Thus DQ is dense in H.
9Note that Dirac bra-ket notation (introduced at the end of the section) can be misleading in this regard
since it effectively collapses the distinction between being symmetric and having an adjoint. See (Jordan,
1969, pp. 30–31) for a helpful exposition of this matter, on which the present discussion is based.
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Now we consider the commutator of these unitary operators with P in the Schro¨dinger
representation,






= −i(iaeiaxψ(x) + eiaxψ′(x)) + ieiaxψ′(x)
= aeiaxψ(x) = aUaψ(x),
valid for all ψ in the domain of the commutator, D[Q,P ].10 P is also self-adjoint, although we
will not prove it here.11 By Prop. 4.1 above, this suffices to show that (Q,P ) is a Weyl pair
since it follows from [P,Ua] = aUa that U−aPUa = P + aI for all a ∈ R, on a dense domain.
We conclude our discussion of the Schro¨dinger representation with a brief account of the
relation between Q and P . These operators are unitarily equivalent, in the sense that they







where ψ(k) is the vector ψ written in the momentum representation. This is a unitary
operation and, since U †QUψ(x) = −iψ′(x), we have P = U †QU . Note that position in the
momentum representation acts by differentiation, Qψ(k) = −iψ′(k), and momentum acts
by multiplication Pψ(k) = kψ(k). This also provides another means to see that eiQa and
eiP b produce shifts in momentum and position, respectively, since UeiQaψ(x) = ψ(k−a) and
U †eiP bψ(k) = ψ(x+ b).
This also provides a useful juncture to discuss the use of bra-ket notation, introduced
by Dirac.12 For our purposes, we need to observe that the following provides a valid re-




















10Since Ua is unitary and thus bounded, its domain can always be extended to the entire space. In that
case, aUaψ(x) is in DQ.
11See (Von Neumann, 1955, §2.9).
12See (Jordan, 1969, p. 60) for a more complete discussion.
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The kets |x〉 are not elements of the Hilbert space, but 〈p|x〉 = e−ipx provides the crucial







dx e−ipxψ(x) = ψ(p).
So long as the more sophisticated expressions are ‘sandwiched’ between two vectors, they
form a valid inner product that may be evaluated in the usual way. The notorious Dirac-δ
arises when we use these rules to define ‘matrix elements’ for operators with continuous
spectra such as,
〈x|Q|x′〉 = x′δ(x− x′),









′) = δ(p− p′).
These are to be considered as mere formal devices to aid calculation of legitimate inner prod-
ucts.13 In considering self-adjoint operators with discrete (purely point) spectra, however,
the kets represent genuine eigenvectors that lie in a Hilbert space, and the matrix elements
are genuinely the entries of an (infinite-dimensional) matrix, operating on a vector given
with respect to the complete orthonormal basis formed by the eigenvectors.
5.2 BOUNDED TIME OBSERVABLE: THE IDEAL PERIODIC CLOCK
This proposal for a time operator avoids Pauli’s Theorem by restricting the spectrum of the
operator to an interval [0, τ ]. The periodic time observable is thus closely related to the angle
observable Φ associated with the (azimuthal) angular momentum L, which can be defined
on L2[−pi, pi] as follows
Φψ(ϕ) = ϕψ(ϕ) Lψ = −i d
dϕ
ψ(ϕ)
where ψ(ϕ) ∈ L2[−pi, pi]. In that case, L has genuine eigenvectors |m〉 = eimϕ, with m ∈ Z,
since then
Lz|m〉 = −i d
dϕ
eimϕ = m|m〉.
13We will not be making use of the ‘rigged’ Hilbert space construction, therefore. See, e.g., Ballentine
(1998). Nor will we consider these deltas in their proper mathematical setting, i.e. as distributions.
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That is to say that the spectrum of L is discrete, i.e. purely point, and the eigenvectors
{|m〉} form a complete orthonormal basis for L2[−pi, pi]. The spectral resolution of L, as








where |m〉〈m| is the one-dimensional projection onto |m〉. We may write an arbitrary vector
ψ(ϕ) ∈ L2[−pi, pi] as







eimϕψ(m) = U †ψ(m),
where U † is the inverse Fourier transform.
Being symmetric and bounded, Φ is self-adjoint on the domain Dφ = {ψ(ϕ) ∈ L2[−pi, pi] :








where |ϕ〉 /∈ L2[−pi, pi] is an ‘improper’ eigenvector which, properly speaking, belongs to the









are well-defined on L2[−pi, pi]. Thus writing the same vector ψ in the angular momentum
representation we have









dϕ e−imϕ〈ϕ|ψ〉 = Uψ(ϕ),
where U is the Fourier-Plancherel transformation.










14See Ballentine (1998) for a discussion of this construction.
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dϕ′ ϕ′〈m|ϕ′〉〈ϕ′|ϕ〉 = ϕ 1√
2pi
e−imϕ = ϕ〈m|ϕ〉.
We conclude our initial analysis by examining how Φ acts in the angular momentum repre-





































































































so that the commutation relation returns





which evidently is not equal to iI since it is undefined when m = n. Indeed, as Susskind &
Glogower (1964) originally pointed out, this relation cannot hold on the entire domain of L
since
〈m|ΦL− LΦ|n〉 = (n−m)〈m|Φ|n〉,










which demonstrates that Φ, L are a Heisenberg pair. Evidently, though, they cannot form
a Weyl pair since if they did the Stone-von Neumann Theorem would entail that they have
the spectrum of the reals, which they do not. Furthermore, since they are not a Weyl pair,
they do not form a Schro¨dinger representation.
Nonetheless, since Φ and L are self-adjoint, they can be exponentiated through the














where k ∈ Z and ϕ ∈ R. Moreover, these are indeed families of shift operators, as can be



















= 〈m+ k|ψ〉 = ψ(m+ k).
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= 〈ϕ− φ|ψ〉 = ψ(ϕ− φ).
where it should be noted that the shift is periodic, (ϕ − φ) mod 2pi, since it appears as a
complex phase. Had we treated (Φ, L) as a Schro¨dinger representation and attempted to
reason accordingly we would have been erroneously led to conclude that eiLφψ /∈ L2[−pi, pi]
since U †eiPaψ(k) = ψ(x+ b). By working in the angular momentum representation, we can
see that this is not the case since functions of angle are periodic.
Although they do not form a Schro¨dinger representation, it seems reasonable to suppose
that angle and angular momentum are ‘true’ conjugates. In particular, their exponential
groups can be seen to obey a relation that appropriately reflects their mutual covariance in

























The only distinction between this Weyl-like relation and the real thing is that this relation
only holds for k ∈ Z, with φ mod 2pi. But this is exactly what one would expect from this
pair of conjugate operators, one of which has a discrete spectrum and one of which has a
periodic spectrum.
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The resulting covariance of Φ and L is interestingly distinct from that of the Schro¨dinger

























So far so good. But things are less straightforward for angle. First, we evaluate the ‘matrix
elements’
〈m|eiLφΦe−iLφ|n〉 = ei(m−n)φ〈m|Φ|n〉,












































it would be tempting to read it as saying that Φ is covariant under shifts in angle in the same
way as Q is covariant under shifts in position. That would be a mistake, however, since this
is a definite integral, for which a change of variables results in a change of limits. We can
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(λ− φ) d〈χ|PΦλ ψ〉+
∫ −pi+φ
−pi











= 〈χ|Φ + φI+ piPΦ([−pi,−pi + φ])|ψ〉 := 〈χ|Φφψ〉.
This demonstrates that the behavior of Φ under shifts generated by L is not strictly co-
variance, since eiLφΦe−iLφ defines a distinct operator, eiLφΦe−iLφ = Φφ. This indicates that
the phase observable Φ is only unique up to a phase factor φ mod 2pi. This is yet another
indication that we are not dealing here with a Schro¨dinger representation.
This kind of behavior led Levy-Leblond (1976) to propose that the unitary operator eiΦ
provides a better candidate for the angle observable than Φ. Although a unitary operator
is not self-adjoint, its periodicity in ϕ (identified by Susskind & Glogower as the cause of
the difficulties with Φ) serves to provide an effective parameterization of phase, despite its
complex spectrum. As Uffink (1990) contends, the supposed unobservability of a complex
number—often cited as a reason to restrict the set of observables to the self-adjoint opera-
tors15—is no bar to viewing the spectral values of eiϕ (the set {z ∈ C : |z| = 1}), as a natural
parameterization of angle since they serve as an effective co-ordinatization of the circle S1.
It is easily seen from the Weyl-like relation above that eiΦ has the desired covariance
property
eiLφeiΦe−iLφ = e−iφeiΦ = ei(Φ−φ),




m|m+ 1〉〈m| − (m+ 1)|m+ 1〉〈m| = −eiΦ.
However, since similar relations are obeyed by the entire family of operators eikΦ, the follow-
ing question naturally arises: which of the operators eikΦ is the angle observable (canonically
conjugate to L)? Furthermore, the physical significance of the operators eikΦ lies in their
being members of a unitary group of angular momentum shift operators, and so it would
15Note that this is also in itself poor reasoning, since a symmetric operator has a real spectrum, but may
not be self-adjoint.
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be odd to view one (or all) of them as themselves representing angle itself. So what does
represent angle?
I contend that these difficulties suggest that the covariant quantity ‘angle’ is best repre-
sented by the corresponding PVM, given by the Spectral Theorem as a map from the Borel
subsets of R to the projections PΦ : B(R) → L(H). The non-uniqueness of this family
simply reflects the fact that the spectrum of Φ is periodic, and any mapping from S1 to R
is non-unique up to a phase. This explains the non-uniqueness of the resulting self-adjoint
angle operators Φφ. But, better, we can regard the PVM associated with angle as a map
from the Borel subsets of the circle Z ∈ B(S1), which can be defined as the intersection of













where ϕ is to be understood as the angle around a circle, the points of which are parame-














= P (Z − φ)
where φ is evidently modulo 2pi. This has the result that projections P (Z) related by a shift
of φ = 2npi are identified, P (Z + 2npi) = P (Z). The operators eikϕ are given in terms of





where Pϕ = P ([0, ϕ]) involves an arbitrary choice of origin. The uniqueness of these operators
is not threatened by that arbitrary choice. Thus the covariance of eiϕ and its commutation
relation with L should be seen as a consequence of the covariance of angle (in the form of





clearly depend on the choice of the phase, in the sense that Pλ = P ([φ, φ+λ]). This explains
their non-uniqueness. Thus, likewise, the failure of Φ to covary with shifts in angle is no bar
to viewing angle—represented by the PVM P (Z)—as a covariant quantity.
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5.3 BOUNDED TIME OBSERVABLE: HARMONIC OSCILLATOR PHASE
The original suggestion that the phase of a quantum harmonic oscillator would function as a
quantum clock is due to Susskind & Glogower (1964). But the correct definition of a phase
observable is a topic of considerable interest in its own right, and has a venerable history
that begins with Dirac’s (1927) famous paper on quantum electrodynamics. In that paper
Dirac introduced the use of creation and annihilation or “ladder” operators to provide a
representation of the dynamics of the electromagnetic field. These operators were derived
from number and phase operators by aid of an analogy with the representation of a classical
single mode field by amplitude and phase. However, although the ladder operators he posited
could be given a firm theoretical basis, the assumption he made that number and phase were
a canonical pair (like position and momentum) turned out to be mistaken.
This was first pointed out by Susskind & Glogower (1964) who suggested replacing the
problematic phase operator (resembling the argument of a complex number) with a pair
of operators resembling the Euler decomposition into trigonometric functions, which Levy-
Leblond (1976) advocated combining into a single unitary operator. Garrison & Wong (1970)
and Galindo (1984) were able to construct self-adjoint operators conjugate to phase, provid-
ing a counterexample to Pauli’s original argument that did not depend on the Hamiltonian
being unbounded (see Chapter 4). These developments often displayed an implicit under-
standing of the fact that the underlying structure was that of a phase POVM (rather than
a PVM) but this connection was made explicit by Busch et al. (1995b) as a means of dis-
playing the connections between various approaches to the quantum phase observable. The
following discussion aims to fill in some details of the account of phase that thus emerged.




)~ω with n ≥ 0, and displays the characteristically quantum ‘zero-point’ energy
of the lowest energy state E0 = 1/2~ω. This suggests that the Hamiltonian can be written
in units of ~ω as H = N + 1
2
, where N = a†a is the number operator, which is self-adjoint
with spectrum N0.16 By letting a† = 1/
√
2(Q − iP ) and a = 1/√2(Q − iP ) we see that
H = N+1/2 = Q2 +P 2, which (up to some constants) is the Hamiltonian in the Schro¨dinger
representation. The number eigenstates N |n〉 = n|n〉 are obtained by repeated application
16Thus we have again adopted natural units, in which ω = ~ = 1.
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and form an complete orthonormal basis for H.17
This indicates that there is an interesting similarity to the case of angle and angular
momentum, with the number eigenstates |n〉 playing the role of the angular momentum
eigenstates |m〉. The difference lies in the fact that L has the spectrum Z whereas N has
spectrum N0. Another indication comes from the way that the creation and annihilation
operators act to raise and lower the number eigenstates
a†|n〉 = √n+ 1|n+ 1〉; a|n〉 = √n|n− 1〉 with a|0〉 = 0.
By analogy with eiΦ from the previous section, we might expect the following operators to














It is easily seen that these are (improper) eigenstates of V , in the sense that V |φ〉 = eiφ|φ〉.18
This analogy with eiΦ might lead one to believe that V is a unitary operator, but this would
be a mistake.19 V is an isometry but not a unitary transformation since V †V 6= I. We can




|n+ 1〉〈n|m〉〈m+ 1| = I− |0〉〈0|.
Nonetheless, V is an isometry (Levy-Leblond (1976) calls it ‘one-sided unitary’) as we see
from the fact that
V V † =
∑
n,m≥0
|n〉〈n+ 1|m+ 1〉〈m| = I.
17See, e.g., (Jauch, 1968, p. 211-215) for a detailed derivation of these results.
18They are not, however, eigenstates of V † since V †|φ〉 = e−iφ (|φ〉 − |0〉).
19Carruthers & Nieto (1968) provide a quick reductio argument for this conclusion as follows. If V ∗V =
V V ∗ = I then we have [a, a†] = (V N1/2(V N1/2)†− (V N1/2)†V N1/2 = V NV †−N = I. Thus if V is unitary
then N and (N + I) are unitarily equivalent. However, this can’t be the case since the spectrum of the latter
is N1 rather than N0.
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So whereas angle Φ was a self-adjoint operator associated with a family of unitary operators
eikΦ, with k ∈ Z, there is no such unitary group in the case of phase. There is, however, a





It is easily confirmed that V l(V l)† = I, but (V l)†V l = I −∑ln=0 |n〉〈n|. This behavior is
characteristic of {V l} forming a semigroup rather than a group.20
Were V l a group rather than a semigroup, we would be able to apply Stone’s Theorem
to find its unique self-adjoint generator. Nonetheless, a semigroup does have a generator,
by which we mean a symmetric operator whose (generalized) spectral resolution defines a
series of exponential operators. The distinction here is that the generator of a semigroup is
associated with a POVM that is not a PVM. There is, in fact, a similar result to Naimark’s
Dilation Theorem (Thm. 3.9) that applies here:
Theorem 5.2 (Cooper21). If {Vs} is a semigroup of isometric transformations of H then
there exists a larger Hilbert space K ⊃ H in which there exists a one-parameter unitary group
{Us} and a projection P onto H such that
Vsψ = PUsψ (5.1)
for all ψ ∈ H and all s ≥ 0.
Once we obtain the unitary group {Us} by dilation in this manner, we may apply Stone’s








The generator of the group Uk (operators on K ⊃ H) will be a self-adjoint operator Φ′ on
K such that Uk = eikΦ′ for all k ∈ Z. This operator closely resembles the angle observable










20A semigroup is a family of transformations {Ts} defined only for s ≥ 0 such that T0 = I and TrTs = Tr+s
for all r ≥ 0, s ≥ 0. See (Riesz & Sz.-Nagy, 1990, p. 393).
21See (Riesz & Sz.-Nagy, 1990, p. 396).
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for all l ≥ 0. This relationship, in fact, serves to define the POVM EΦ uniquely (up to
unitarity) (Busch et al., 1995b).
Another indication that phase is represented by a POVM rather than a PVM is the fact











However, the |φ〉 form an overcomplete (i.e. non-orthogonal) basis and so provide a (gener-










We can confirm the covariance of EΦ with shifts generated by number, in analogy with






dφ ei(n−m)(φ+θ)|m〉〈n| = Eϕ(Z + θ).
This also implies that Φ, the expectation operator of the POVM EΦ, can be given as follows,


















This operator is symmetric and bounded, therefore it is self-adjoint.22 This leads to an
apparent conflict with the Spectral Theorem, which appears to state that every self-adjoint
operator has a spectral resolution.
We can see, however, that this conflict is indeed only apparent. We have in effect defined
the POVM EΦ through its covariance properties under the unitary group generated by N
(an operator with a spectrum bounded from below). Therefore, Pauli’s Theorem entails that
22See Galapon (2002b) for a painstakingly direct proof of this fact.
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EΦ is not a PVM. Nonetheless, Φ, a self-adjoint operator, has a unique spectral resolution
corresponding to a PVM. This spectral resolution, however, is not covariant under shifts
in phase generated by N .23 Note also that the periodicity of phase also creates the same
difficulty for the covariance of Φ as for the angle observable, so that
e−iNθΦeiNθ = Φ+ θI+ piEΦ([−pi,−pi + φ]) = Φθ. (5.2)
There is thus a sense in which requiring phase shift covariance alone is insufficient to
pick out a phase operator uniquely. Lahti & Pellonpa¨a¨ (2000) show that requiring (i) phase-
shift covariance, (ii) that the number observable N generates phase shifts, and (iii) that a
phase observable generates number shifts, is sufficient to pick out EΦ uniquely (up to unitary
equivalence). We have made each of these assumptions above. In that case, it seems we have
just as good a reason regard EΦ as a canonical representation of phase as we did to regard
P (Z) as the canonical representation of angle. It is only at this level of abstraction that
the relation between a measurement of phase and a single covariant quantity defined on the
physical Hilbert space becomes apparent.
5.4 LINEAR TIME OBSERVABLE: TIME OF ARRIVAL
5.4.1 The Classical Distribution of Arrival Times
To consider the simplest possible case, take a classical free particle in one dimension, with the
event in question being arrival at the origin. The position of the particle is q(t) = q0 + p/mt
and on a space-time diagram the possible trajectories will appear as diagonal lines with
gradient p/m, each trajectory crossing the origin q = 0 exactly once. Setting q(t) = 0 and
rearranging we find that t = −(mq0/p), which gives the time t at which the particle “arrives”
at the origin. (Similarly we could have considered the time at which the particle arrives at
any point q(t) = x.) So long as p 6= 0 (in which case this expression is ill-defined) if we
evolve the system forward by t′, then the particle arrives at the origin t′ seconds earlier.
23See the discussion of Lahti & Pellonpa¨a¨ (2000).
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Perhaps a more telling comparison arises from analysis of the classical phase space dis-
tribution, defined for an ensemble of non-interacting particles by24∫
f(q, p, t) dq dp = 1.
The probability density for finding a particle at a point x at time t is found by integrating
this quantity over p,
ρ(x, t) =
∫
f(x, p, t) dp.
The time at which a particle crosses a point X is T = (X − q0)m/p0, where q0, p0 are
the initial data. Consider the following distribution, defined for f(q, p ≥ 0, t) i.e. for an
ensemble with only positive momenta
Π(T ;X) = ρ(X,T ) =
∫ ∞
0










Since ρ(X,T )dt corresponds to the fraction of particles that cross X between T and T + ∆t,
we have ∫ ∞
−∞










This quantity corresponds to the average arrival time for the ensemble. Note that there is a
singularity at p0, which corresponds to a particle failing to cross the point x at all, but the
integral converges so long as it is canceled somewhat by f .





dpf(X, p, T )
|p|
m
= Π+[T ;X] + Π−[T ;X].
A crucial property possessed by this distribution is covariance under time shifts. This can
be seen by defining the time co-ordinate t = t0 + T relative to a reference instant t0, where
f(t0) is the distribution associated with t0. We have
Π[T ;X; f(t0)] =
∫ ∞
∞





Π[T ;X; f(t0)] = Π[T + t0;X; f(0)].
The quantum analog of the distribution f is the Wigner functionW , but the key difference
is that W is not a true probability distribution but only a ‘quasi-probability’ distribution
24In what follows I draw heavily from the excellent review article by Muga & Leavens (2000).
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since it may take negative values. The extent to which this is the case for a given quantum
state is taken to indicate the ‘non-classicality’ of the state. It is a somewhat surprising
fact that even for rightward directed states whose momentum is solely positive, the Wigner
function need not be positive. That is, there exist states (and times) for which the direction
of probability current flows leftward, even though the momentum has only positive support.
This is known as the backflow effect, first noted by Allcock (1969), and is related to the
non-commutativity of the experimental question “Is the particle in the region x ≥ 0?” with
the requirement that the state be one of only positive momentum.25
This indicates that the relation between the classical and quantum distributions cannot
be so simple. However, Kijowski (1974) demonstrated that the classical time of arrival
distribution f(t) may be recovered uniquely from the following axioms.
1. Π ≥ 0
2.
∫∞
−∞Π dt = 1
3. If f ′ = (q + x, p, t) = f(x− q, p, t) then Π(F ′) = Π(F )
4. Π has the minimum variance (∆t)2.
This result demonstrates (at least) that there exists a set of necessary conditions that define
the arrival time in classical mechanics (for the case of free motion). Remarkably, Kijowski
also showed that these axioms serve to define uniquely a corresponding quantum distribution.
The distribution obtained by Kijowski as a result of imposing his axioms on the quantum
case takes the following form for a state with only positive momentum









This gives the probability of a free particle arriving at X at an instant t = t0 + T , where t
is also the parameter that appears in the unitary evolution of the state ψ(t). The general
case (with positive and negative momentum) is obtained by considering the sum of the two
separate integrals, that is











25Perhaps the easiest way of explaining this comes from considering the Bohmian picture: the backflow
effect is associated with Bohmian particle trajectories which change the sign of their momentum under the
influence of the quantum potential even when the particle is free.
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where α = ±1. Since the dependence on t arises only through the state ψ(t0), the distribution
is covariant under time shifts,
ΠK [T ;X;ψ(t0)] = Π[T + t0;X;ψ(0)].
This is precisely the behavior one would expect of an event time. The distribution this
defines was the same as that derived by Allcock (1969) as an approximation, and has as
its first moment the time of arrival Ta. This was the subject a detailed study in Chapter
5. Furthermore, the Weyl quantization of the classical expression above results in much the
same operator Ta—not to mention other quantization schemes as well (Muga & Leavens,
2000, p. 390). Since Ta is maximal symmetric but not self-adjoint, the quantum distribution
is associated with a POVM and so higher moment operators are not obtained in the usual
manner, i.e. T 2a is not the second moment of the POVM E
Ta .
5.4.2 The Quantum Distribution
Here we investigate in more detail the properties of Ta, which, given its similarity to the
operator of Aharanov and Bohm (1961), is often referred to as the Aharanov-Bohm time
of arrival operator (Muga & Leavens, 2000). However, the difference of overall sign signals
their original intent to regard their operator as a quantum clock: the classical expression
corresponding to their operator returns q(t) = vt, which entails that q(0) = 0 so that the
position of the particle is proportional to the elapsed time, as required of a clock. We will
be interested here in the time of arrival operator, interpreted as returning the time of an
event (the particle’s crossing the point x = 0) rather than a clock observable, measurement















P−1[Q,P 2] + [Q,P 2]P−1
)
= i.
Therefore, (Ta, H) form a Heisenberg pair. In accord with Pauli’s Theorem, since H is
semi-bounded Ta is not self-adjoint.
26See Section 2.3.4 for a critique of the idea that a quantum free particle admits such a clock observable.
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Making the substitution q = i d
dp

























Since this involves a factor of (1/p) there will be a singular point at p = 0, and this is the
source of the difficulties which prevent Ta from being self-adjoint. However, we can define
a suitable dense domain on which Ta is symmetric. The problem will be restricting the
functions ψ(p) ∈ H so that |Taψ|2 <∞, with the problematic part of the integral being the




with a > 0. If ψ(p) ∼ p1/2 as p→ 0 then this part of the integral vanishes, and if ψ(p) ∼ p3/2
then the contribution is finite for any a.27 Splitting the domain of integration into two parts
from −∞ to −a and a to ∞, the dependence on a appears as28
〈ψ|Taψ〉 − 〈Taψ|ψ〉 = −i lim
a→+0




Since Ta is formally symmetric, we chose the domain so that this limit vanishes, which it
won’t if ψ(p) ∼ p1/2 as p → 0, so instead we require ψ(p)/p3/2 → 0 as p → 0. Thus Ta is
symmetric on the domain
DTa =
{




→ 0;Taψ ∈ H
}
.
This restricted domain for Ta leads Paul (1962) to doubt the physical meaningfulness of this
operator. Indeed, Heathcote (1990) argues similarly that there is a problem in general for
the foundations of quantum mechanics involving unbounded operators, since functions not
in the domain of an unbounded operator represent vector states for which the expectation
value of the operator is not defined. But in that case it is not clear that the difficulties faced
by Ta are different in kind from those faced by the unbounded symmetric operators such as
Q and P that Heathcote considers, which are generally taken to be physically meaningful.
It is just an unfortunate fact of life that unbounded operators will not be defined for all
vectors inH. But, since the domain is dense, a sequence of vectors in the domain can be found




p the integral evaluates as 4(log(a)− log(−a)) = i4pi.
28See Paul (1962) for details.
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arrival, there is a reasonable expectation that some states will have an ill-defined expectation
value for arrival at the origin anyway, since the classical time of arrival is undefined for states
with p = 0. Furthermore, as Heathcote notes, although the expectation value of a symmetric
unbounded operator is undefined for states not in its domain, the probability distribution
for the outcomes of measurements associated with any state at all can be obtained by means
of the associated PVM (or POVM in this case).
Our interest now is in whether Ta is self-adjoint. First, since it is densely defined it
does possess an adjoint T †a whose domain is closed.
29 To see this, we use von Neumann’s
formula for essential self-adjointness, according to which a symmetric operator has a unique
self-adjoint extension (i.e. is essentially self-adjoint) if and only if its deficiency indices are
(0, 0) (See Section 3.2). That is, we want to compare the number of eigenvectors of T †a with
eigenvalue i with the number of eigenvectors with eigenvalue −i. The critical calculation
involves seeing whether there exists some ψ ∈ H such that
〈ψ|(Ta ± i)φ〉 = 0
for all φ ∈ DTa . For T †a , then, the following are eigenfunctions corresponding to i
ψ±(p) = Θ(±)
√±pe−p2/2m,
where Θ is the Heaviside step function. There are no eigenvectors with eigenvalue −i. The
deficiency indices are thus (2, 0), demonstrating that Ta is maximal symmetric but not self-
adjoint.30
In contrast to the case of the harmonic oscillator, where we could compare number and
phase to the angular momentum and angle pair and so see how to ‘double’ the energy
spectrum, it is not immediately obvious how one should go about constructing such a rep-
resentation for the free particle. The guiding principle here is that, as realized by Dirac
back in 1926, time, being (in principle) conjugate to energy, should take the representation
−i∂/∂E in the energy representation. The key, then, is to find the energy representation,
which we can do in terms of the momentum representation H(R, dp). Egusquiza & Muga
(1999) suggest the isomorphism
H(R, dp) ≡ H(R+, dE)⊕H(R+, dE)
29The following analysis follows that of Egusquiza & Muga (1999) rather closely.
30See the more detailed general discussion of Section 3.2.
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which decomposes H into a direct sum of orthogonal subspaces corresponding to positive
and negative momenta (so that the inner product is given as a sum). In essence, the idea is
















[Θ(p)ψ(p) + Θ(−p)ψ(p)] .























Under this isomorphism, the time of arrival has the representation Ta = (−i∂E) ⊕ (−i∂E)
where each of these operators is isomorphic to momentum on the half line, due to the
semi-bounded spectrum of H.
Interestingly, the study of momentum on the half line goes back to von Neumann, who
used it to illustrate the distinction between self-adjoint and maximally symmetric operators
in 1929. Rather than consider a free particle on the real line, with Hilbert space H =
L2(−∞,∞), we consider a free particle on the positive half line H1/2 = L2[0,∞). Although
the position and momentum operators are defined in the usual manner, with Q′ acting by
multiplication and P ′ = −i d
dx
, the domain of the momentum operator must be restricted so
that functions vanish at the origin,
DP ′ =
{
ψ ∈ H1/2 : ψ′ ∈ H1/2 : ψ(0) = 0
}
.
This leads to the fact that eix is an eigenfunction of P ′† with eigenvalue i, while there is no
eigenfunction with eigenvalue −i. Thus P ′ has deficiency indices (1, 0).
To find the Naimark dilation of P ′ we merely reintroduce the other half of the real line.
Let us first write down an explicit expression for the POVM associated with P ′,




where |p′〉 = (1/√2pi)eipx. These improper generalized eigenvectors form an overcomplete
basis forH1/2. They are not orthogonal, which is indicative of P ′ being maximally symmetric.






where again |p〉 = (1/√2pi)eipx, but these form a complete basis for H = L2(−∞,∞).











It is clear that if we define a projection P such that (Pψ)(x) = Θ(x)ψ(x), for all ψ ∈ H,










dp 〈φ|x〉〈x|p〉〈p|y〉〈y|ψ〉 = 〈φ|F ([a, b])ψ〉.
Thus E([a, b]) is the PVM of our Naimark dilation, defined on H ⊃ H1/2. For future
reference, it will be useful to write the associated probability density Πψ(p) for a state
ψ ∈ H′, given as follows








The same procedure applies for Ta, where we will find its Naimark dilation in the ‘doubled’
energy representation. Momentum on the half line corresponds to the time of arrival, whereas
position is self-adjoint on the half line, and so corresponds to the energy of the free particle.
In that case, to follow the analogy we express Ta in the energy representation as Ta = −i ddE .
Reintroducing the decomposition into positive and negative momenta, we have Ta = (−i∂E)⊕
(−i∂E) = T+a ⊕T−a acting onH(R+, dE)⊕H(R+, dE), where T±a are isomorphic to momentum
on the half line. The Naimark dilation is to be found in H± = H(R, dE)⊕H(R, dE), which
extends the energy representation to functions of negative energy.
Consider the operator  that acts by multiplication on this extended space, (ψ)(x) =
xψ(x). This operator is self-adjoint, and has a corresponding PVM




where |E〉 = (1/√2pi)eiEt. Correspondingly, there is a self-adjoint operator τ which acts by
differentiation in the ‘energy basis’ and has a PVM




where |t〉 = (1/√2pi)e−iEt. If so, we have a Schro¨dinger representation, formed by  and
τ . That is, an ‘energy-time representation’; in this ‘larger’ Hilbert space of the Naimark
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dilation, ‘energy’ and ‘time’ are true conjugates.31 Consider the following inner product for
φ, ψ ∈ H±,










As before, the ‘probability density’ is introduced as follows







dE ′〈ψ|E〉eit(E−E′)〈E ′|ψ〉dt = ΠTψ(t)dt.















As before, if we introduce a projection P such that (Pψ)(E) = Θ(E)ψ(E) then we
obtain a POVM by projection PET ([a, b]) = F Ta([a, b]). This leads to a probability density

















which is the probability density associated with the time of arrival Ta. Therefore the POVM
corresponding to Ta is PE
T ([a, b]) = F Ta([a, b]).

























































This is all we need to explicitly calculate expectation values and probabilities for the time of
arrival via its POVM. The time translation covariance of the the PVM ET ([a, b]) is preserved
31The scare quotes indicate the interpretative hazards of regarding the Naimark dilation as a providing a
representation of a physical quantity of a physical system here: since no quantum systems have unbounded
energy spectra, this cannot be a representation of a quantum system.
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when projected back down to the POVM, but Ta is not the generator of shifts in energy; Ta is
the generator of a semigroup of shifts in energy. There is a sense, then, in which Ta cannot be
‘the’ canonical time observable. This is as it should be, since Ta is a case specific observable,
in the sense that it is one of a family of time of arrival observables: Ta corresponds to arrival
at the origin, x = 0, and so forms one of a one-parameter family of ‘arrival at x operators,’
reached by spatial translation of F Ta([a, b]) under the usual unitary group.
5.5 LINEAR TIME OBSERVABLE: FREELY FALLING PARTICLE
The Hamiltonian here consists of the usual kinetic term and a potential term, H = (1/2m)P 2+
mgQ, where g is the acceleration due to the potential field (assumed here to be gravita-
tional). Since H is self-adjoint (being the sum of two self-adjoint operators) there exists a
unitary group Ut = e
iHt. Formally, we have [Q,H] = (i/m)P and [P,H] = −img. Thus
[Q,Ut] = −(1/m)UtPt and [P,Ut] = mgtUt, and the Heisenberg equations of motion yield
Q(t) = U−tQUt = Q− (P/m)t− 1
2
gt2 P (t) = U−tPUt = P +mgt.
This suggests that the operator Tg = P/(mg) has commutator [T,H] = −i and increases
linearly with time Tg(t) = U−tTgUt = Tg + t. Since P is self-adjoint, Tg is self-adjoint, and
(Tg, H) forms a Weyl pair. As Pauli’s Theorem demands, H has an unbounded spectrum.
There is good reason to doubt that this is the correct quantization of the classical system,
however, since I here propose an alternative quantization scheme in which the spectrum of
the Hamiltonian is bounded from below. The form of the classical equation of motion
indicates that the gravitational potential can be removed by means of a time dependent
co-ordinate transformation into the freely falling frame, q(t)→ q′(t) = q(t) + (1/2)gt2. I will
now show that this transformation implements Einstein’s original Equivalence Principle: no
experiment can differentiate between the effects of a homogeneous gravitational field and the
effects of constant acceleration. The acceleration experienced by the classical particle due
to the gravitational field is q¨ = −g, and the acceleration relative to the primed co-ordinates
is q¨′ = 0.
Since there are no other forces acting on the system in the primed frame, Newton’s
Second Law returns F ′ = mq¨′ = 0 and the Lagrangian is L′ = (1/2)mq˙′2. The Hamil-
tonian in the primed frame is thus h′ = 1
2m
p′2. When we solve Hamilton’s Equations for
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h′, q′, p′ we find that q′(t) = q′(0) + p′(t)/m and p′(t) = p′(0). The initial data are the
same in each frame p′(0) = p(0), q′(0) = q(0). Performing the inverse transformation
q′(t) → q(t) = q′(t) − (1/2)gt2 we find that q(t) = q(0) + p(0)/m − (1/2)gt2, as before.
We also have Newton’s Second Law in the unprimed frame, F = mq¨ = −mgt, which when
integrated indicates that the unprimed momentum is p(t) = p(0) − (1/2)gt2. There is thus
no observable difference between the behavior of the accelerating classical particle described
in the unprimed co-ordinates and the classical particle with potential. However, the lat-
ter Hamiltonian function involves a potential term and has no lower bound on its energy,
whereas the primed Hamiltonian does not.
Now we consider the quantization of the primed system, q′ → Q′, q′ → Q′ with [Q′, P ′] =
i. The Hamiltonian is H ′ = (1/2)P ′2. Since P ′ commutes with H ′ we have P ′(t) = P ′. The
dynamics is given by the group Ut = e
iH′t. Using the fact that [Q′, Ut] = (t/m)P ′Ut, we have
the equation of motion for a free particle,













To return to the time-dependent frame, we need to apply a general (time dependent) passive
Galilei transformation UG(t). This will consist of two parts: a boost, generated by mQ, and
a spatial transformation, generated by P , which ensures that the wavefunction is invariant
under the transformation. Writing the (improper) primed position eigenstates in terms of
the unprimed eigenstates we have
|x′〉 = |x− (1/2)gt2〉 = e−(1/2)iPgt2|x〉.
The time dependent velocity is, therefore, gt and so we have eiQmgt for the boost. Putting





where the equality follows from the identity eA+B = eAeBe[A,B]/2, valid for operators that
commute with their commutator. Thus the Heisenberg picture momentum operator in the
unprimed frame is
P (t) = U−tUGP ′U−1G Ut = P
′ +mgtI,
as before. The Heisenberg picture position operator in the unprimed frame is
Q(t) = U−tUGQ′U−1G Ut = Q
′(t)− (1/2)gt2 = Q′ + t
m
P ′ − (1/2)gt2I,
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in accord with the classical equation of motion. But now we find that Tg = P (t)/(mg) =
P ′ + tI which, although covarying with time as desired, commutes with H ′. It thus fails
to satisfy the premises of Pauli’s Theorem. In this unprimed description of the system, the
source of the covariance is merely the co-ordinate transformation q(t) → q′(t), represented
in quantum mechanics by the unitary group UG(t).
So we have two inequivalent quantizations of what is ostensibly the same classical system,
at least according to the Equivalence Principle. It is easy to see that there is no unitary
transformation that implements the Equivalence Principle here, since if there were then
H and H ′ would have the same spectrum. In response, one might nonetheless claim that
they represent the same physical system, and thus assert that unitary equivalence is not
necessary for physical equivalence. This would not be without precedent: Ruetsche (2011)
considers cases where it is feasible to assert that unitary equivalence is sufficient but not
necessary for physical equivalence. Certainly the identical expectation values given by the
alternative quantization schemes (when considered in the same frame) are good reason to
take them to be equivalent. If one would prefer to consider these as inequivalent systems
then two questions arise: (i) which is the correct quantization? (ii) what, then, is the status
of the Equivalence Principle in quantum mechanics? The latter of these questions, although
fascinating, will have to await further examination. The former could be answered in favor
of the alternative quantization I provide by means of the following argument.
When we measure the momentum of a quantum particle in the lab, in a (roughly) ho-
mogeneous gravitational field on the Earth’s surface, we are measuring the momentum with
respect to a frame at which the particle is not at rest. We have every reason to believe
that there is a freely falling reference frame in which a quantum particle, subject only to a
gravitational force in the lab frame, behaves as if it were free (at least in a local region).
In that frame, a measurement of energy would return a result that is greater than or equal
to zero. The difference between the energy measured in the freely falling frame and the lab
frame can be entirely attributed to their relative acceleration. This means that there exists
a frame, accelerating with respect to the freely falling frame, in which the (expectation value
for) energy of the particle is greater than any given real number. But it is not true that
there exists a frame in which the (expectation value for) energy is less than any given real
number. The energy, as measured, is therefore bounded from below.
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6.0 QUANTUM CLOCKS
Equipped with a detailed discussion of the technical apparatus of modern quantum mechanics
and its application to some specific cases of putative time observables, we are now in a
position to return to the questions raised by Schro¨dinger and Pauli regarding the existence
of ideal clocks, discussed in Section 2.1.3. Let us review their exchange. Schro¨dinger defined
an ideal clock as a system that evolves through a succession of orthogonal states such that
its state at a time is a perfect indicator of the value of the time parameter that appears in
the Schro¨dinger equation. He pointed out that the time-energy uncertainty relation would
seem to imply that such a system (having a sharply defined state for each time) would have
a completely uncertain value for energy. On these grounds, he rejected the existence of such
states as “physically meaningless.”
This point of view will be backed up by the following discussion of Pauli’s Theorem.
There is a sense (to be made precise) in which Pauli’s Theorem entails that such an ideal
quantum clock must have an unbounded Hamiltonian spectrum, and thus allows states of
infinite uncertainty in energy. However, in response to Schro¨dinger, Pauli countered that
such a state of affairs is unproblematic since the situation regarding position in time is no
more desperate than the situation regarding position in space. In both cases, he maintained,
the ideal indicator is to be reached as the limit of sequence of physically possible systems. I
will call this Pauli’s Strategy.
My proposal for a sequence of such clocks comes from consideration of the quantum
harmonic oscillator, and in particular the suggestion of Garrison & Wong (1970) regarding
the use of coherent states as a ‘pointer’. This is in conflict with Hilgevoord’s proposal for
an ideal periodic clock, which has an unbounded Hamiltonian spectrum (Hilgevoord, 2002,
2005; Hilgevoord & Atkinson, 2011). In Section 6.2 I argue that this manifest unphysicality
is unacceptable, even considered as the limiting behavior of a sequence of (potentially)
physically allowed clocks. I explain how Hilgevoord’s sequence of clocks can be regarded as
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an approximation to the quantum harmonic oscillator clock that I propose, rather than his
unphysical ideal clock.
Before proceeding to discuss the details of the no go results and positive proposals for
quantum clocks, I would like to sound a note of general caution regarding the analogy
between the use of a point particle as an ideal indicator of position in space and the use of
an ideal clock as an ideal indicator of location in time.1 A real clock indicates the elapsed
time by means of some non-temporal variable, for instance the angular position of the hand
of a rotary clock. It is the position of the hand that covaries with the elapsed time, and the
elapsed time is estimated from the relative position of the hand (compared to its position at
an earlier time).
That is, a physical clock indicates the time not in virtue of its location in time, but
by having some degree of freedom that covaries with time. Indeed, as we saw in Section
2.3.1, the position of a classical point particle in space can serve as an ideal clock. On the
other hand, it is not clear just what the location of a point particle in space indicates about
position in space. By itself, a location in space is a spatial point, and a location in time is a
temporal instant. Just as a system is not a clock in virtue of being located in time, nor is a
system an indicator of position in virtue of being located in space. Rather, it seems better
to say that the position of a point particle can be used as a measure of relative distance
in space: either distance from one particle to another or distance from the position of the
particle at one time to its position at another time.
In the latter case, it is important that the positions in space at various times are attributed
to the same thing: the point particle, considered as a persisting object. Thus the point
particle serves as an indicator of location in space in virtue of its persistence through time.
The danger of regarding the mere location of a particle in space at a time as an indicator
of position, is that the temporal analogue would indicate the time merely by virtue of its
location in time. Something that has a precise location in time, however, is not a clock—
a persisting thing—but an event. This confusion is exhibited by the recent proposal of
Hegerfeldt & Muga (2010) for quantum clock observables, which, as I argue in Section 6.4,
are not clock observables but event observables.
1This analogy features heavily in analysis of Hilgevoord (2002, 2005); Hilgevoord & Atkinson (2011).
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6.1 NO IDEAL QUANTUM CLOCKS
Let us examine exactly what Pauli’s Theorem manages to tell us about quantum clocks.
Classically, a clock is a time function that covaries along the dynamical curves either locally
or (in addition) globally. In Section 2.3, this was distinguished from an event time, which
covaries with the initial data (and in the opposite direction). In Hamiltonian (analytical)
classical mechanics, the existence of a clock function was sufficient to allow one to infer the
value of the time parameter (up to periodicity) from the instantaneous state (in conjunction
with the initial data). There is a sense in which quantum mechanics replicates this idea
quite nicely, and a sense in which it makes it much more problematic.
First, the good news. Given a non-periodic quantum system whose Hamiltonian is exactly
known, precise knowledge of the state at two times suffices to determine the time interval
between those states. If one knows the Hamiltonian and the state ψ at t = 0 then, since the
Schro¨dinger equation is first order in time, one knows the state at all other times ψt = Utψ.
This family of states parameterized by t associates with each instant of time t a unique state
ψt, knowledge of which can be used to infer the elapsed time. This is analogous to the use
of a classical time function to infer the elapsed time in terms of a parameterized curve in
phase space. Where quantum mechanics complicates matters is in seemingly providing in
principle limitations on the extent to which the state can be precisely known at a moment
of time.
On the standard account offered by Ordinary QM, a system can be prepared in a precise
state at t = 0, but knowledge of the values of variables at later times is mediated by the
measurement of observables (self-adjoint operators or spectral projections thereof). This
suggests the following model of a quantum clock: a system is prepared in a known state at
t = 0 and a clock observable is measured at time t′, the results of this measurement providing
knowledge of the elapsed time t′ − t. This is perhaps more suggestive of a stopwatch rather
than a clock in the traditional sense: this quantum clock observable returns the time when
measured, and only when measured. This is like a digital stopwatch that displays the elapsed
time only when the ‘lap time’ button is pressed. One highly desirable characteristic for such
a quantum observable to possess is an appropriate classical limit in which the time can be
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known with arbitrary precision. This would thus mirror the situation of the infinitely massive
particle, assumed to provide an ideal indicator of position.2
In the Schro¨dinger picture, the expectation value of an observable Tc measured at time t
for a system prepared in state ψ at time t = 0 is given by 〈ψt|Tcψt〉. If Tc is to function as a
quantum clock observable, then this expectation value had better covary with time, in the
sense that
〈ψt′|Tcψt′〉 − 〈ψt|Tcψt〉 = t′ − t,
for at least some subset of times. This is a somewhat weaker requirement than the demand
that Tc itself covary with time, Tc(t) = Tc(0) + It, which (as an operator identity) applies to
all states of the system (or at least vectors in the domain of Tc) and also for all times.
That requirement, as we have seen, is inconsistent with the Hamiltonian of the system
having a spectrum of anything but R, i.e. having a lower bound on its energy. This global
requirement also suffices to exclude periodic clocks, whose time operators do not covary in
this way. As I argued in Chapters 4 and 5, it is better to express the covariance requirement
in terms of the underlying POVM ETc . That is, we require that, for every t ∈ R and every
ETc(∆), there exists a projection ETc(∆ + t) such that
U−tETc(∆)Ut = ETc(∆ + t),
where ∆ ∈ B(R) is a Borel subset of times. This can be satisfied by a periodic clock
observable with period τ since ETc(∆) = ETc(∆ + nτ) is consistent with this relation.
Expressed in these terms, the refined version of Pauli’s Theorem (Theorem 4.4) serves to
exclude the possibility that ETc is a PVM, so long as the Hamiltonian is semi-bounded.
There are thus no quantum clock observables corresponding to PVMs.
Unruh & Wald (1989, p. 2606) prove a similar result which they claim establishes that
there can be no perfect quantum clock, which they take to be a system possessing a time
operator whose observed values increase monotonically with parameter time t.
Proposition 6.1 (Unruh & Wald). If the Hamiltonian H is bounded from below, then there
can be no operator T possessing eigenstates |T0〉, |T1〉, |T2〉, . . . with the following properties:
2I will not explore the interesting issue of whether this is the most appropriate account of an ideal position
indicator, other than providing the simple-minded observation that the Heisenberg picture position operator
of a free particle is Q(t) = Q(0) + (1/m)Pt, which strongly suggests that a system lying at the limit of
infinite mass will stay put.
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1. Each |Tn〉 is an eigenstate of the projection operator onto the (non-overlapping) spectral
interval Tn, with T0 < T1 < T2 < . . .
2. For each n there is state a |Tm〉 such that m > n and |〈Tn|Tm〉|2 > 0 for some interval
t > 0.
3. For each n there is no m < n such that |〈Tm|Tn〉|2 6= 0.
I supply here my own proof based on the results of Section 4.4.
Proof. Let ET (Tn) be the projection associated with the temporal interval Tn so that 1. is
satisfied by the states ET (Tn)|ψ〉 = |Tn〉, for ψ ∈ H. Condition 3. says that 〈Tm|Tn〉 =
〈Tm|ET (Tn)|ψ〉 = 0 for all n > m, which implies that 〈Tm|U †tET (Tn)Ut|ψ〉 = 0 for all t > 0,
which by Hegerfeldt’s Lemma (Lemma 4.2) implies that 〈Tm|Tn〉 = 0 for all t and thus all
n,m. We have |〈Tn|Tm〉|2 = 〈Tn|Tm〉†〈Tn|Tm〉 = 〈Tm|Tn〉〈Tn|Tm〉 = 0, in contradiction with
2.
Roughly, then, there can be no quantum clock passing through successive states |Tn〉
which has a non-zero probability of running forward in time while having no possibility of
running backwards. This quantum clock would resemble less of a quantum stopwatch and
more of a quantum ratchet.3 However, this theorem provides a useful indication of what
a non-ideal quantum clock would look like. Obviously, if we want our clock to run at all
we cannot jettison condition 2., so it seems that condition 3. must be the one to go: real
quantum clocks will have a finite probability of ‘running backward in time.’ This is not to
say, however, that this clock will pass through a series of states ‘out of temporal sequence,’ as
it were, since the succession of states is given by the Schro¨dinger equation. More precisely,
if 3. fails then the successive states of such a clock will not be mutually orthogonal. In
fact, Corollary 4.1 states that no dynamically allowed quantum mechanical system can have
successive states that are mutually orthogonal for more than a set of instants of measure
zero.
There is, therefore, a very strong case to be made against the existence of an ideal quan-
tum clock, passing through a succession of orthogonal states. To the extent that all physical
systems have a semi-bounded Hamiltonian, then, the existence of an ideal quantum clock is
ruled out. A periodic clock can, however, have a Hamiltonian with a bounded spectrum, as
3I owe this observation to Gordon Belot (in conversation).
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we will see. The use of these finite-dimensional systems to model ideal clocks goes back to
Salecker & Wigner (1958), and these clocks have become somewhat standard in the quantum
time literature due to their simplicity (e.g. Peres (1980)). Recently Hilgevoord (2002; 2005)
has advocated these finite-dimensional clocks as providing successive approximations to an
ideal periodic quantum clock (with unbounded Hamiltonian). The idea is that an sequence of
n-dimensional systems approaches the infinite-dimensional ideal clock in the limit as n goes
to infinity. The unphysical ideal clock is thus promoted to an idealization, on his account,
approximated as closely as one likes by physically allowed systems.
6.2 FOLLOWING PAULI’S STRATEGY
I have already discussed in Section 2.1.3 the sense in which Pauli’s analogy between position
and time fails to answer Schro¨dinger’s worry: where the ideal indicator of position involves a
system with infinite energy, the ideal indicator of time involves a state of infinite uncertainty
in energy. Nonetheless, Pauli’s overall strategy can reasonably be applied. In both cases,
Pauli proposed, the remedy is the same: while a system that would serve as an ideal indicator
is an idealization, it may nevertheless be approached as the limit of a sequence of physically
allowed systems. Hilgevoord (2005) explicitly considers and endorses Pauli’s strategy:
An ideal quantum clock is an idealization which can be arbitrarily approximated.
In a sense, an ideal clock is the analogue for time of a point particle, an ideal
indicator of position.”4 (Hilgevoord, 2005, p. 50)
This suggests an analogy between the relation of the (unphysical) ideal clock to the systems
that approximate it and the relation that a boundary point of an open interval of R bears to
the set of points in the interval: although the boundary point lies outside the set, it is the
limit of a sequence of points that are in the set, and as such may be approximated arbitrarily
while remaining within the set.5
But, as previously discussed, there is an important distinction between the infinitely mas-
sive particle and the maximally uncertain energy states of an ideal clock. To rehearse the
4Recall here the discussion of the introduction of this chapter regarding the dangers of this analogy.
5My thanks to Mike Tamir for useful conversations on this topic.
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arguments offered in Section 2.1.3, the problems with a system with a unbounded Hamilto-
nian are twofold: first, such a system would appear to provide a source of boundless energy;
second, used as an ideal clock, this system will be in a state of complete uncertainty in
energy, making interacting with it a risky business. Plus, of course, we know of no such
systems in Nature.
In a recent article, Norton (2012) introduces a distinction between idealization and ap-
proximation that will be useful for us here. An idealization, he proposes, “is a real or
fictitious system, distinct from the target system, some of whose properties provide an inex-
act description of some aspects of the target system.” An approximation, on the other hand,
“is an inexact description of a target system” (Norton, 2012, p. 209). One of the illustrations
he provides concerns a body falling through a resistive fluid. According to Newton’s Laws,
this introduces a coefficient of friction k into the acceleration of the body x¨ = g − kx˙. We
obtain a good approximation of the motion of the target system (where the friction coeffi-
cient is small) by setting x˙(t) = gt and discarding the higher order terms in the power series
expansion. Introducing a (fictitious) reference system whose behavior is perfectly described
by this approximation, we may regard the reference system as an idealization of the target
system (the system in the world whose behavior we intend to describe). Hence we have
promoted an approximation to an idealization.
Alternatively, we might want to regard the limiting system itself as an idealization of
the target system, in which case “we consider the target system to be one of a sequence
of systems whose limit system is intended to be the idealizing system. The promotion
fails if the sequence fails to have a limit system or has a limit system with unsuitable
properties” (Norton, 2012, p. 211). For example, the system might allow for violations of
energy conservation. This introduces a distinction between two types of sequences of systems:
those that have a limit system which can function as an idealization and those which don’t.
Thus, if Schro¨dinger is right, then the ideal quantum clock is problematic in a way that an
infinitely massive particle is not: it cannot serve as an idealization of a target system (i.e. a
real clock).
In more detail, if we consider the set of all possible quantum systems, i.e. systems with
semi-bounded Hamiltonians, then the infinitely massive particle lies within that set. The
Hamiltonian of a sequence of (otherwise identical) massive particles, after all, differs only with
respect to the mass parameter (a c-number). In the limit of infinite mass, the expectation
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value of the Hamiltonian becomes infinite and the change in the position of the particle over
time goes to zero.6 While we know of no particles of infinite mass, we do encounter many
systems in the world of finite mass that are usefully described as having no uncertainty in
position: macroscopic objects.7
These target systems lie in a sequence of systems whose limit is a particle of infinite mass.
In taking this limit, one is not required to leave the set of physically allowed systems, and
thus the limiting system itself may serve as an idealization which explains the corresponding
property of the target system. To return to the analogy with an open interval of R, we can
always include the boundary points into the set by taking the closure of the interval without
leaving R. On the other hand, while a real clock is a system described by a semi-bounded
Hamiltonian, Hilgevoord’s ideal clock is not and thus it lies outside the set of physically
possible systems. So even if the ideal clock can be reached as the limit of a sequence of
systems belonging to the set of physically possible quantum systems, it cannot be included
in that set. This is analogous to taking the limit of a sequence of rationals {xn} ⊂ Q that
converges to an irrational number: although each element of the sequence lies in Q, the limit
does not.
Of course, one could object that the fact that the ideal clock lying at the limit is itself
unphysical is irrelevant if it is only being used to represent some target system in some
(unproblematic) respect, and, furthermore, there may exist a (physically allowed) system in
the sequence that approximates the target quite well. This objection is fine, so far as it goes,
but what it concedes is that inferences concerning the behavior of the limiting system must
be made with great care. In particular, we had better be careful of inferences that rely in the
one characteristic that Pauli’s Theorem tells us not to expect in real systems: self-adjointess
of a clock observable or, equivalently, orthogonality of successive states of a quantum clock.
However, the use of ideal clocks as objects of foundational study has often failed to exhibit
such care. Consider the following discussion of ideal quantum clocks (possessing unbounded
Hamiltonians) taken from a recent survey article:
6One might object that this limit is also unphysical, since any attempt to bring about a concentration
of limitless mass at a point results in the creation of a black hole (Gambini et al., 2007). This should fail
to worry us here, however, since I am merely suggesting that this fictitious system can be used to describe
some aspects of a target system.
7This recalls the exercise of calculating the de Broglie wavelength of a particle of macroscopic mass,
commonly set in an introductory quantum mechanics class.
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It is true that ideal clocks are ‘unphysical’ in a sense, but then so are point par-
ticles. Both are consistent with the formalism of quantum mechanics. Together
they illustrate the similarity between the quantum mechanical treatment of in-
dicators of position in space and indicators of position in time. . . . In a sense, an
ideal clock is better behaved than a point particle, for an eigenstate of such a par-
ticle’s position spreads with infinite velocity. By contrast, the eigenstates of time
operators do not spread at all, but rather transform into eigenstates belonging
to a different eigenvalue[.] (Hilgevoord & Atkinson, 2011)
This exhibits precisely the sort of problematic inferences that one should be on guard against
in cases of this sort. As I have argued at length, this ideal clock is disanalogous to an ideal
indicator of position in the important respect that the ideal clock does not represent the
behavior of a physical system at all, not even a fictitious one. In addition, the inference
made here from the particular case (an ideal clock) to the general case (time operators) is
deeply problematic since the properties of the ideal clock referred to here are possessed in
virtue of its lying outside the set of physically possible systems. As consideration of Pauli’s
Theorem reveals, a quantum system has a time operator with orthogonal eigenstates only if
the Hamiltonian of the system fails to be semi-bounded.8
To be fair to Hilgevoord, he has often claimed that these ideal clocks are physically
allowed systems, just ones with a special property: having states of completely uncertain
energy. Hilgevoord also maintains that the unbounded spectrum of H need not be as prob-
lematic as is often thought
[F]or an isolated system, the demand that its Hamiltonian has a lower bound is
not at all necessary. Thus, from the point of view of the quantum mechanical
formalism, our [ideal] clock is a bona fide physical system. Hilgevoord (2002, p.
304)
That is, although the spectral condition is designed to prevent a system with an unbounded
Hamiltonian from providing a source of unlimited energy, there is another way to prevent
this from happening: make sure that all such systems are completely isolated, always.
But do we have reason to think that systems which are, as a matter of principle, non-
interacting are physically possible? How could such a system be prepared in the lab? More-
over, since the whole point of a clock is to allow one to read off the time, a clock which
can in principle never be read seems to constitute an uncomfortably Pickwickian solution to
8This also serves to exclude systems with bounded Hamiltonians, which it seems from the context are
also under consideration here. More on this later.
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the problem posed by the no go results of Section 6.1. Perhaps anticipating this response,
Hilgevoord & Atkinson (2011) add that the system could be coupled to another system,
so long as that system cannot ‘take up’ an infinite amount of energy, i.e., a system with a
Hamiltonian H2 whose spectrum possesses an upper bound.
The problem with this is that the joint system, with Hamiltonian H ′ = H+H2 + interac-
tion term, still has an unbounded energy spectrum, and so remains capable of supplying an
indefinitely large amount of energy to its surroundings. If we adopt the semantic view, and
thus regard a theory as a collection of models, then admitting even a single system with an
unbounded Hamiltonian into the models allowed by the theory means that the theory now
admits a whole class of models with a joint Hamiltonian whose spectrum is unbounded from
below. Given that quantum mechanical systems of particles have no upper bound on their
Hamiltonian, there is every reason to suppose that such a system coupled to Hilgevoord’s
ideal clock would experience large and unpredictable fluctuations in energy.
On the contrary, there is good reason to build into our interpretative principles the idea
that only systems with physically reasonable properties are physically possible, and that we
should cast out unphysical models from inclusion in the theory. Thus it is controversial, to say
the least, to claim that “the formalism of quantum mechanics allows for the existence of ideal
clocks, and that the energy of such systems is unbounded” (Hilgevoord & Atkinson, 2011).
Functional analysis may allow for the definition of collections of mathematical operators that
resemble systems of quantum mechanics, but that does not imply that those collections of
operators correspond to a physical system. On Hilgevoord’s view, it seems, Pauli’s Theorem
is to be thought of as an informative account of the ideal clock: Pauli’s Theorem tells us
that all ideal clocks have unbounded Hamiltonians. But these ideal clocks are not the sort of
things that exist outside of Platonic Heaven. There can be no charge of logical inconsistency
against those who would hold fast to the existence of such ideal clocks and embrace the
consequences, come what may. But we need not join them; we may look elsewhere.
6.3 HOW TO BUILD A QUANTUM CLOCK
This section presents an alternative account of how one could go about the definition of
a suitable ideal periodic clock observable, which respects the spectrum condition. I will
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first review the case against the ideal quantum clock, outline some potential responses,
and propose a particular series of physically allowed systems as representing the best hope
of fulfilling Pauli’s Strategy. This account mirrors Hilgevoord’s attempt to follow Pauli’s
Strategy quite closely, which leads to the claim that each system lying in the sequence
approaching Hilgevoord’s ideal clock corresponds to a system with the same formal structure
in a sequence approaching a clock with an semi-bounded Hamiltonian. This latter sequence
provides the best hope of satisfying Pauli’s Strategy.
6.3.1 Action, Angle as Ideal Quantum Clock
Hilgevoord’s suggestion for the ideal periodic clock follows the logic of Pauli’s Theorem to
a fault: ideal clocks exist, and, therefore, possess unbounded energy spectra. The concrete
Hamiltonian he suggests for an ideal (periodic) quantum clock amounts to a trivial redef-
inition of the angular momentum operator L considered in Section 5.2. That is, in order
to have units of energy Hilgevoord suggests we consider the operator H = ωL, where L is
the angular momentum operator and ω is a constant of appropriate units. This gives the
Hamiltonian of the system a superficial resemblance to the action-angle form of the (classi-
cal) harmonic oscillator. But this is not the Hamiltonian of a quantum harmonic oscillator,
since the spectrum of L is unbounded in both directions. This gives the operator L a quite
different role, in which the energy of the system is proportional to the value of the angular
momentum (rather than how it couples to the B-field in the Pauli Equation).
In fact, Hilgevoord (2005) reaches this ideal clock Hamiltonian by considering the direct
quantization of a classically conjugate pair of action and angle variables. This is a question-
able move on conceptual grounds, as I pointed out in Section 2.4. The action-angle form
of Hamiltonian classical mechanics is reached by a canonical transformation from a descrip-
tion of the system in appropriate configuration and momentum variables. It is particularly
useful for systems with periodic motions. A canonical transformation preserves relations of
conjugacy since it leaves the Poisson bracket invariant. On the other hand, the equivalent
transformation in quantum mechanics is a unitary transformation, in which case the Hamil-
tonian in the quantum ‘action-angle form’ will be unitarily equivalent to its transformed
version, and thus have the same spectrum. Hilgevoord exploits this fact to define a system
whose energy is unbounded above and below.
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In the case of a quantum harmonic oscillator, this unitary transformation leads to the
number-phase representation, in which the number operator retains the (discrete and semi-
bounded) spectrum of the original Hamiltonian (see Section 5.3). What Hilgevoord suggests
instead, in effect, is a (classical) canonical transformation to the action-angle form followed
by promotion of action and angle to a pair of quantum operators. This provides an inequiv-
alent quantization in which the ‘Hamiltonian’ comes to have an unbounded spectrum, and
evidently does not have a unitary transformation relating it to the quantum harmonic oscil-
lator. The classical covariance of action and angle is retained in the quantum description,
but it is not clear how those variables relate to the original configurational variables of the
classical system (i.e. position and momentum). Essentially, the complaint I have here is
that the procedure of canonical transformation followed by quantization is not equivalent to
quantization followed by unitary transformation.9
Regardless of the means by which it is reached, the Hamiltonian H = ωL has a conjugate
operator τ = Φ/ω with units of time, as desired. By the relation derived earlier for Φ, L,
these are form a Heisenberg pair [τ,H] = i (on a dense domain excluding the momentum











eim(τ/ω+ωt)|m〉 = |τ + ωt〉.
Were one able to prepare the system in such a state (which is debatable since these are
improper eigenstates that lie outside of Hilbert space), comparing the states at different
times would give a measure of elapsed time. More feasibly, a state highly peaked about
|τ〉 could be prepared. The effect of eiωLt on such a state is akin to the effect of a spatial
translation of a wavepacket highly peaked in space, i.e., it does not change anything but its
location in time.
This evolution is essentially, then, just a change of complex phase—not the behavior
we would expect from a typical Hamiltonian operator. However, the quantum harmonic
oscillator does behave much like that when the initial state is a coherent state, i.e., a state
9See also the discussion of Section 5.5.
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which minimizes the product of uncertainties in position and momentum, and then the
corresponding phase is a physical quantity representing the angular location of the peak.
As Schro¨dinger first observed, the Hamiltonian of the quantum harmonic oscillator acts to
preserve this special property a coherent state, unlike the free particle Hamiltonian, for ex-
ample. It is unclear, however, just how one is supposed to reach a Schro¨dinger representation
of Hilgevoord’s ideal clock, in which such state could be defined.10 Hilgevoord (2005) does
note that if “m is confined to values m ≥ 0, the system becomes [formally] equivalent to a
harmonic oscillator,” but he bemoans the fact that “the resulting mutilated [phase] states
are no longer orthogonal and there is no ideal phase or time operator in this case.” (p. 59).
In the previous section I introduced my doubts that such an ideal clock could be regarded
as an idealization at all, and it is difficult to see just what kind of physical system is being
described here: what target system could be usefully described in there terms? The lack of
a Schro¨dinger representation is particularly distressing given that it also makes the classical
limit difficult to describe. It is all very well saying that the corresponding classical system
is one with action-angle variables, but that is akin to saying that a given curve in three-
dimensional space can be described in spherical co-ordinates: no information about the
Hamiltonian function is thus conferred. Worse than this, the system is not one with a
description in terms of action-angle co-ordinates, but rather a system whose Hamiltonian is
just the action.11 Given its manifest unphysicality, I would rather maintain that this so-called
ideal quantum clock results more from an unfortunate mutilation of the phase observable of
the quantum harmonic oscillator (i.e. its Naimark dilation), rather than vice versa.
6.3.2 Coherent States As the Hands of a Quantum Clock
The suggestion that the phase of a quantum harmonic oscillator could serve as a clock ob-
servable goes back (at least) to Susskind & Glogower (1964), with Garrison & Wong (1970)
providing a concrete suggestion for a physical realization of this system as a quantum clock.
The great advantage of a considering states of a quantum harmonic oscillator is their experi-
mental accessibility. The collective behavior of such systems is described by quantum optics,
10Note that the angular momentum eigenstates can be given in the position representation, where L
appears as the z-component of orbital angular momentum in a system with a central potential, i.e., a
Hydrogen atom. Defined on the usual infinite dimensional (separable) Hilbert space L2[R3], the Li are
written in terms of the position and momentum operators Qi, Pi, where i = x, y, z. In particular, L = Lz :=
QxPy −PxQy. It is not at all clear what Hilgevoord’s suggested Hamiltonian corresponds to in this context.
11See the discussion of Section 2.4.
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which is essentially the study of low energy quantum electrodynamic phenomena. Since the
energies are low, the Galilean form of quantum theory provides a good approximation of
these phenomena by means of a Fock representation of the EM field, i.e. in terms of exci-
tations of an infinite collection of quantum harmonic oscillators. This suggests a great deal
about the expected behavior in the classical limit, and gives us confidence that the formal
manipulations and relations will have physical counterparts accessible within a quantum
optics lab.
First let us confirm that the phase states behave as promised. (Note that these are
again improper eigenstates that are not vectors of the Hilbert space.) The Hamiltonian
is H = N + 1/2, the eigenstates of which H|n〉 = (n + 1/2)|n〉 correspond to energies
~ω(n+ 1/2), with n ≥ 0 (having earlier removed the factor of ~ω from the expression of H
for convenience). (See Section 5.3 for a more extensive discussion.) Evidently the spectrum
of H is bounded from below. The unitary evolution of the system is given by Ut = e
iHt, and







ein(φ+t)|n〉 = |ϕ+ t〉,
with periodicity (ϕ+ t) mod 2pi. Although these improper eigenstates have a dubious claim
to physicality, the suggestion of Garrison & Wong is to use Glauber states for the hand of
our clock. These Gaussian states were given by Glauber (1963) as coherent states of the
electromagnetic field, but were first considered by Schro¨dinger in 1926 as coherent states
which minimize the product of the uncertainties in position and momentum, ∆P∆Q.
For a single harmonic oscillator, the Glauber states |α〉 are formed from a superposition
of number eigenstates as follows:








with α = |α|e−iθ. These are states with a Poisson distribution, characterized by a complex
amplitude α and phase θ, which in the limit |α| → ∞ approximate classical states of the
electromagnetic field with definite amplitude and phase. They have the property of being
unchanged by applications of the annihilation operator, up to a phase factor,
a†|α〉 = α|α〉.
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Note that the label α refers not to an ‘occupation number,’ but rather is related to the
value of the expectation value, 〈α|N |α〉 = |α|2. Setting θ = ωτ and parameterizing a set of
Glauber states by time, Λτ , these have the desired covariance property
eitHΛτ = Λτ+t,
with obvious periodicity.
The complications introduced by the non-uniqueness of the phase observable12 are not
severe. The choice of a particular phase observable Φθ to measure just involves an arbitrary
choice of phase, akin to choosing a particular position of the hand of a rotary clock to be
zero. Therefore, as long as we are able to measure the same phase observable twice, the
expectation values of the measurements will serve as a measure of elapsed time, up to the
periodicity of the clock. The inaccuracy of the clock can be made as small as one likes,
and disappears in the classical limit as the phase states Λτ peaked about τ approach a
δ-function.13
Physically, this essentially corresponds to choosing coherent states of a single mode elec-
tromagnetic with larger and larger (average) numbers of photons, and so energy 〈Eα〉 ≈ |α|2.
Thus we reach a limiting situation that closely resembles the infinitely massive particle, an
ideal indicator of position. Moreover, as Garrison & Wong (1970) point out, the periodic
restriction is (in principle at least) no restriction at all since two clocks with periods whose
ratio is irrational would provide a perfect linear clock. In practice, even clocks with (known)
rational ratios of period could provide a greatly expanded range and accuracy, so long as
they can be measured at the same instant.
6.3.3 Approximating Phase and Angle
The use of finite-dimensional systems to approximate the behavior of an ideal quantum clock
goes back to Salecker & Wigner (1958). Hilgevoord regards the Salacker-Wigner discrete
periodic clock as a approximation of his proposal for an ideal periodic clock, as discussed in
Section 6.3.1. These discrete clock operators can be seen as resulting from the restriction of






12See (5.2) of Section 5.3.
13See Lahti & Maczynski (1998) for a recent analysis of the uncertainty relations for such states.
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where φk = k
2pi
2l+1
, k = −l, . . . , l. These are the eigenstates of an operator Φ self-adjoint on













It is easily seen that the periodicity of angle will again prove problematic for the covariance
of Φk under shifts in angle, that is, e
iLϕΦke
−iLϕ 6= Φk + Iϕ. Let us consider instead the


























|θk〉〈θk| = E([a+ ϕ, b+ ϕ)).
The last equality holds so long as φ ∈ {ϕk}, otherwise the effect of the transformation will
be to define a distinct PVM which lies in an orthogonal 2l + 1-dimensional subspace of H.
The family of PVMs El can be considered as a series of approximations to the POVM
P (Z), which converges to P (Z) as l→∞, or equivalently we may say that Φk → Φ as l→∞.
This fact is used by Hilgevoord to justify his contention that his ideal periodic clock may
be approximated by a discrete periodic clock with a bounded Hamiltonian spectrum. Now,
if he regards this as serving to assuage worries about the unphysicality of his unbounded
Hamiltonian, the following should serve to assuage his worries about the ‘mutilation’ of the
non-orthogonal phase states.
The Pegg-Barnett phase operator is defined on an s-dimensional subspace Hs ⊂ H′
spanned by the s ∈ N number states |0〉, |1〉, . . . , |s〉. The Pegg-Barnett phase states |θs,k〉
are defined for θs,k = k
2pi
s+1







Note the close similarity to the definition of the |ϕk〉. Since Hs is finite-dimensional, the


















As s→∞, we recover EΦ, the phase POVM of Section 5.3, as the weak limit of Ms. Thus
we have that ΦPB,s → Φ as s→∞.14
Thus the construction of the Pegg-Barnett phase operators takes place in a directly
analogous manner to the finite-dimensional Salecker-Wigner clocks that Hilgevoord regards
as finite-dimensional approximations to his ideal clock. That means that there is a one-to-
one correspondence between 2l+ 1-dimensional Salecker-Wigner clock operators and 2l+ 1-
dimensional Pegg-Barnett phase operators. Since the interest of these clock operators lies
just in their abstract characterization as covarying with time (i.e. forming a Heisenberg
pair with the restricted Hamiltonian) there is no reason not to regard these structurally
identical Pegg-Barnett phase observables (displaying the same time covariant behavior) as
the proper objects of foundational study. But these finite-dimensional clocks converge to an
clock observable of a infinite-dimensional system with a semi-bounded Hamiltonian, i.e., the
phase POVM of the harmonic oscillator.
In other words, Hilgevoord views the Salacker-Wigner discrete clocks as converging to the
Naimark dilation of the phase observable of the harmonic oscillator, rather than the phase
observable itself. Why would one chose the sequence of otherwise identical approximations
that converges to an observable of a manifestly unphysical system rather than a physically
meaningful one? No matter; there is no need to make that choice. We may equally regard
the the discrete approximations to an ideal clock as approaching a system in the limit that
can serve as a valid idealization: the harmonic oscillator.
14Note that this provides another way to pick out EΦ as the canonical phase POVM: Lahti & Pellonpa¨a¨
(2001) characterize EΦ as the only covariant measure that has a projection valued discretization in this
sense. See this paper for rigorous derivations of the limits and relationships given here.
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Moreover, note that in this sense the approximating sequence is not to be thought of as a
series of physical systems, but as a series of approximate measurements (of finite-dimensional
observables) that approach an ideal measurement of the phase observable of a single physical
system, an observable defined on the infinite-dimensional state space of that system.15 The
approach to an ideal clock, therefore, involves an additional limit: the behavior of a quantum
harmonic oscillator approaches that of an ideal clock in the limit of infinite energy of the
system.16
6.3.4 Relation to Atomic Clocks
The reader may perhaps be wondering why, in advocating a particular schema for defining
a quantum clock on the basis of its physical reasonableness, I have failed to describe the
quantum clocks that are in common use as timekeeping devices: the atomic clocks based
on Caesium, Rubidium, and the like. The essential idea behind the current generation
of quantum clocks is to use an atomic transition of known energy (and thus frequency) to
calibrate a single mode laser such that its frequency is stable at this known atomic frequency.
The physics is simple: take a positive ion (or a collection) of (e.g.) Ca+ and tune the laser
frequency to that which the electron in the outer shell requires to transition to a state of
higher energy.
In order to ensure that the ions are in a known state, they first are filtered through a
Stern-Gerlach apparatus, sensitive to the spin of the outer electron. The ions which undergo
the transition are then put though another magnetic filter, and the strength of the resulting
ionic current provides an indication of the closeness of the frequency of the laser to that of
the atomic transition. Any variation in frequency will result in a decrease in the probability
of the transition and so this maximum, once located, is easily maintained by tuning the laser
accordingly. Since this transition energy is known to a high degree of accuracy, it provides
a standard against which the frequency of the laser may be known precisely. The laser fre-
quency, therefore, provides a clock in the sense of a frequency source, much like a quartz
15In fact, every POVM of an infinite-dimensional Hilbert space can be approximated by a sequence of PVMs
restricted to a finite-dimensional subspace in this manner. This is the content of Naimark’s Approximation
Theorem, a less well-known cousin of his Dilation Theorem. See Olkhovsky (2011). One can also regard the
confined time of arrival operators of Galapon et al. (2004) (with discrete spectra) as approximations to the
continuous time of arrival POVM in the same way. On this see Galapon et al. (2005).
16There is some indication that uncertainty in event time POVMs also depends on the expectation value
of energy in a similar way. See Brunetti & Fredenhagen (2002a).
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crystal inside a digital watch (which acts to pick out a preferred frequency through mechan-
ical vibration, corresponding to a electronic resonance through the piezoelectric effect). The
time is kept by a digital counter which counts the number of elapsed periods.
There are two things to say here. The first is that the atomic clocks of this kind seek
to provide a frequency standard, whereas the clocks I have described so far are based upon
the idea that an ideal quantum clock is one which possesses an observable which provides
from its measured values an estimation of elapsed time. As such, the atomic clock does not
itself tell the time but rather provides a known frequency so that the elapsed time follows
from counting the number of periods of the source frequency. This extra apparatus is not
the subject of quantum mechanics as conventionally understood, so the entire system does
not, in this sense, provide a truly quantum clock.
The second thing to say is that the treatment of the harmonic oscillator is somewhat
relevant to the theoretical basis on which the atomic clock operates. Its operation depends
on the use of a single mode laser which naturally is described by the theory of quantum
optics, whose foundation lies in the description of the quantum harmonic oscillator and the
coherent states described above (which properly reside in Fock space). In fact, the existence
of (a family of) phase observables indicates that there is another paradigm of atomic clock
design—an atomic stopwatch, if you will.
The atom clocks I have described here can use laser cooled ions or even a single Aluminum
ion as their frequency source. As clocks, they operate by the principle of counting periods of
the tuned laser frequency, but the results of this chapter indicate that it should be possible to
tune the frequency of a coherent optical state as described here, and then measure the phase
of that state with an accuracy that depends on its energy. This provides an indication of the
amount of time that has elapsed within a period. Thus we can see how the theoretical limits
we have explored here are straightforwardly related to a potential physical realization.17
6.4 ON THE ALLEGED PREVALENCE OF QUANTUM CLOCKS
The quantum clocks of this chapter (call them quantum stopwatches if you will) have relied
on the characteristic behavior of the system state over time when prepared in a basis that is
17See also the discussion of (Muga et al., 2002, §§8–9), (Muga et al., 2010, §13).
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stable over time. The preparation of the system in a known such state and subsequent mea-
surement of a suitable observable provides an indication of the elapsed time. In terms of the
dynamics of the theory, this is readily represented by the time evolution of the Schro¨dinger
picture instantaneous state, followed by the instantaneous measurement of a Schro¨dinger pic-
ture clock observable. The covariance requirement is met due to the characteristic variation
of the expectation value of such a Schro¨dinger picture observable with time.
This is to be contrasted with the behavior of an event time observable which, evaluated
in the Heisenberg picture, returns a temporal distribution for the time of occurrence of
some event. The characteristic covariance of this distribution results from the behavior of a
Heisenberg state under time shifts, and has the opposite sense. Thus the expectation value
of an event time observable does not change with time: it is a property of the temporal
probability distribution derived from the Heisenberg state, which does not vary with time.
Consider the time of arrival of a classical free particle. The time at which a particle arrives
at the origin does not change as the particle moves along its path. The event time changes
if the initial state is varied, but the initial state does not vary with time: it corresponds to
an entire evolution of the system.
In this way, the conceptual difference between a clock observable and an event time
observable is obscured by the observation that they covary with time in opposite directions.
The event time distribution is calculated from the Heisenberg state, and, therefore, has
no Schro¨dinger picture equivalent (which would have to correspond to an instantaneous
measurement). There can be no instantaneous measurement of a temporal distribution,
whatever that might mean. Moreover, it is easy to see that a Schro¨dinger picture operator
corresponds to a time-indexed Heisenberg picture operator, i.e. something to be measured
at a particular time. That is, measuring an arbitrary Schro¨dinger picture operator A in
state ψt is the same thing as measuring a Heisenberg picture operator A(t). But, although
an event time observable does not vary in time, it certainly can be defined as a Heisenberg
picture operator. (See Section 7.1.) These non-instantaneous Heisenberg operators simply
do not correspond to a Schro¨dinger picture operator, which can be measured at an instant.
There is, therefore, no way to regard these event time operators as providing clock times,
despite their superficial resemblance to genuine clock observables. I bring up this point
to challenge the recent claim of Hegerfeldt & Muga (2010) to have provided the means to
generate both event time observables and clock observables for arbitrary quantum systems.
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In the next chapter, I will explore the sense in which the former claim is valid. Here, I expose
the sense in which the latter is bogus.
The time operators in question are defined by means of a generalized spectral family of
self-adjoint operators O ≥ Fτ ≥ I with the usual properties (see Chapter 3) so that they





The covariance of this operator is equivalent to the covariance of the operators Fτ , UtFτUt =
Fτ+t, which are elements of the corresponding POVM, i.e. Fτ = F (−∞, τ ]. These operators
are defined such that 〈ψ|F−∞ψ〉 = 0 and 〈ψ|F∞ψ〉 = 1, where ψ ∈ H is a vector of unit












For an arbitrary Schro¨dinger picture observable A ≥ O (a positive operator) 〈Utψ|AUtψ〉 =
f(t) is a monotonically increasing function of t. The requirement above establishes that
f ′(τ) = 〈Uτψ|AUτψ〉 is bounded from above by 1. As a POVM, F (∆) assigns probabilities to
time intervals ∆ through the usual means we have Pr(∆) = 〈ψ|F (∆)ψ〉. But the covariance
property determines that 〈Utψ|F (∆)Utψ〉 = 〈ψ|F (∆ + t)ψ〉 = Pr(∆ + t).
This is not a covarying probability that determines the time read by the moving hands
of a clock, but a probability that assigns a number directly to a time interval. The resulting
time operator is nothing but the expectation operator of that probability distribution, whose
expectation value varies with the Heisenberg state. Its expectation value is given by the








The appearance of an entire history of Schro¨dinger picture states on the right hand side means
that this operator cannot possibly be measured at an instant. A quantum clock observable
provides a probability distribution for the value of a physical quantity (e.g. phase) when it is
measured at a time, and the dynamics of the system determines how that quantity changes
with time. When the probability distribution concerns times rather than values of a variable,
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that cannot be a distribution that concerns a clock observable, which measures a physical
quantity that covaries with the dynamical evolution of the system according to the external
time parameter.
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7.0 EVENT TIME OBSERVABLES
The topic of event time observables was introduced in Chapter 2 as a way to respond to
Hilgevoord’s (2005) contention that the argument for the existence of time operators based
on the analogy between position in space and position in time was based on a confusion. In
Section 2.3.2, I countered that there is a valid analogy between location and space and time
when events are concerned: a co-ordinate in space-time refers to the location in space and
in time of an event. This idea arises naturally when explaining the physical interpretation
of Minkowski space-time, for instance. Here is a recent account of space-time given in these
terms (intended for a general audience):
The fundamental notion is that of an event, which we think of as a physical
occurrence having negligibly small extension in both space and time. That is, an
event is “small and quick,” such as the explosion of a firecracker or the snapping
of your fingers. Now consider the collection of all possible events in the universe—
all events that have ever happened, all that are happening now, and all that will
ever happen; here and elsewhere. This collection is called space-time. It is the
arena in which physics takes place in relativity. (Geroch, 2005, p. 201, original
emphasis)
The guiding idea of an event time observable is that the position observable in quantum
mechanics, when applied to a concrete measurement situation like a diffraction experiment,
often predicts the spatial distribution of some set of events, say, the appearance of a dot on
a luminescent screen. These events also have a temporal distribution, in terms of the time
after emission at which they occur (i.e. the time of flight). An event time observable, then,
predicts the distribution in time of these events, just as a position observable predicts their
distribution in space.
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7.1 CHARACTERIZING EVENT TIME OBSERVABLES
In modern quantum mechanics, to derive such a distribution from the system state we are
required to define a suitable operator, customarily (in Ordinary QM) a self-adjoint operator.
Observables are often defined by their properties under symmetry transformations, for exam-
ple Jauch (1968, pp. 197–199) regards the covariance of the position operator with spatial
translations (generated by the total momentum) as expressing the homogeneity of space.
Essentially, Wightman (1962) shows that requiring this covariance is sufficient to uniquely
define a self-adjoint position operator. One way of defining event time observables, then, is
to do so through their characteristic covariance under time shifts of the initial state.
The first thing to note is that in the usual identification of observables with self-adjoint
operators it is assumed that these these operators act instantaneously. In the Schro¨dinger
picture (in which the states vary with time) the expectation value of an observable A in
the (pure) state ψt = Utψ is 〈A〉t = 〈ψt|Aψt〉, whereas in the Heisenberg picture (in which
the observables vary with time) the expectation value of an observable A(t) is given by
〈A(t)〉 = 〈ψ|U †tAUt|ψ〉.1 In the Schro¨dinger picture it makes very little sense to ask when a
particular event occurs (in the sense of a probability for it occurring during some interval of
time) since we may only interrogate the state at a instant of time. In contrast,
“event time measurements are extended in time, with sensitive detectors wait-
ing to be triggered. The experimenter has no control over the time instant at
which the detectors fire. This very instant constitutes the outcome of such a
measurement. (Busch, 2007, p. 19)
However, in the Heisenberg picture we may define operators that involve more than one
instant of time.
An event time observable is to be defined, therefore, by its behavior under temporal trans-
lations, generated by the Hamiltonian. In particular, we will require that such observables
covary with time translations.2 In effect, this means that the experimental results (depend-
ing on relative times) will be independent of the time at which the experiment begins, and
so this expresses the homogeneity of time. This covariance depends on the time-independent
(initial) state of the system, and hence is expressed in the Heisenberg picture. (See Section
2.3.2).
1Evidently these return the same expectation value, 〈A〉t = 〈A(t)〉, but they are not identical expressions.
2This is to be regarded as a necessary, not a sufficient condition.
143
If ψ is the Heisenberg picture state, then an event time operator Te returns a distribution
of times through its associated PVM ETe as follows,
W (I) = 〈ψ|ETe(I)ψ〉,
where I ∈ B(R) is a Borel subset of times, and ψ0 is the Heisenberg state that equals the
Schro¨dinger picture state ψ0 = ψ at time t = 0, corresponding to the family ψt = Utψ. If
we consider another Heisenberg state ψτ , related to the first by a unitary transformation
ψτ = Uτψ (a time shift), then the distribution of times in this state is given in the same way
Wτ (I) = 〈ψτ |ETe(I)ψτ 〉 = 〈Uτψ|ETe(I)Uτψ〉.
The Heisenberg state ψτ corresponds to the Schrod¨inger picture family ψt′ = Utψτ = Ut+τψ,
so that what is now the state at time t′ = 0 was the state at time t = τ . Thus the It is
evident that the relationship between the distributions will be given by Wτ (I) = W (I − τ),
since the Heisenberg state ψτ is just the state ψ prepared τ seconds earlier, and thus any
event that occurs at time t in state ψ will occur τ seconds earlier in state ψτ . Setting the
two expressions to be equal we obtain
〈Uτψ|ETe(I)Uτψ〉 = 〈ψ|ETe(I − τ)ψ〉.
Assuming that this equality holds for all ψ ∈ H and all τ ∈ R, we have the operator equality
U−τETe(I)Uτ = ETe(I − τ). (7.1)
This is the proper expression of time covariance for an event time POVM. The sense is
opposite to the covariance of a clock observable, but also the interpretation is importantly
distinct: an event time POVM returns a probability distribution for times (the time of an
event) from a Heisenberg state. That distribution does not change with time. In contrast,
a clock observable concerns the distribution of values of some physical quantity at a time,
and is defined by the fact that this distribution covaries with the time parameter—i.e. with
the dynamical evolution of the system state.
To take a simple example of an event time, consider an experiment consisting of a single
radioactive atom and a Geiger counter that fully surrounds it. If the half-life of the atom is
1 hour, then the probability that the counter clicks in the first hour is 1/2, the probability it
clicks in the second hour 1/4, the probability it clicks in the third hour is 1/8, and so on. Thus
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the probability that the counter clicks at some point in the future is given by an geometric
series that tends to one as t tends to infinity. However, once the counter has been observed
to click, the probability that it clicks in the future is essentially zero. This is evidently
a experimentally meaningful situation, and we should expect that this phenomenological
law may be derived from a detailed quantum mechanical description of the decay process.
However, Pauli’s Theorem shows that there is no way to implement this simple scheme in
Ordinary QM.
This description would involve a (Heisenberg picture) quantum mechanical vector state
ψ in a Hilbert space H, a Hamiltonian H describing the time evolution of the system, and
a series of projection operators Ti representing the proposition “the system decays during
hour i” such that 〈ψ|T1ψ〉 = 1/2, 〈ψ|T2ψ〉 = 1/4, and 〈ψ|T3ψ〉 = 1/8, and so on. Requiring
that the distribution of results respect the time translation symmetry implemented by the
unitary group Ut = e
−iHt, we have that T2 = U
†
t T1Ut, T3 = U
†
t T2Ut, and so on (where t
is one hour). Even this bare bones sketch is enough to tell us something interesting about
the operators Ti: if H is a self-adjoint operator with spectrum bounded from below then it
follows that 〈ψ|Ti+1Ti|ψ〉 6= 0 and so these operators Ti cannot be projections onto mutually
orthogonal subspaces of H.3
Thus there is no mixed state decomposition in terms of distinct eigenstates ψi of Ti (for
which Tiψi = ψi) such that the ψi would correspond to the system decaying during distinct
intervals of time, and neither can the Ti together serve to define a self-adjoint ‘time of decay’
operator. The former implication indicates that von Neumann’s famous projection postulate
cannot be applied to this situation; the latter than the identification of observables of the
theory with self-adjoint operators is ill-suited to include the time of an event as an observable
quantity.
Yet there seems every reason to suppose that the theory should be able to answer ques-
tions like, “When will the Geiger counter click?” or in a diffraction experiment, “When will
a dot appear on the screen?” In failing to answer these questions, the theory would be fail to
be empirically adequate; this failure would constitute a real ‘problem of time’ for the theory.
But this problem can be overcome, and without modifying the dynamics: at first blush, the
problem is not with the way that quantum mechanics defines the state of the system, but
the way that probabilities are derived from the state.
3This is closely related to Prop. 6.1. The proof is easily adapted to the current case if it is assumed that
there is some k > 0 such that for all i > k the probability of decay is zero.
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7.2 DEFINING EVENT TIME OBSERVABLES
The history of attempts to define event time observables in quantum mechanics begins with
Aharonov & Bohm’s (1961) critique of the energy-time uncertainty relation, understood as
a limitation on the possibility of measuring the energy of a system precisely in an arbitrarily
short time. In essence, Aharonov & Bohm’s objection amounts to the observation that the
Hamiltonian is a self-adjoint operator like any other, and so can (according to the usual
Dirac-von Neumann formalism) can be measured effectively at an instant. To combat what
they see as a prevalence of somewhat heuristic arguments based on particular experimental
setups adduced in support of the erroneous interpretation, they provide a detailed analysis of
an experiment which serves as a counterexample, i.e. one in which the energy of the system
under observation can be determined precisely in arbitrary short time. The ‘apparatus’ in
this experiment is modeled by a free particle in one dimension, considered as providing a
physical clock to measure the time at which the measurement interaction occurs.
However, the operator they suggest is closely related to the time of arrival of a classical
free particle, and so it is plausible that the operator they defined is better understood as
representing the time of an event rather than a clock. (See Section 2.3.4). In Chapter 5
the quantum time of arrival provided a case study to illustrate the mutually antagonistic
relationship between the requirement of Ordinary QM that observables must correspond to
self-adjoint operators and the idea that time covariance is constitutive of an event time ob-
servable, as expressed by Pauli’s Theorem. That is, to the extent that event time observables
are operators that covary with time shifts, Pauli’s Theorem shows that event time operators
are not observables of Ordinary QM. As I have suggested, the way out of this impasse is
to allow for the experimentally observable quantity (the time of an event such as a detector
firing) to be represented by a time covariant POVM.
The first steps towards this understanding of the quantum time of arrival as a time
covariant POVM were taken by Allcock (1969) and Kijowski (1974).4 Kijowski took an
axiomatic approach to defining the quantum distribution of arrival times. The axioms he
chose were based on axioms that were sufficient to derive the classical distribution. One of
these axioms ensured its characteristic covariance under time translations. Corresponding
to the corresponding quantum distribution he found our time of arrival operator Ta. Since
4For details of these and other interesting episodes in the development of the quantum time of arrival see
Muga & Leavens (2000).
146
every maximally symmetric operator defines a unique POVM (Akheizer & Glazman, 1993,
Theorem 2, p. 135), this distribution can also be obtained from the POVM I 7→ ETa(I) so
defined.
Allcock, on the other hand, provided the first analysis of the difficulties of the time of
arrival in terms of the positivity of H. By means of an analytic continuation argument he
was able to show that the condition H ≥ O entails the non-orthogonality of the (generalized)
eigenstates of Ta, characteristic of its failure to be self-adjoint.
5 He found that he could avoid
this problem by ‘doubling’ the domain of definition of Ta to include negative eigenstates of
H (i.e. negative energies), arriving at a new operator T±a that was self-adjoint, but defined
on a ‘larger’ Hilbert space H′ ⊃ H. This operator is canonically conjugate to the doubled
Hamiltonian H± and, so I 7→ P T±a (I) is time shift covariant PVM on H′.
This provides another way to avoid Pauli’s theorem, since the spectrum of H± is not
bounded from below. However, the self-adjoint operator T±a he defined (and its corresponding
PVM) is of negligible physical relevance since the Hamiltonian of a free particle evidently does
have a spectrum bounded from below. Nonetheless, as is well-known (although apparently
not by Allcock), by projecting the operators P T
±
a (I) to the original Hilbert space via an
orthogonal projection PH one obtains positive operators ETa(I) = PHP T
±
a (I), i.e. the positive
operators that form the time of arrival POVM I 7→ ETa(I) defined by Ta. This result is an
instance of Naimark’s famous Dilation Theorem, which establishes that a POVM can always
be extended to a PVM in a ‘larger’ Hilbert space in this way, to which it is related by a
projection.6
Allcock and Kijowski can perhaps be forgiven for failing to make these connections,
writing as they were at a time before the development of the POVM formalism by Holevo
(2011), Kraus (1983), Ludwig (1983) and others (in response to various problems in quantum
measurement theory). It was left to Werner (1986) to make the connection of the time of
arrival to time covariant POVMs, which he did in some generality to arrive at a treatment
of what he termed screen observables.7 Making use of results from operator algebra and
Mackey’s theory of imprimitivity, Werner obtained a general recipe for constructing POVMs
covariant under a unitary group by means of their Naimark dilation. Screen observables are
5See, again, Akheizer & Glazman (1993, Theorem 2, p. 135). The argument that Allcock gave is directly
related to the ‘refined’ Pauli’s Theorem proof of Chapter 4, and can be seen as the immediate ancestor of
that result.
6This summarizes the discussion of the time of arrival in Chapter 5.
7The results relied on by Werner are closely related to those given by Holevo (2011).
147
defined as POVMs covariant under the translation group of an arbitrarily chosen hyperplane.
As such, they include the usual position observable (corresponding to an instantaneous
hyperplane) and the time of arrival POVM just discussed (which, in three spatial dimensions,
corresponds to arrival at a timelike hyperplane). Werner showed that the resulting POVM
could be uniquely defined (subject to some other restrictions) for both non-relativistic and
relativistic symmetry groups. I now proceed to summarize and motivate these developments,
beginning from the distribution considered by Kijowksi (1974), which was discussed earlier
in Section 5.4.
7.2.1 Symmetries and Screen Observables
In considering the axiomatic definition of a suitable time of arrival distribution, the key
input from classical mechanics was to provide the symmetries of the desired probability dis-
tribution. When Kijowski was writing, in 1974, the method of defining quantum observables
through their behavior under a symmetry group was already well established. In particu-
lar, Wightman (1962) was able to uniquely define the position observable in Galilean and
Lorentz invariant quantum mechanics by requiring that the probability distribution behave
appropriately under Euclidean transformations. These symmetry requirements acted to con-
strain the form of the PVM since this gave a series of required covariance behaviors under
transformations of the PVM (according to the corresponding unitary groups). Having fixed
the form of the PVM, the self-adjoint position observable was uniquely given through the
Spectral Theorem.
In the case of a PVM (such as position) the covariance of a probability distribution
under a one-parameter family of unitary symmetries implies the existence of a self-adjoint
generator of that family (through Stone’s Theorem). More generally, Mackey’s Imprimitivity
Theorem showed that an irreducible unitary representation of a symmetry group gives rise to
a System of Imprimitivity, in which the property of mutual covariance implies the existence
of a pair of self-adjoint operators that form a Scho¨dinger representation.8 This is, in effect,
a generalized version of the Stone-von Neumann Theorem.
The characteristic behavior of a probability distribution for the time of an event is covari-
ance under shifts in time, but Pauli’s Theorem entails there can be no PVM corresponding to
8To state this important and powerful theorem, and give the required group theoretic definitions, would
require rather more build up than befits the limited use that I will put it to. See (Dickson, 2006, §3.3.2.1)
for a recent discussion by a philosopher of physics, and references therein.
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such a distribution. As we have seen, this difficulty can be obviated through consideration of
POVMs, and Kijowski’s seminal work in fixing the form of the probability distribution also
served to fix a corresponding POVM, which led back to the Aharanov-Bohm time operator.
The question naturally arose: could these symmetry requirements be used more generally
to determine the form of an arbitrary time covariant POVM? This question was answered
in the affirmative through the use of Naimark’s Theorem in the construction of generalized
systems of imprimitivity by Holevo (2011), Cattaneo (1979), and others.
The idea behind this construction is quite simple. In the case of a time covariant POVM,
the first moment of the POVM defines a maximal symmetric operator that is not self-adjoint,
and thus cannot be the generator of a one-parameter family of unitary symmetries. As Pauli’s
Theorem establishes, such a family can only exist if the spectrum of the Hamiltonian is the
entire real line. However, when one considers the Naimark dilation of the POVM, a time
covariant PVM, the covariance of this PVM under time shifts is equivalent to the existence
of a one-parameter unitary group of shifts in energy, generated by the self-adjoint operator
defined by the dilation. In projecting this family of unitary operators back to the original
Hilbert space they become a semi-group of isometries, which correspond to the positive shifts
in energy.
The idea of a generalized system of imprimitivity, then, is to form a genuine system of im-
primitivity in the Naimark extension which retains its covariance properties when projected
back to the physical Hilbert space. Using this means, Werner (1986) was able to generalize
Wightman’s construction of PVMs covariant under spatial transformations (corresponding to
a position observable) to POVMs covariant under (spatio-)temporal transformations. Think-
ing of the situation relativistically, Wightman’s construction of a position observable from a
PVM is limited to the symmetry group of a space-like hyperplane, whereas Werner is free
to consider “position” in a space-time hyperplane. Whereas the conventional position ob-
servable corresponds to a detection experiment performed everywhere in space at an instant,
detection in a space-time hyperplane corresponds to an idealized screen detector, sensitive
for all time in a particular spatial plane.
7.2.2 On Detection and Idealization
Arguably, the idealization involved in modeling any real detector as instantaneously sensitive
but (maximally) spatially extended is considerably more severe than the idealization involved
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in regarding a screen detector as having zero (spatial) width but unbounded spatio-temporal
extent. Picture a typical diffraction experiment which involves a source emitting a beam of
particles, a diffraction grating through which the beam passes, and a luminescent screen.
The source of quanta (electrons or photons, say) emits a single quantum particle at a time,
at a frequency such that only a single particle is ever in the apparatus. Some time after
a particle is emitted, a dot appears on the screen, and, repeating the experiment many
times, the relative intensity of these discrete events comes to form a characteristic spatial
interference pattern.
The outcome of such an experiment is a detection event lying in the plane of the detector,
occurring at some time after emission. The screen is sensitive over the entire course of the
experiment, and an individual experiment ends only when a particle is detected. This means,
in effect, that the probability of detection (at some time) is one, and so the probabilities
given by the theory can be thought of as applying under the condition that the particle is,
with certainty, detected at the screen (at some time). There is little harm, then, in extending
the description of the screen such that the plane is unbounded, and the detector is sensitive
over all time.
The idealization required to reach the normalization condition of the instantaneous po-
sition observable (measured at an instant t) is much more severe, since it presumes that the
particle is detected somewhere at t. Since in a typical experiment a particle is detected at
most a handful of times, the attribution of probability one to the occurrence of an event to
some particular time is problematic. The best interpretation of an instantaneous measure-
ment of spatial position, it seems, is a detector spread throughout space, certain to fire when
it switched on at an instant t. It is hard to imagine a detector we possess that has such char-
acteristics. Far more usual is the experimental setup described above, in which a detector
sensitive to some limited spatial region fires once in the course of an experiment. Consider
here the advanced detectors in operation in particle physics experiments at CERN. These
detectors contain banks of locally sensitive detector ‘elements,’ whose results are combined
to give particle trajectories of the collision products.
Werner’s generalization of position observables to screen observables9 corresponds to
something like the following. Envision an empty universe containing a particle detector
spread through space, sensitive for all time. The physics of this universe is simple: in this
9Note again that the former is included in the definition of the latter.
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universe there is some physical process that brings about detection at some time, at many
times, or at no times. As it happens, the probability distribution for these detection events
is given by a quantum state ψ, a vector in some Hilbert space H. A Wightman position
PVM provides the means to generate probabilities that answer the following sort of question:
given that a detection occurs somewhere in this spacelike hyperplane (i.e. at time t), what
is the probability it occurs in ∆? A screen observable, concerning a space-time hyperplane,
asks: given that a detection occurs on this two-dimensional spatial plane at some time, what
is the probability it occurs at t?
Each such observable picks out a different set of possible histories of this universe, i.e. a
particular class of possible worlds. The probabilities supplied are conditional probabilities,
since they apply to that class of possible worlds alone. So we ask: given that an event
of a particular type occurs in this world, what is the probability it (the event) has these
properties? In the case of Wightman position, we are constrained to conditions that assume
an event occurs on some space-like hyperplane (and only there), and so we assign probabilities
to its location in space (really an instantaneous space-time region).
In the case of a screen observable, we may consider any hyperplane we like and, assuming
that an event occurs there, assign probabilities to a three-dimensional space-time region that
lies in that hyperplane. But there are other classes of possible worlds we would like to assign
probabilities to: what about the class of worlds in which an event occurs in a spatial region
∆ during a time interval I? And what about an event given in terms other than its spatial
location? Furthermore, what about a possible world in which more than one event occurs?
The rest of this dissertation will provide the means to answer such questions.
7.3 GENERAL EVENT TIME OBSERVABLES
Most recently, Brunetti & Fredenhagen (2002b) supply a general recipe for constructing
event time observables from an instantaneous projection or positive operator (i.e. an effect)
taken to correspond to the occurrence of an event at that time. Key to this construction
is the technique of operator normalization, by which a time covariant POVM is normalized
according to the condition that the event in question occurs exactly once (in analogy with
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Werner’s screen observables). I will give the general technique first, then describe its applica-
tion and interpretation in a particularly simple case: a straightforward example concerning
the detection of a particle within a detector occupying a volume of space ∆ rather than a
plane.
In general terms, the construction of Brunetti & Fredenhagen (2002b) proceeds as follows.
Take any effect, i.e. a positive operator I ≥ A ≥ O.10 The Schro¨dinger picture state at a
time is ψt = Utψ, and the expectation value of A at time t is 〈ψt|Aψt〉. We seek a unique
time covariant POVM I 7→ EA(I), which is not related to A by a (generalized) spectral
resolution but rather as a probability distribution for the occurrence of A, an event, during
I = (t1, t2), a time interval.








where αA(t) is the function of t given by that inner product. Due to the properties of A,
0 ≤ αA(t) ≤ 1 for all t, φ and ψ, and thus B(I) is positive. Furthermore, the expectation
value of B(I) is bounded from above by |t2 − t1|.
However, if 〈ψt|A|ψt〉 = 1 for all t the expectation value of B(R) in (Heisenberg) state ψ
will not be bounded, and if 〈ψt|A|ψt〉 = 0 for all t then the operator B(I) is undefined. If
A corresponds to a detection probability at time t, say, such states would correspond to the
system having probability of detection in ∆ of one at every time t, or having no probability of
detection at any time. To exclude such states from the domain of definition of the event time
POVM, Brunetti & Fredenhagen suggest the following means. First we form the operators
(BA(I) + I). Since BA(I) is positive, (BA(I) + I) does not have −1 as an eigenvalue and so
these operators have an inverse CA(I) = (BA(I) + I)−1. If CA(I)ψ → ψ as I approaches R
then this is a state for which αA(t) = 0 for all t. If CA(I)ψ → 0 as I approaches R then
this is a state for which αA(t) = 1 for all t. To exclude these states from the domain of
our POVM, we take the orthogonal complement of the eigenspaces of CA corresponding to
eigenvalues 0 and 1.
10It is an open question as to whether an arbitrary effect can be interpreted as the occurrence of an event.
While I suspect that not every effect represents an event, I also suspect that events may be defined more
generally than considering only spatial projections, say, would allow.
11Compare this with the construction of time operators by Hegerfeldt & Muga (2010) considered in Section
6.4, where the idea was to find an instantaneous effect which, when integrated over time, would define a
time covariant symmetric operator. The end result is essentially the same, but the instantaneous effect from
which the time operator is constructed has a clear physical interpretation, retained throughout.
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On this domain (of states with a finite expectation value for all BA(I)) the self-adjoint
operators CA(I) form a net, with CA(I) ≤ CA(J) for I ⊂ J .12 The net of operators CA(I)
has a unique greatest lower bound CA ≤ I, and we define the operator BA(R) = C−1A − I.
The inverse of this operator BA(R)−1 is positive and thus has a unique positive square root
BA(R)−1/2. This allows us to define the desired operator normalized event time POVM as
follows
EA(I) = BA(R)−1/2BA(I)BA(R)−1/2.
It is easy to see that (on this domain) EA(R) = I. Of course, it may be that this domain
is the entire space H, but in any case we can by this means define an event time POVM
corresponding to the occurrence of A, on all states for which it makes sense to do so. Also note
how this procedure highlights the sense in which event times cannot be given independently
of the dynamics of a system, since the definition of EA(I) depends not just on A but on
the unitary group Ut. This is not surprising, since the distribution of event times will vary
not just with the (Heisenberg) state of the system, but also with the dynamics given by the
Hamiltonian.
7.3.1 Example: Localization as an Event
Here I will provide a detailed analysis of a simple case where the event in question is given
by the instantaneous spatial projection of a localization system P∆(t), which is associated
with the localization of a physical system in the region ∆ at the time t. On the conventional
(Wightman) account of localization, P∆(t) corresponds to a property of the system: the
property of being located in ∆ at t. If the Heisenberg state of the system is ψ then the
proposition that the system is located in the region ∆ at time t is true if P∆(t)ψ = ψ .
13 We
are going to interpret this fact about the quantum state ψ in terms of the occurrence of an
event in ∆ at t, rather than the possession of a property.
David Lewis (1986) gave an account of an event as a property (or class) of spatio-temporal
regions as follows, which is easily adapted to the interpretation of spatial localization as an
event (assumed to occur at t).
12A net is a set of self-adjoint operators completely ordered by the relation ≤, where A ≤ B if and only if
〈ψ|(B−A)ψ〉 ≥ 0 for all ψ ∈ H, bounded from below or above. An increasing (decreasing) net has a unique
self-adjoint operator as its least upper (greatest lower) bound. See, e.g., (Pedersen, 1989, 4.5.2).
13This is the forward direction of the famous ‘eigenstate-eigenvalue link,’ which says a system has a
property if and only if it is in an eigenstate of the corresponding projection (with eigenvalue one).
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To any event there corresponds a property of regions: the property that belongs
to all and only those spatio-temporal regions, of this or any other possible world,
in which that event occurs. Such a property belongs to exactly one region of any
world where the event occurs . . . (p. 243)
This closely resembles the account of Wightman localization given above, but it will require
a little modification. Note that Lewis distinguishes ‘occurring in’ a region from ‘occurring
within’ a region. If an event occurs within a region ∆ then, according to Lewis, it occurs
within every super-region Σ ⊃ ∆. However, if an event occurs in a region ∆ then it occurs
within that region (and thus every super-region) but occurs in no super-region (nor any
subregion).
An instantaneous position projection P∆ is an element of a PVM, and thus P∆P
′
∆ = 0
if ∆ and ∆′ are disjoint spatial regions, ∆ ∩ ∆ = ∅. If Σ ⊃ ∆ is a super region of ∆
then P∆ψ = ψ implies that PΣψ = ψ.
14 This provides us with a concrete realization of
Lewis’s relation of ‘occuring within’: an event occurs within a region ∆ at t if and only if
the Heisenberg state is ψ = P∆(t)ψ. However, according to Lewis, an event occurring in a
region ∆ does not occur in any super-region, nor any subregion. The region in which an
event occurs is, therefore, ‘just the right size.’ This can be achieved here by means of the
following definition: Given a state ψ, a localization event occurs in a region ∆(t) if and only
if P∆(t)ψ = ψ and there is no subregion Ω ⊂ ∆ such that PΩ(t)ψ = ψ.
This ensures that a localization event cannot occur in ∆ and its super-region Σ, since if
it occurs in ∆ (and thus obeys the first condition) then the latter condition is not satisfied.
This also excludes the situation where there is some subregion in which the event (with
certainty) did not occur.
Say that we have a particle detector set up in region ∆, and so the events we are describing
with the projections P∆(t) correspond to the occurrence of a detection event in ∆ at t.
Naively, one might expect the following positive operator to describe the event of detection





However, there is no guarantee that the expectation value of T∆ will be less than one, and
so these will not form a normalized POVM. Brunetti & Fredenhagen’s suggestion is to use
14Let P∆ψ = ψ then, since PΣP∆ = P∆, we have PΣψ = PΣP∆ψ = P∆ψ = ψ.
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known as the dwell time operator,15 to provide a suitable operator normalization in the
following way.
Being positive, T∆(R) has a unique positive square root such that (T∆(R)1/2)2 = T∆(R).
Using the inverse of this operator, we define
E∆(I) = T∆(R)−1/2T∆(I)T∆(R)−1/2.
It is easily verified that E∆(I) is a time translation covariant POVM.
16 This operator nor-
malized POVM returns E∆(R) = I and so the probability distribution obtained reflects
the condition that the event given by P∆ occurs at some t. This is analogous to the as-
sumption made in defining a screen observable so that the elementary event (detection in a
hyper-plane) is assigned probability one.
7.3.2 Against Measurement (of Event Time POVMs)
The difficulty with providing an interpretation of events as conditional probabilities, con-
ditioned on the outcome of a measurement, is the following. As a time covariant POVM,
Pauli’s Theorem guarantees that E∆(I) is not a PVM, and thus E∆(I)
2 6= E∆(I). As was
remarked upon in Chapter 3, this fact rules out an interpretation of E∆(I) as a conditional
probability, given by the usual means. To recap, Lu¨ders’ Rule updates the state by project-
ing it onto the eigenspace corresponding to the measured eigenvalue (normalizing according
to the trace). That is, for a projection Pk onto the eigenspace associated with k,
ρ→ ρ˜ = PkρPk
tr [Pkρ]
,
which leads to the following expression for conditional probability
Pr(F |E) = tr [EFEρ]
tr [Eρ]
= tr [F ρ˜], (7.4)
15See Jose Munoz et al. (2010) for a recent discussion.
16In connection with the time of arrival, Hoge (2008) verifies that the POVM ETa(I) is returned from
E∆(I) in the limit |∆| → 0, that is, as detection within a volume becomes detection at a plane (or point).
This suggests that the time of arrival comes about as an illicit conditionalization on a zero probability event.
As do screen observables in general, including instantaneous position.
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where ρ is a density matrix (a trace-class operator with unit trace norm).
Where E is a positive operator that is not a projection, the Lu¨ders operation provides
the next best thing:




which reduces to Lu¨ders’ Rule just in case E is a projection, i.e. E2 = E = E1/2. Pauli’s
Theorem, however, entails that E∆(I) is not a projection, and so we must use the Lu¨ders
operation. By following the earlier example of a conditional probability (7.4) we would be
led to define




as a conditional probability for the effect F given the effect E. But it is easily seen that
this does not have the form of a conditional probability (unless B is a projection), since if
B2 6= B then W (B|B) 6= 1.
That is, we cannot interpret the state ρ = E∆(I)
1/2ρE∆(I)
1/2 (i.e. the state ρ subjected
to the Lu¨ders operation corresponding to the effect E∆(I)) as the state ρ conditioned on
the occurrence of an event during the time interval I. This throws into doubt the use of
this expression (7.5) by Hegerfeldt & Muga (2010) to define “conditional distributions” for
operator normalized event time POVMs. There is also reason to doubt the interpretation of
the quantity tr [E∆(I)ρ] as the probability for the occurrence of the event P∆(t) during I in
state ρ. By definition, the probability of detection at t is tr [P∆(t)ρ], which seems to entail
that the probability of detection during I is rather the cumulative probability of detection at
each instant, i.e. tr [T∆(I)ρ]. But T∆(I) does not provide a properly normalized probability
for detection in ∆ during I.
Note also that the Standard Model of Measurement (Section 3.3) is of no help here. The
idea of Theorem 3.15 was to use the Naimark dilation of the POVM under consideration to
define a PVM on the state space of a larger system. But Pauli’s Theorem entails that the
larger system must possess a Hamiltonian with an unbounded Hamiltonian. Such a system
does not have a physical interpretation. (Recall the discussion of Allcock’s suggestion for the
time of arrival in Section 7.2.) This larger system is condemned, therefore, to be regarded a
mathematical artifact rather than a representation of the states of a physical system. There
is no way to measure an observable of an imaginary system.
A similar problem applies to Theorem 3.16, Kraus’ Theorem, which demonstrates that a
POVM on the object system could be measured by means of a projective measurement on an
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ancilla, correlated with the object system by means of a unitary evolution. Pauli’s Theorem
entails that if a projective measurement of the ancilla is to serve as a measurement of a time
POVM of the object system then the one-parameter family of unitary operators in question
must be generated by a Hamiltonian with an unbounded spectrum, corresponding again to
the dynamics of an imaginary, unphysical mathematical artifact. This makes the accommo-
dation of time covariant POVMs within the Standard Model a practical impossibility. There
is, therefore, no self-adjoint observable waiting in the wings whose measurement (according
to the conventional account) will serve as a measurement of an event time POVM. Thus we
require an interpretation of these operators that does not rely on a prior understanding of
what it means to perform a projective measurement.
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8.0 EVENT TIMES AS CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES
We have found a general recipe for finding an event time POVM EA(I) associated with an
arbitrary (instantaneous) effect A. We have also found that POVMs are particularly ill-
suited to supply conditional probabilities through the trace, which are typically defined for
a projection through Lu¨ders’ Rule. In this chapter I present my proposal for making sense
of these event time POVMs as conditional probabilities: probabilities for the occurrence of
A during time interval I given the occurrence of the event (once) at some t ∈ R. I will
argue for this proposal by making use of the case considered above, where the occurrence of
a particular event was associated with an instantaneous space-time region ∆(t) through the
spatial projection P∆(t).
The argument proceeds by analogy with conditional probabilities for instantaneous space-
time regions, which are given by Lu¨ders’ Rule. I will argue for the view that conditional
probabilities for the occurrence of events in non-instantaneous space-time regions should
be given in just the same way as those for instantaneous space-time regions. This can
be achieved in two (numerically equivalent) ways: either by defining temporal projections,
so that Lu¨ders’ Rule may be applied directly, or by allowing conditionalization on non-
normalized positive operators representing occurrence at a time interval. The first option
involves making use of an ‘extended’ Hilbert space of functions of time and space. I will
consider this option in the next section. The second option involves the definition of non-
instantaneous Heisenberg picture observables. That is the approach I will initially pursue
here.
8.1 EVENTS AND SPACE-TIME LOCALIZATION
As above, we will interpret P∆(t), a Heisenberg picture projection operator, as corresponding
to the occurrence of an event within ∆ at t. According to the Born rule, if the state of
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the system is ψ, a vector of unit norm, then the probability for occurrence in ∆ at t is
〈ψ|P∆(t)ψ〉 = 〈ψt|P∆ψt〉, where ψt is the equivalent Schro¨dinger picture state with ψ0 = ψ.
According to the Born rule this probability is conditioned only on the state of the system,
otherwise it is unconditioned. Interpreted as a probability for the occurrence of an event,
however, this probability is conditioned on the occurrence of the event in question at time t.
We can see this by examining the nature of the elementary event, which is assigned
probability one. The instantaneous projections together form a PVM ∆ 7→ P∆(t) on H,
the expectation operator of which is the Heisenberg picture position observable, P (t), a
self-adjoint operator. (For simplicity’s sake, we will consider just one spatial dimension.) As
projections, the operators P∆(t) are ordered by subspace inclusion, P∆(t) ≤ PΣ(t), according
to ∆ ⊂ Σ. We may then apply Lu¨ders rule to two such projections to obtain a well-formed
conditional probability for detection in ∆ at t given detection in Σ at t as follows:






This expression assigns probability one to the event corresponding to PΣ(t), i.e. detection
within Σ given detection within Σ (at t).
Consider a sequence of such expressions, ordered by subspace inclusion. The maximal
spatial region, i.e. all of space, corresponds to the entire Hilbert space, and the associated
projection is the identity, I. According to this interpretation, then, the event corresponding
to detection at t (i.e. detection at t somewhere in space) is assigned probability one by the
standard normalization of the (instantaneous) position PVM. The probabilities given by the
PVM ∆ 7→ P∆(t) are, therefore, already conditional probabilities: they are conditioned on
the event of detection at t.
The expression for conditional probability (8.1) provides the means to define another
position PVM, however, conditioned on the occurrence of the event within Σ. Consider the
Hilbert space HΣ ⊂ H, obtained by projection onto the subspace corresponding to PΣ(t),
i.e. HΣ = {PΣ(t)φ : φ ∈ H}. On this Hilbert space PΣ(t) corresponds to the identity, since
PΣ(t)ψ = ψ for all ψ ∈ HΣ, and all projections P∆(t) such that P∆(t) ≤ PΣ(t) together form
a normalized PVM in HΣ. This is a trivial example, but we will use similar methods in the
more challenging case of occurrence within a four-dimensional region.
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8.1.1 Non-Instantaneous Localization
In Section 7.3 I argued that the use of POVMs for event times was unavoidable due to
Pauli’s Theorem, which prevents the definition of time covariant PVMs. However, Pauli’s
Theorem—which relies on the time translation covariance of the desired POVM—is not the
only obstacle to associating a projection with the probability for occurrence of an event in
a four-dimensional space-time region. Consider the positive operator TΣ(I) defined as per





Let this operator represent the occurrence of an event within Σ during I, and let the operator
T∆(I) represent the occurrence of that event within ∆ during I.
I propose that the following expression gives the conditional probability for the occurrence
within ∆ given occurrence within Σ:









Since we are in effect adding probabilities from different times, we are treating the occurrence
of an event at those times as independent. This makes sense considering that the condition
ensures that just one event occurs, at some specific time. Each different time of occurrence
corresponds, therefore, to a different possibility; a distinct possible world.
Now we seek to define a POVM that covaries with spatial translations representing the
probability of detection within ∆ during I given detection within Σ during I. Since TΣ(I)
is a positive operator, this suggests the use of the Lu¨ders operation (7.5) to condition on
detection within Σ as follows
ρ→ ρ = TΣ(I)1/2ρTΣ(I)1/2.
Now we seek a POVM ∆ 7→ EI(∆) such that the following expression gives the right asso-
ciation of conditional probabilities to regions:





Remarkably, this desideratum is satisfied precisely by introducing the following operator




With this definition in place, we have








as before. This suggests that the operator normalization technique of Brunetti & Freden-
hagen does serve to define a conditional POVM corresponding to a conditional probability,
so long as it is used in conjunction with the appropriate conditionalization, i.e. the Lu¨ders
operation of the positive operator that represents the occurrence of the elementary event
(picked out by the condition under which the probabilities apply).
Note, however, that ∆ 7→ EI(∆) is not a time covariant POVM but a spatially covarying
POVM. That is, EI(∆) covaries with spatial translations Ua as follows:
U−aEI(∆)Ua = TΣ(I)−1/2T∆+a(I)TΣ(I)−1/2 = EI(∆ + a),
assuming that translation by a does not remove ∆ from Σ. In fact, we may allow ∆ to move
arbitrarily in space by considering conditionalization of the occurrence of the event anywhere
in space during I, in which case we have










t2 − t1 .
In that case, the ‘operator normalized’ POVM corresponding to the probability of detection




Note that, as a spatially covariant POVM, EI(∆) does not fall under the ambit of Pauli’s
Theorem. The relative simplicity of this operator makes an investigation of its spectrum a
tractable problem (at least numerically). In recent work with James Yearsley (in manuscript)
we examine this operator (which we call the ‘quantum curfew’) for the free particle in one-
dimension, and find the expectation value of EI(∆) to be bounded from above by b < 1.
This leads to the suspicion that there are no unit vectors in ψ ∈ H such that EI(∆)ψ for
any ∆, for any time interval I = [t1, t2]. Equivalently: there are no states ψ ∈ H such that
〈ψ|P∆(t)ψ〉 = 1 for all t ∈ I. This conjecture seems to be borne out when considering the
free particle Hamiltonian. In general it turns out that this conjecture is not quite right,
since there are states for which this relationship holds. However, those states have a severe
limitation when considered as dynamical solutions of the Schro¨dinger equation.
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Proposition 8.1. Let P ≤ I be a Schro¨dinger picture projection operator, ψ ∈ H be a
vector of unit norm in a separable Hilbert space, and let Ut = e
iHt be the unitary group
uniquely generated by H, a self-adjoint operator with semi-bounded spectrum. Let P ({tk})
be the projection operator that corresponds to the possession of the property P at every time
t ∈ {tk}. That is, ψ is in the range of P ({tk}) if PUtψ = Utψ for all t ∈ {tk}.
Let ψ be in the range of P ({tk}) then either:
1. {tk} is a set with zero Lebesgue measure, or
2. ψ is in the range of P (R), i.e. P ({tk}) = P (R).
Therefore, there is no projection P (I) that corresponds to the possession of a property at an
open interval of instants I ⊂ R and at no other time.
Proof. Let Pc be the projector onto the orthogonal complement of P . At each time t ∈ {tk}
we have 〈ψ|U−tPcUtψ〉 = 0. The premises of Hegerfeldt’s Lemma are satisfied by ψ, Ut
and Pc (see Lemma 4.2). Therefore, 〈ψ|U−tPcUtψ〉 = 0 for all t, unless {tk} is a set of
zero Lebesgue measure. Assuming that {tk} has non-zero Lebesgue measure, it follows that
〈ψ|U−tPUtψ〉 = 1 for all t. Thus PUtψ = Utψ for all t ∈ R. Therefore, if ψ is in the
range of P ({tk}) then ψ is in the range of P (R), i.e. P (R) ≥ P ({tk}). But, by definition,
if ψ is in the range P (R) then ψ is in the range of P ({tk}), i.e. P ({tk}) ≥ P (R). Thus
P ({tk}) = P (R).
If {tk} = I is a time interval, then, the only states for which 〈ψ|P∆(t)ψ〉 = 1 for every
t ∈ I are those which are confined to the region ∆ for all t ∈ R.1 Such states will arise if
the Hamiltonian H can be decomposed into a direct sum of operators on closed subdomains,
H = H1 ⊕ H2, where P∆H1ψ = H1ψ for all ψ in the domain of H. (Blank et al., 2008,
14.6.1) demonstrate that the inclusion in H of an infinite potential term surrounding ∆ is
sufficient for such a decomposition to exist; it is necessary in the sense that a finite potential
term will not have this effect.
1This resembles the Quantum Zeno (or Watchdog) Effect, where continuous measurement of a projection
confines the evolution of the system to the orthogonal subspace of that projection (Misra & Sudarshan,
1977).
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8.1.2 No Non-Instantaneous Properties
Excluding such Hamiltonians from consideration, we reach some interesting conclusions re-
garding the Wightman interpretation of localization as a property of a system.2 If we have
reason to believe that the system is not localized in some region for all time then the times
at which the system is localized anywhere within that region are severely limited. This is
because the result applies to subregions as well. That is, if Σ ⊃ ∆ is a larger region that
includes ∆ then PΣ(t)ψ 6= ψ implies that P∆(t)ψ 6= ψ.3 So the conclusion of the result
restricts localization within a subregion of the region just as much as it does for the region
itself, and the region under consideration could be as large as one likes: the Earth, the Solar
System, or so on.
Moreover, the condition that a state must satisfy to be localized within a region for a
time interval is so severe that a non-zero probability that the system is localized anywhere
outside of the region at any time t entails that the set of times at which it is localized within
the region has measure zero. The upshot of all this is that if we are to admit the mere
possibility that the particle could be detected outside of the lab next week, then it cannot
be localized within the lab today at more than a set of times with zero measure. Therefore,
on the Wightman interpretation the spatial localization properties are temporally sparse, in
this sense.
Returning to the question of non-instantaeous localization, we have a proof that (given
some mild restrictions on the Hamiltonian) any such POVM ∆ 7→ EI(∆) cannot be a PVM,
since the operators EI(∆) are not projections. If projections are associated with properties
(and vice versa) then it seems, therefore, that there is no such property as being located in a
spatial region at a time interval. Interpreted in terms of a property of a system, this seems to
say that no system can be located within a bounded region of space for more than an instant
(or at most a set of measure zero). This is an odd feature for a physical thing—presumably
envisioned as a persisting object—to display. One would think that a persisting thing must
be located somewhere at every time it exists.
This result, however, seems to suggest otherwise. So long as the Hamiltonian is well
behaved (with a semi-bounded spectrum and without an infinite potential well) a quantum
2In his “notion of localizability in a region” ∆, these instantaneous projections are “supposed to describe
a property of the system, the property of being localized in ∆” (Wightman, 1962, p. 847, original emphasis).
3Let P∆(t)ψ = ψ then, since PΣ(t)P∆(t) = P∆(t), we have PΣ(t)ψ = PΣ(t)P∆(t)ψ = P∆(t)ψ = ψ, in
contradiction with the assumption made above.
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system described by a Heisenberg state ψ ∈ H cannot be said to be located within any
bounded region of space for more than a set of times of measure zero.4 This puts a severe
pressure on the idea that the normalization condition of a unit vector entails that a (non-
relativistic) quantum particle has a position at every time. On the contrary, it would seem
that a free particle undergoing unitary evolution is (almost) always not located anywhere
in particular. This leads to the following uncomfortable dilemma for the would-be quantum
ontologist who believes that quantum states describe persisting objects—things that persist
in virtue of existing in space and time—and, with Wightman, believes that localization is a
property of the system described by the quantum state.
If having a definite location in space at every time it exists is necessary for an entity to
be a persisting object then either unitarily evolving quantum systems are persisting objects
that (almost) always don’t exist or unitarily evolving quantum systems are not persisting
objects.
The first horn is rather unpleasant, I would say. Let us dwell there no further. The
second horn, on the other hand, opens up the possibility of interpreting the quantum state
in terms other that the properties of a persisting thing (the ‘quantum system’). In this vein,
I have begun to develop here an interpretation of the quantum state as a means to predict
the occurrence of events. On this view, the things that have the property of being located
in some spatial region at some time are events, not ‘quantum systems’ (whatever such a
thing may be). This perspective is developed further and compared to some other related
interpretative approaches in Chapter 9.
In sum, what if the Schro¨dinger picture quantum state did not describe the instantaneous
properties of a persisting object, but rather just the probabilities for events to occur at a
time? In that case, the failure of a quantum system to have spatial properties at every time
becomes a failure of some event to occur within some region at every time. But events are
temporally localized by their very nature; one would expect an event to happen in—to be
located at—some spatial region at some subset of times, rather than everywhere at all times.
If an event happens just once, in some place at some time, we would not be at all surprised;
that is the nature of events.
Taking this point of view, where P∆(t) represents the occurrence of an event at t, gives
Pauli’s Theorem an interesting new significance as a result related to temporal indeterminacy.
4If it could, there would be a corresponding PVM (of at least two elements) that includes such a projection.
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As Srinivas & Vijayalakshmi (1981) argue, the use of POVMs to represent the time of an
event entails that there can be no state preparation that guarantees the occurrence of an
event during some finite time interval. This suggests that quantum processes are inherently
indeterministic in the following sense: given the quantum state of a system and concern
with the occurrence of some event, there is no way to predict with certainty when that event
will occur. This fact deserves further attention as an indication that quantum mechanics
describes processes that are stochastic in time. To see what I mean here, compare the time
of an atomic decay with a coin toss (assumed to be indeterministic). The time of decay is
inherently unpredictable, and we assign probabilities to times. For a coin toss, the time at
which the event occurs is assumed to be well-defined, but the character of the events that
follow are assumed to be inherently unpredictable. Atomic decay is thus a process that is
stochastic in time.
8.2 EVENT POVMS AS CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES
In Section 8.1.1 I explored the use of operator normalization to define conditionalized POVMs
for the occurrence of an event within a four-dimensional spatio-temporal region. These
POVMs returned well-formed conditional probabilities when conditioning on the occurrence
of the elementary event by means of a (non-normalized) Lu¨ders operation. We considered
conditional probabilities that concerned the occurrence of the event in question in some region
of space rather than another (given occurrence in some spatio-temporal super-region). We
may use exactly the same technique to define the conditional probability for occurrence in a
region ∆× I given occurrence in Σ× J , a super region of ∆× I.
That is, I propose the following expression as providing that conditional probability









where J = [t3, t4]. If this is accepted as a legitimate conditional probability with that inter-
pretation, then we find that the event time observables that were the concern of Brunetti &
Fredenhagen arise as a special case. In particular, consider our earlier choice of instantaneous
effect P∆, conditioned on the occurrence of an event in ∆ at some t ∈ R. The probability of
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This conditional probability is well-formed, in the sense that the elementary event of de-
tection in ∆ at some t is assigned probability one. It is also has the following expression
in terms of the operator normalized POVM I 7→ E∆(I) defined by applying Brunetti &
Fredenhagen’s scheme (see Section 7.3),






This suggests that the generalized event time POVMs they define may be generally un-
derstood as providing conditional probabilities, when applied to the system state conditioned
by the corresponding Lu¨ders operation. Although straightforward to apply, this is an im-
portant conceptual advance. It also suggests that the distribution over times obtained by
applying an event time POVM to the unconditioned state cannot be interpreted as con-
ditional probabilities, in which case it is not clear how they should be interpreted at all.
Furthermore, the operator normalized POVM, although conceptually valuable, is not neces-
sary for the purpose of calculating these probabilities. Since these POVMs are often difficult
to calculate, this approach also has pragmatic benefits.
Conceptually, it is important not to think of this conditionalization as a dynamical process
(as an operation is often conceptualized). First, the conditionalization in this case involves
all of time. It also concerns the Heisenberg state, not the Schro¨dinger state, and we cannot
expect there to be any unitary evolution that implements it. This is not a process that unfolds
in time; by adopting this conditionalization, we are not changing the state in manner that
could be attributed to any physical process at all. Rather, the condition corresponds to the
conceptual selection of a particular set of histories as being particularly relevant, and it is to
these that the conditional probabilities apply. The operator normalized POVM corresponds
to a further selection of a subset of those histories, and the probability concerns the likelihood
that one of those histories is the actual history observed (with respect to the relevant set of
background assumptions).
Once it is acknowledged that the probabilities concern histories, their expression in terms
of a state space that does not explicitly include time becomes somewhat limiting. Once
we have adopted a conditionalization of the state, we have fixed the subset of histories
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under consideration and further conditionalization is not feasible—our condition, remember,
concerns all time. Furthermore, the use of positive operators rather than projections limits
the applicability of these expressions to the single case: if we had projections at our disposal
we could repeatedly conditionalize on the occurrence of an event and remain within the
ambit of Lu¨ders’ Rule. In short, we have gone somewhat beyond our means in defining
non-instantaneous probabilities in this instantaneous setting.
But there is no reason why our condition could not be given the from of a projection.
We are interested in (e.g.) the projection onto states ψ∆ such that P∆(t)ψ∆ = ψ∆ at every
t ∈ R. The relevant subspace is the states for which P∆(t)ψ∆ = ψ∆. The difficulty we face
is that every vector ψ ∈ H uniquely corresponds to a history ψt = Utψ, but the histories
we are interested in (corresponding to the occurrence of an event within some time interval,
say) must be defined more generally. It is here that the limitations of the Heisenberg and
Schro¨dinger pictures start to bite since each concerns (equivalent) instantaneous projections.
To free ourselves from this restriction, let us consider instead vector valued functions of
t, Ψ(t) = ψ(t), with ψ(t) ∈ H. Such a function represents an entire history of a system, i.e a
possible world. We may thus define a history Ψ∆(t) corresponding to the desired elementary
event by the function Ψ∆(t) = P∆Utψ. But these functions of t cannot lie in the instantaneous
Hilbert spaceH = L2[R3] of functions of (configuration) space. Instead, we must consider the
temporally extended Hilbert space H+ = L2[R3] ⊗ L2[R] ∼= L2[R4] of functions of space and
time. The conditional probabilities obtained here can be precisely replaced in that setting,
but with projections onto time intervals, and—correspondingly—Lu¨ders’ Rule proper.
8.3 THE EXTENDED HILBERT SPACE
Vectors in the extended Hilbert space Ψ ∈ H+ (constructed on Dirac’s extended configuration
space) are defined from vectors in H by means of a vector valued function of t. That is,
each vector Ψ can be written Ψ(t) = ψ(t), where ψ(t) ∈ H, the usual Hilbert space of the
system. A Heisenberg state ψ ∈ H uniquely corresponds to a family of Schro¨dinger states
Utψ = ψt ∈ H, but the function Ψ(t) = ψt will fail to be included in H+ since this function is
not square integrable. Nonetheless, we will be able to set up a close correspondence between
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vectors Ψ ∈ H+ and Heisenberg states ψ ∈ H that will serve our purpose of defining valid
conditional probabilities via Lu¨ders’ Rule.
Following Naimark & Fomin (1957), we will define H+ as a continuous direct sum of





where {ek} is a fixed orthonormal basis for H. First, we consider more general vector-valued
functions t 7→ φ(t) ∈ Ht, where instantaneous vectors φ(t) at different times need not be
related by Ut. Such a function is measurable if f(t) = 〈ψ|φt〉 is measurable (with respect
to the usual Borel measure on R) for arbitrary ψ ∈ H. If two such functions Ψ(t),Φ(t)
are measurable, then so is the numerical function of t defined by their instantaneous inner
product F (t) = 〈Ψ(t)|Φ(t)〉t. The set of all such measurable functions Ψ is a Hilbert space,5
which corresponds to the continuous direct sum of the spaces Ht, that is an integral with










Note that whereas Ψ(t) = Utψ is not included in this space, partial dynamical evolutions of
the system are, i.e. if Ψ(t) = Utψ for t ∈ (t1, t2), 0 otherwise then Ψ ∈ H+. Note also that,
since H+ was defined as a direct sum of instantaneous spaces Ht, instantaneous vectors from
different times are orthogonal. Thus we can define a projection operator P T ([t1, t2]) which
has the effect of truncating an arbitrary history Ψ(t) as follows:
P T ([t1, t2])Ψ(t) =
{
ψ(t) if t1 ≤ t ≤ t2
0 otherwise.
Considered as a map from temporal intervals to projections, I 7→ P T (I) provides the means
to define a PVM from Borel subsets on R to projections on H+. By the Spectral Theorem,
there is a corresponding observable T+, self-adjoint on H+. The conjugate observable to T+
is not the Hamiltonian (an operator on H), and so Pauli’s Theorem is avoided. This feature
of the correspondence between H and H+ deserves further comment.
5Identifying, as usual, functions that differ only on a set of measure zero.
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Consider a bounded operator B ∈ B(H) which, operating on a vector ψ ∈ H, returns a





where BΨ(t) ∈ H. The domain of B+ will be all Ψ ∈ H+ such that B+Ψ ∈ H+. We can
expect the partial dynamical evolutions mentioned above to be in this domain.
This provides the following expression for the conditional probabilities for detection
events, as defined earlier. Let Ψ(t) = Utψ for a system in Heisenberg state ψ. The history
corresponding to detection within ∆, therefore, P∆+Ψ(t). Detection during I corresponds











This is just the same expression we obtained before, Equation 8.3.
Now consider the action of a unitary time shift operator Uτ on a vector Ψ(t) ∈ H. Only
if Ψ(t) = ψt = Utψ will this have the effect UτUtψ = ψt+τ , otherwise the effect is to map the
vector Ψ(t) ∈ H to a vector UτΨ(t) ∈ H. That is, a distinct vector assigned to the same time
t. This means that the projection P T (I + τ)Ψ 6= (U−τP T (I)Uτ)Ψ, at least not in general.
The time covariance of the projections P T (I) takes on a distinct, more general form under
a unitary group U(s) defined on H+ rather than H.
To reflect on this fact, consider the relationship between a Hilbert space of one-dimensional
functions ψ1 ∈ L2[R] and a space of two-dimensional functions ψ2 ∈ L2[R2]. Whereas ψ2(x)
is a function of x, ψ2(x, y) is a function of two independent parameters x and y. If x and
y correspond to orthogonal axes in two-dimensional Euclidean space, to place a function of
x in this space requires a specification of the y co-ordinate. This suggests that we can set
up a one-to-one correspondence of the form ψ1(x)→ ψ2(x, 0). However, it is not clear that
this function ψ2(x, 0) is an element of ψ2 ∈ L2[R2] if the function is left unspecified for other
values of y. To remedy this defect, we could set ψ2(x, y) = ψ1(x) for all y, but it is still
not clear that ψ2 ∈ L2[R2] since it could fail to be square integrable. However, by mapping
ψ1(x) to an interval of y, i.e. ψ2[−a,a](x, y) = ψ
1(x) if −a ≤ y ≤ a, 0 otherwise, we obtain a
function of x and y that is certainly square integrable if ψ1 is.
Now consider a translation by b of a function ψ2[−a,a] along the y-axis. Such a transfor-
mation has the effect of mapping the function ψ2(x, y) to the function ψ2(x, y + b). For a
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function ψ2[−a,a], translation by b along the y-axis has the effect ψ
2
[−a,a] → ψ2[−a+b,a+b]. Now
define the operator Qy by multiplication in y, (Qyψ
2)(x, y) = (yψ2)(x, y). This provides the
means to set up a Schro¨dinger representation with Py, where (Pyψ
2)(x, y) = (i d
dy
ψ2)(x, y).
All the discussion of Section 5.1 applies here, and one can show by the same means that Qy
and Py are self-adjoint operators forming a Weyl pair, with Py the generator of a unitary
group of shifts in y, U(b). That is, U(b)ψ2(x, y) = ψ2(x, y − b). There is evidently no hope
of finding a representation of this group in terms of unitary operators acting on functions
ψ1 ∈ L2[R].
The situation inH+ is directly analogous, despite the fact that there exists inH a unitary
group parameterized by t. In terms of its physical significance, this group of spatio-temporal
symmetries is on a par with spatial translations and rotations, Galilean boosts etc.: it is
one of a collection of one-parameter unitary groups that together provide an irreducible
representation of the Galilei Group. When a vector in H is acted on by a unitary operator
Ut, the result is another vector in H, taken to be related to the original by a time translation.
This is often interpreted dynamically, as a process that changes the instantaneous state of a
physical system over time. Evidently this interpretation is not without physical significance
since quantum mechanics equipped with unitary evolution alone has (empirically, at least)
done quite well. But the fact that this representation of time translations exists on H does
not entail that other representations cannot be found, nor that (if found) they should have
no physical significance.
If the state of a system is taken to be a non-instantaneous, spatio-temporal object Ψ ∈ H+
giving an entire history of a system then the time-translations of that state correspond to
different histories. This is analogous to the effect of Ut on the Heisenberg state ψ ∈ H: in the
Heisenberg picture, Utψ is distinct time-independent state. Considering an arbitrary function
of t in the extended Hilbert space H+, however, the group of unitary time translations
U(s)Ψ(t) = Ψ(t + s) is generated by a self-adjoint operator on H+. This operator, call it
W+, is the operator conjugate to T+, acting by differentiation in the representation where
T+ acts by multiplication. Together, (W+, T+) are a Schro¨dinger representation, and form a
Weyl pair.
This entails that the PVM corresponding to T+ covaries with these time translations,
U(−s)P T (I)U(s) = P T (I − s). The covariance of W+ with translations generated by T+,
however, need have no special physical significance. Certainly, neither T+ nor W+ are ob-
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servables of Ordinary QM, and there is no interpretative rule in place to say that self-adjoint
operators on H+ can be measured at an instant of time. There is no reason to regard the
PVM P T (I) as anything but a convenient means to associate observables of H (represent-
ing events) with intervals of times, and the existence of W+ as a logical consequence of the
demand that those associations covary with time translations. The physical significance of
this time translation symmetry lies in the fact the result of an experiment concerning event
times (at the ensemble level) is a distribution of times, and that this distribution covaries
with the time at which the experiment begins.
8.4 DISCUSSION AND INTERPRETATION
For the situations considered thus far, the group U(s) has been somewhat surplus to re-
quirements since the families of states (histories) under consideration have all had the form
Ψ(t) = ψt, for some set of t, and so the unitary group Ut would have sufficed. Conceptually,
however, there is a important distinction since the role of the group U(s) is not dynamical.
In the Schro¨dinger picture of Ordinary QM, we tend to imagine the vectors ψt as describ-
ing the successive instantaneous states of a substantial thing, viz., ‘the quantum system,’
imagined as a persisting object. That is, despite the fact that the wavefunction of a system
almost always resides in a higher dimensional space than three-dimensional physical space,
the intuition remains that these instantaneous states ψt are states of the same thing persist-
ing through time—the collection of quantum particles, or whatever. Underlying this mode
of thought is the intuition that quantum phenomena are the manifestations of the properties
of an underlying thing whose identity through time is grounded in its continuing existence
as a physical object (of some stripe).
This overtly metaphysical assumption is, however, actively in conflict with the four-
dimensional picture appropriate to the use of the extended state space H+. Minimally, a
history Ψ ∈ H+ can be thought of just as a means of attaching probabilities to experimental
outcomes associated with distinct sets of times. Any metaphysical interpretation of Ψ should
at least be consistent with this use. Recall that given a Heisenberg state ψ ∈ H we were
able to obtain an assignment of conditional probabilities to the occurrence of an event at
different times, conditioned on the occurrence of that event at some time.
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The Heisenberg state ψ does not correspond to a vector in H+, however. In terms of H+,
the conditional probabilities for times of occurrence are obtained by an application of Lu¨ders
Rule to projections representing occurrence at a time interval, and the condition under which
these probabilities apply corresponds to a conditionalization of the history Ψ(t) = ψt. The
experimental outcomes themselves correspond to a further conditionalization of the relevant
history. To what extent can we regard these conditonalizations of histories as descriptions
of the actual dynamical evolution of some substantial thing? To do so would require that,
following the observation of some particular outcome, we must be able to assign a dynamical
evolution to the substantial thing ‘passing through’ the experimental apparatus which brings
about the observed outcome. These conditionalized histories, however, are not apt to play
this role.
A better view of these projections is provided by thinking of them as providing a speci-
fication of the worlds possible according to the theory. On this view, the conditionalization
of the state corresponds to a narrowing down of the possibilities under consideration. We
can usefully think of these possibilities as a specification of a class of possible worlds, and
the probabilities that are assigned to them as (roughly) Lewisian chances, i.e. as objecti-
fied assignments of credence. According to Lewis (1981), we are to think of ourselves as
world-bound individuals occupying a single possible world, which we can think of here as
corresponding to a maximal specification of all the events that have happened or will hap-
pen. If, therefore, as a world-bound individual I were to learn exactly which world I was in,
i.e. which world is actual, I would know the entire history of the world: past, present and
future. As a world-bound individual whose knowledge of the future is uncertain, however, I
can at best assign probabilities (i.e. credences) to future events.
That is, I assign probabilities to future events conditioned on the events in my past
and according to my expectation that the world in which I reside will contain events to my
future of a certain type. For example, my assignment of probabilities summing to one to
the possible outcomes of a future coin toss, {heads, tails}, is based on the assumption that
I am not in a world in which the coin lands on its edge, or is vaporized before it lands,
or what have you. This provides a sense in which the objective validity of an assignment
of probabilities to future events depends on not just what lies to my past, but also what
lies to my future (and that of my relevant counterparts). While specific knowledge of future
events is inadmissible, I cannot assign meaningful probabilities to future events without some
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(imperfect) knowledge of the future. This knowledge takes the form of specifying the class
of worlds to which I belong, i.e. worlds in which an event of a certain type lies to my future
(or that of my counterparts).
The objective chances, given relative to a time, must be be similarly conditioned by the
class of possible worlds to which they apply: roughly, worlds that agree on the past and, to
a certain extent, agree to the future. On this view, an assignment of probabilities to future
events can be thought of a probability measure on the relevant class of possible worlds. In
the context of a physical theory specifying the laws of our world, we can take the (initial)
state of the system to contain all the relevant information about the past of this world. The
relevant set of possible worlds will be those which have the same laws and the same history,
i.e. which assign the same initial state and the same dynamics to this particular experimental
setup.6 The probabilities supplied by the theory will be the chances for this set of possible
worlds.
Appropriately interpreted, this is precisely what the prescription for conditional proba-
bilities supplied here allows us to do for quantum theory. Thinking just in terms of the time
of an event, we have an assignment of experimental outcomes to projection operators P T (I),
the initial state is the Heisenberg state ψ, and the elementary event (assigned probability
one) is the occurrence of the event given by P at some time t. Without yet fixing the state,
the possible worlds corresponding to the elementary event are given by the histories P+Ψ.
We fix the state by setting Ψ(t) = ψt. Conditional probabilities for the event P given this






This has the interpretation that ψ describes a set of worlds in which the event is neither
impossible, nor certain to occur at every moment. In that case, ψ defines a probability
measure on the times at which the event can occur. We can think of this as a probability
measure on the set of relevant possible worlds, differing as to when this event occurs.
Thus the partial history P T (I)Ψ describes a set of possible worlds (those in which the
event occurs during I) rather than the state of physical object. The covariance of P T (I)
under time translations, therefore, reflects the relationship between the probabilities assigned
to sets of possible worlds rather than the changing state of some physical thing. This way
6Note that there is no need to think of the dynamics as specifying more than just how the chances will
change with time.
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of thinking reflects my belief that the laws of the actual world (i.e. quantum mechanics)
are probabilistic in a particularly strong sense. That is, I believe that these laws concern
inherently indeterminstic or stochastic temporal processes. What I mean by this is that there
is a sense in which a complete specification of the actual world together with its laws cannot
be pieced together into a dynamical story that provides a continuous function assigning
states to instants of time.
Despite the existence of well-confirmed and well-known quantum phenomena such as
radioactive decay, of which no such description appears possible, the idea that our world
might nonetheless permit such a continuous description has proved quite popular. In my
opinion, this is due to an unfortunate inclination to project the apparent continuity of macro-
scopic physical processes, with which we have direct experience, onto quantum processes that
take place on vastly shorter time-scales.7 Note that this inclination was (at least at first)
thwarted by matrix mechanics, which led to serious consideration of the possibility that nat-
ural processes could be discontinuous.8 However, von Neumann’s reconciliation of matrix
and wave mechanics within Hilbert space made it all too easy to attribute the existence of a
(strongly) continuous family of unitary operators Ut describing time translation symmetries
to the supposed fact that quantum mechanical processes themselves are (in the main at
least) continuous and deterministic.
The series of instantaneous states resulting from the action of this group on the initial
state of a system came to be conceived of as describing the successive states of a persisting
physical object. This led to a worrying conflict with the apparently discontinuous change in
state resulting from measurement, and so the ‘measurement problem’ as traditionally con-
ceived. This is not the place for a detailed historical analysis of the difficulties into which
interpreters of quantum theory have been led by the idea that quantum mechanics is a the-
ory of physical objects submitted to continuous dynamical processes—the so-called ‘unitary
evolution of the wavefunction’. However, I do claim that there is a possibility of interpreting
quantum theory realistically (as a theory of processes that are in fact discontinuous and
stochastic) without this problematic metaphysical assumption.
7See Chapter 1 of Ladyman & Ross (2007) for a recent attack on the use of intuitions honed at the
comfortable level of the macroscopic. See also the discussion of Russell (1927, pp. 147–153), which is
particularly pertinent for my purposes.
8See the introduction of Heisenberg (1927).
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8.5 FURTHER PROSPECTS FOR THIS APPROACH
The obvious limitation of the approach to event times considered here is that the conditional
probabilities apply to an event so long as it is assumed to occur exactly once, over all time.
This problem is thrown into sharp relief by these considerations from H+, according to
which Lu¨ders rule associates conditional probabilities with the occurrence of a single event.
That such a restrictive condition is required to apply Lu¨ders’ rule seems to suggest that this
limitation is, in fact, inherent to this method of generating conditional probabilities.
I propose that the solution to this difficulty lies in considering instead the extended
Schro¨dinger equation, defined for functions of time and space as Dirac (1926a) originally
envisioned it,
(H+ −W+)ψ(x, t) =
(
H+ − i ∂
∂t
)
Ψ = HˆΨ = 0.9
The problem with interpreting this equation is that the operator Hˆ has a continuous spec-
trum, and so there is no vector Ψ ∈ H+ which is an eigenvector with eigenvalue 0. Without
going into the details, Brunetti et al. (2010) show how solutions to this equation may be
written in terms of a linear functional rather than a vector. While these physical solutions
don’t form a Hilbert space, and define non-normalizable ‘weights’ on the algebra of observ-
ables of H+ rather than algebraic states, there is a construction which, given an operator on
H+ representing the occurrence of an event, leads to a (GNS) Hilbert space representation
giving the expectation values for (a subset of) the algebra of observables on H+—the algebra
of events—on the condition that the event in question did occur. The vectors of this Hilbert
space representation are not states but observables—events—to which the weight assigns a
(conditional) probability through the inner product of the GNS representation.
This weight thus provides a replacement for the trace, such that by conditioning on
these events one can calculate probabilities for subsequent events, e.g. a detector’s firing
again elsewhere. This theory has a good claim to be regarded as a straightforward, con-
servative extension of the usual Schro¨dinger dynamics, but the form that the theory takes
is surprisingly distinct: the solutions of the extended Schro¨dinger equation do not form a
Hilbert space, the dynamics are not given by a unitary operator, and there is no meaning
to the phrase ‘the state of the system’ (i.e. no normalized algebraic state assigning expec-
tation values to operators) without first specifying an event (the occurrence of which can
9Note that W+ is here the operator conjugate to T+.
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be used to give a probability assignment to further events). In particular, such probability
assignments appear to correspond to genuinely conditioned state, rather than the conditional
expectations considered here. This holds the promise of a generalization of these conditional
probabilties for events to conditions which do not refer to all times, and beyond the rather
limited case of the occurrence of a single event.
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9.0 PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS
The topics addressed in detail in the foregoing chapters have required a certain degree of
technical sophistication to approach, and the development of the tools to do so has required
several chapters. These topics are of interest not just for the foundations of physics, but
also for philosophy. In this concluding chapter, I have attempted to draw out some implica-
tions of the present work for some traditional philosophical topics concerning ontology and
metaphysics. In Section 9.1 I use the account of quantum theory supplied in Chapter 8 as a
means to flesh out a conception of an ontology for matter as a collection of events: an event
ontology. Beginning with consideration of two recent advocates of an event ontology for
quantum theory (Carlo Rovelli and Rudolf Haag), I compare my account with two related
views: the GRW ‘flash’ ontology, and the Everettian interpretation due to Simon Saunders.
This section concludes with a brief survey of where my account might turn out to be superior
in terms of accounting for certain experimental phenomena.
In Section 9.2 I consider some implications for the metaphysics of time of the no go
results of Chapter 6 concerning quantum clocks. In Section 9.3 I defend Bertrand Russell’s
relational theory of time against a recent attack by Ulrich Meyer (2013), based on the idea
that Russell embraced a thoroughgoing event ontology that (unlike Whitehead) sought to
eliminate objects (or at least reduce them to events). I conclude with a (very) brief proposal
that the adoption of event ontology may assist the strong structuralist program in philosophy
of science of James Ladyman and collaborators (Ontic Structural Realism).
9.1 EVENT ONTOLOGY AND QUANTUM MECHANICS
What is quantum mechanics about? That is, what is the intended domain of an interpre-
tation of the theory? In the long history of attempts to interpret quantum theory a wide
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variety of answers have been given to this question, including: observations, experiments,
wavefunctions, the universe, point particles, information. I have presented here a way to
think of quantum theory in terms of the occurrence of events, which suggests that quantum
theory may be about events. On this view, the probabilities supplied by the quantum state
are probabilities for the occurrence of events, and the observables of the theory are to be
interpreted as supplying probabilities for some event to occur, at some time. The dynamics
of the quantum state do not reflect some changing state of matter, but just the change in
those probabilities. An event ontology supposes that that there is no need to posit any other
ontological category apart from events. On an event ontology, then, quantum theory is a
theory of events and therefore a theory of matter, since matter itself is ‘composed of’ nothing
but a series of events.
In twentieth century analytic philosophy, event ontologies were proposed by (variously)
Whitehead (1925), Russell (1927), and Davidson (1980). The event view of quantum theory
has had some recent interest from notable theoretical physicists such as Carlo Rovelli and
Rudolf Haag, who express in different ways the core idea of this view. Rovelli (2005) con-
trasts the “‘wave function ontology,” which takes the state “as the ‘real’ entity which fully
represents the actual state of affairs of the world,” with his proposal for an “ontology of
quantum events.”
A better alternative is to take the observed values . . . as the actual elements of
reality, and view [the state] as a mere bookkeeping device, determined by the ac-
tual values . . . that happened in [the] past. From this perspective, the real events
of the world are the ‘realizations’ (the ‘coming to reality’, the ‘actualization’) of
the values . . . in the course of the interaction between physical systems. These
quantum events have an intrinsically discrete (quantized) granular structure. (p.
115)
The key idea is that the changing quantum state given by the dynamics of the theory
does not describe the changing properties of some physical object.1 Rather, the quantum
state describes the probabilities for events to occur; events that often arise as the result of
interactions between systems.
In turn, here is Haag’s (2013) recent critique of the conventional view:
1In approvingly citing Rovelli’s commitment to an ontology of events I do not mean to endorse his
accompanying interpretation of quantum theory, Relational Quantum Mechanics, about which there is much
to criticize. I shall not do so here, however.
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What do we detect? The presence of a particle? Or the occurrence of a micro-
scopic event? We must decide for the latter.. . . [The microscopic event] is almost
always the ionization of some molecule in the detector. . . . [T]he standard use of
the term “observable” does not really correspond to the needs of collision theory
in particle physics. We do not measure a “property of a microscopic system”,
characterized by a spectral projector of a self-adjoint operator. Rather we are
interested in the detection of a microscopic event. The first task is to characterize
the mutually exclusive alternatives for such an event. (p. 1310)
So in practice, i.e. in the context of a particle detection experiment, the theory concerns—
is about—microscopic events, such as the ionization of a molecule by a cosmic ray. The
detector is expressly designed to amplify these micro-events such that they reliably lead to
a macroscopic record of detection, by which we mean detection at a place, at a time.
In Chapter 8, I suggested a re-interpretation of Wightman localization in terms of the
occurrence of localized events within extended spatio-temporal regions. I claimed that,
interpreted in terms of events, there is a crucial further question concerning localization to
which quantum mechanics can supply an answer: When does an event occur? Providing
a satisfactory answer to this question, I contend, gives an informative account of Haag’s
‘principle of random realization’ and provides the means avoid Rovelli’s paradox that “the
statement that a certain specific outcome ‘has happened’ can be true and not-true at the
same time” (p. 115). I will address these issues through comparison with the account of
events offered by two extant alternative interpretations of quantum mechanics: dynamical
collapse and the Everett interpretation.
John S. Bell, writing about the Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber (GRW) dynamical collapse theory,
proposed to regard the spontaneous localizations of the wavefunction about a space-time
point as events, and those events as the ‘local beables’ of the theory.2 He expressed the idea
of an event ontology as follows:
These [events] are the mathematical counterparts in the theory to real events
at definite places and times in the real world (as distinct from the many purely
mathematical constructions that occur in the working out of physical theories,
as distinct from things that may be real but not localized, and as distinct from
the ‘observables’ of other formulations of quantum mechanics, for which we have
no use here). A piece of matter then is a galaxy of such events. As a schematic
psychophysical parallelism we can suppose that our personal experience is more
2This discussion does not apply to the continuous mass distribution variant of the theory. It is important
that the localizations (or ‘flashes’) are discretely positioned.
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or less directly of events in particular pieces of matter, our brains, which events
are in turn correlated with events in our bodies as a whole, and they in turn with
events in the outer world. (Bell, 1987, p. 205)
This would be consistent with a Humean view of physical law, as recently considered in
the context of the GRW theory by Frigg & Hoefer (2007). They consider the idea that the
localization events (or ‘flashes’) form a Humean mosaic, which they liken to a ‘pointilist
picture,’ and note that the Humean would approve of the introduction of only occurrent
events without “reference to any hidden powers or mechanisms explaining these occurrences,
which would be unacceptable from a Humean perspective” (p. 381). On this basis, they
argue that the GRW theory deserves serious consideration as the best system of laws (in
its domain at least), and that the probabilities supplied by the theory can be interpreted as
Humean objective chances.
In the last chapter I took the point of view that the introduction of an additional stochas-
tic process regarding the time of an event (as advocated by Ghirardi, Rimini and Weber) is
spurious, and showed how the state of a quantum system returns a probability distribution
for the occurrence of an event at a time (and spatial location) without it. I also introduced
the idea that one can think of the probabilities supplied in this context as Lewisian chances
(i.e. objectified credences). This conception of quantum probabilities is subtly at odds with
the idea of quantum theory as a Mills-Ramsey-Lewis best system.
Were quantum theory such a system, its success would be judged against its fit with
the Humean mosaic as a whole: the entire history of the actual world. In the conception
of the quantum state that I introduced, however, the success of the theory would have to
be judged against its performance in predicting the future course of events, given sufficient
information about the past events. As future events become present, those events are to
be included in the conditions under which the probabilities apply; there is no mechanism
to bring about the occurrence of the events within the theory, which merely supplies the
(conditional) probabilities for their occurrence.
There is, therefore, a subtle distinction to be drawn between the role played here by
quantum mechanics as a theory in use by an agent in the world, whose knowledge of the
future course of events is uncertain, and as a best system for the total mosaic of events, which
is assumed to be given without respect to epistemic limitations. As the recent analysis of
Esfeld & Gisin (2013) would have it, the Humean perspective on GRW is as follows:
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There only is the mosaic of flashes in space-time. Everything else supervenes
on that mosaic. Given an initial configuration of flashes, there is nothing in
nature that determines the temporal development of the distribution of flashes
in spacetime, or that, more generally speaking, poses constraints on how that
distribution can develop. (p. 4)
But if one takes the GRW theory as given and attempts to apply it as a situated agent, the
theory supplies a dynamical story concerning the evolution of the initial state which seems
to constrain the future distribution of events quite strongly indeed. Moreover, at least in
rhetoric, the role of the spontaneous localization process seems to depart rather severely
from this Humean ideal:
the idea is that the space-time in which physical processes develop exhibits some
fundamentally stochastic, random aspects, which induce precisely the sponta-
neous localizations of the microscopic constituents of the universe. . . . nature
itself (Einstein’s God?) chooses to induce such a process according to random
choices but with precise probabilities. (Ghirardi, quoted in [p. 376] Frigg &
Hoefer (2007))
Now it is hard to resist giving a dynamical story like this, which invokes some sort of agency or
disposition to bring about these quantum events. However, the promise of an Humean event
ontology for quantum theory lies in rejecting the idea that there is any kind of dynamical
story to be told where microscopic processes are concerned.
One way of proceeding, then, is to take quite seriously the idea that the Humean mosaic
of events provides the first and last word when it comes to matters of ontology, necessity
and probability. In that case, the best theory for us (as situated agents in the actual world)
is not the theory which best fits the overall totality of events according to a dynamically
evolving (albeit stochastically localized) instantaneous state, but the theory that is most
informative in the situations of imperfect knowledge in which we habitually find ourselves.
In those situations, the most informative theory will be one that fits the probabilities to the
details of the situation rather than blindly applying a fixed distribution derived for a generic
situation. That may not be the theory that gives the ‘Humean Laws’ (whatever sort of thing
those could be), but it may be the theory that best provides the objective chances.
In rejecting the need for a dynamical story that invokes a succession of instantaneous
states, one must do without an account of a dynamical process by which events come about.
This leads Esfeld & Gisin (2013) to worry that “even in the non-relativistic flash ontology, it
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remains unclear how the occurrence of flashes can be triggered through interactions” (p. 12).
It seems to me that this rather misses the point: in an event ontology (a Humean one, at
least) ‘interaction’ cannot be a shorthand for ‘causally bring about.’ However, Haag (2013)
offers a helpful attempt to capture a notion that might replace the explanation offered by a
dynamical account.
The theory provides the description of possible alternatives (the probability
space) and the probabilities for the different possibilities. But we are still left
to explain the emergence of individual facts whose appearance is governed by a
statistical law which is intrinsic i.e. not due to any ignorance of hidden variables.
This implies that the step from the virtual realm of propensities to reality is
governed by a principle of random realization. The step is neither determined
by previous history nor is it entirely free. The principle says that the theoreti-
cally predicted pattern will be realized by a sequence of many individual events
unpredictable in the individual case. (p. 1311)
While this talk of propensities will not be acceptable to the strict Humean, I think the idea
of a principle of random realization nicely captures the relationship between the (probabilis-
tic) predictions of the theory and the occurrence of the events to which the probabilities
are assigned. The key point is that there is no dynamical process supposed to bring this
realization about: we just assume it to be true (by posit) that the universe will realize some
pattern of events (lying to our future).
Having addressed Haag’s event ontology through consideration of GRW, I now come to
address Rovelli’s (2005) paradox that “the statement that a certain specific outcome ‘has
happened’ can be true and not-true at the same time” (p. 115) in the context of the Everrett
interpretation. In the Everett interpretation, the proposition that a particular outcome
obtains (e.g. spin ‘up’) can be both true (with respect to an observer regarded as confined
to a branch of the Universal Wavefunction) and not-true (with respect to the description
afforded by the Universal Wavefunction itself). The Everett interpretation could scarcely
take the dynamical (unitary) evolution of the state of a quantum system more seriously, yet
it too allows for the notion of an event.
Bacciagaluppi (2002) suggests that the Everrett interpretation might provide an adequate
expression of Haag’s (1996) earlier contention that quantum theory is, ultimately, about
the observer-independent occurrence of events. Bacciagaluppi contends that a process of
decoherence leads to a branching structure of decoherent histories which can be understood
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in terms of events located in space-time. Bacciagaluppi addresses this idea in the context
of a relativistic space-time, where the allowed decoherence interactions are, therefore, to be
constrained by locality conditions.
The conjecture is thus the following. If the axioms [of Haag’s Local Quantum
Field Theory] characterize decoherence interactions, any decoherent histories will
be made up of local projections (in fact local effects [i.e. elements of E(H)] . . . ).
The ‘events’ in each history will be embeddable in a Minkowski space-time. Iden-
tifying histories with Everett worlds, Everett worlds will thus have a Minkowski
space-time structure. . . . Our current motivation is to consider the (branching)
space-time we live in as the collection of events created by the process of deco-
herence. (p. 116, original emphasis)
Less speculatively, similar ideas arise in the context of non-relativistic Everettian quantum
mechanics through the use of decoherent histories, introduced into this context by Saunders
(1995).
Very roughly, the idea is that, outside of the carefully controlled conditions of a laboratory
experiment, a quantum system is continually interacting with its environment, a system of
vastly many more degrees of freedom. Any system undergoing continuous interactions of
this sort is subject to a process of decoherence which very rapidly acts to correlate states
of the system with states of the environment. Tracing out the enviromental degrees of
freedom, the reduced density matrix of the system is, in general, found to be approximately
diagonalized with respect to some dynamically preferred basis—the decoherence basis. If one
were to decompose that vector basis into a sum of projections, dynamically allowed states
of the system acted on by those projections would be (approximately) orthogonal. If there
exists at some time such a decoherence basis, then there exists a sum of Heisenberg picture
(instantaneous) projections onto (approximately) orthogonal states that forms a resolution
of the identity.
A decoherent history is a time-ordered string of these projections, one from each such in-
stantaneous decomposition. Two decoherent histories are (approximately) orthogonal when
they consist of strings of mutually orthogonal instantaneous projections (considered pairwise
at the same instant). In this framework, an event corresponds to an instantaneous projection
and a decoherent history specifies a time-ordered set of events. This time-ordering suggests
that the set of such histories has a branching structure, but recent work has shown that an
183
interpretation in terms of non-overlapping divergent worlds may be feasible (Saunders, 2010)
or even preferable (Wilson, 2012).
To differentiate two worlds according to when an event occurs in this framework would
require a series of instantaneous projections each corresponding to the occurrence of the same
event, normalized over an appropriate time period such that the probability of occurrence is
unity. Consider a process of radioactive decay. Decay at a time t would be represented by a
set of projections, and a world in which decay occurs at t1 would correspond to a history that
includes the ‘decay at t1’ projection at t1 but no other ‘decay at t’ projections. The temporal
normalization condition would amount to an extra constraint on the allowed histories so that
they do not include repeated occurrences of the same decay event.
However, it is not at all clear how decoherence could act to bring about this situation
when what is at issue is a process occurring independently of decoherence, in this case
radioactive decay. Now, it could well be that the Heisenberg state of the entire system of
decaying atom and environment can be given in such a way that the occurrence of decay
leads to environmental decoherence once it occurs (in the sense that the decay product may
be detected within a Wilson cloud chamber, say, leading to a macroscopic effect). But the
decay process itself is not subject to decoherence effects (or at least is stable with respect
to them) since it unfolds independently of its environment. What this suggests is that the
consideration of decoherent histories is not going to be of help when our concern is with
predicting when an event occurs, since the relevant constraints on those probabilities cannot
be given instantaneously.
This is not to say that decoherence effects are not relevant to when an event occurs
(considered independently of the decoherent history approach) because, where decoherence
effects are significant, the state from which the probabilities for the time of occurrence is to
be derived will be that of the system and environment. That is, one should consider environ-
mental interactions to be relevant in describing the outcome of an experiment to the extent
that it becomes empirically problematic to treat the system of interest as an independent
and isolated object. The actual occurrence of an event at a time, however—considered as
an experimental outcome—results here from Haag’s principle of random realization, which
is a process that cannot be described unitarily.3
3I take this point to be a consequence of the various proofs for the insolubility of the measurement
problem. See, for example, (Busch et al., 1996, p. 73–79).
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The point at issue here is not the existence of non-actual possible worlds—everything I
have said in Chapter 8 is consistent with modal realism in as strong a sense as one could
want—but rather the adequacy of unitary quantum mechanics as an empirical theory, i.e. as
a valid description of every quantum phenomenon and process as it occurs in Nature. I do
not claim to have proved here that unitary quantum mechanics is empirically or descriptively
inadequate, or even to be able to give a strong argument in favor of such a claim. Rather,
in suggesting that there is an alternative way of formulating quantum theory within an
extended Hilbert space of functions of time and space, there arises the possibility that this
extended theory may account for phenomena that the usual formalism does not.
Aside for accounting for the time of occurrence, which (arguably) may be achieved within
the usual unitary framework, the phenomena I have in mind here concern time-energy inter-
ference. In particular, there are several experiments that can be regarded as a demonstration
of diffraction in time, i.e. as representing something like a two-slit experiment in the energy-
time domain.4 In particular, the recent experiment of Lindner et al. (2005) leads Horwitz
(2006) to argue that “The standard nonrelativistic quantum theory cannot be used to pre-
dict interference in time” (p. 1). In essence, his argument is just that instantaneous states
cannot be integrated over times in a manner that would allow one to introduce ‘temporal
superpositions’ of instantaneous states. This problem is entirely obviated by my proposed
move to the extended Hilbert space (and, eventually, the extended Schro¨dinger equation).
There, the occurrence of an event at an indeterminate time can be represented by a projec-
tion corresponding to the union of disjoint temporal intervals in just the same way as an
indeterminate location in space may be represented in Ordinary QM.
I have not carried out the analysis here, but the possibility offered here for empirical
tests that might choose between various competing interpretations or formulations of quan-
tum theory is worthy of note. That is, the use of a Bohmian or dynamical collapse theory to
describe these phenomena (for instance) may result in distinctive predictions for phenomena
in the time domain that serve to empirically distinguish an interpretation from its competi-
tors, and may even pick out one uniquely. This provides a strong motivation for further
research concerning the questions addressed in this dissertation
There are (at least) two further reasons why the extended formulation of quantum theory
suggested here is worthy of further study. First, the importance for theories (or at least
4See (Busch, 2007, §3.6.3) for a recent review.
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toy models) of quantum gravity is immediately suggested by the quantization of Brunetti
et al. (2010) of a Freidman-Robertson-Walker cosmological model. The interpretation I have
suggested for the extended Hilbert space theory in terms of events may usefully be applied to
quantum versions of constrained Hamiltonian systems, considered without the derivation of a
‘physical’ Hilbert space of states annihilated by the constraint operator. Second, formulating
of relativistic quantum mechanics within the extended framework allows for consideration
of relativistic localization within a setting appropriate for a theory set in space-time. It is
my expectation that the alleged problems with non-locality (see, e.g., Malament (1996)) will
prove to be an artifact of the consideration of an instantaneous formulation of the theory.
9.2 RELATIONAL TIME, CLOCKS, AND EVENTS
In Chapter 6 I provided a detailed study of the definition and construction of quantum
clocks—quantum systems that could be used to ascertain the passage of time. The oper-
ational significance of clock variables in general lies in their use in setting up a system of
co-ordinates in which the laws of motion hold. That is, we use the regular motions of some
physical system to set up a time co-ordinate with which respect to which the motions of
other physical systems may be defined. The philosophical significance accrued by proofs for
the existence (or otherwise) of these physical systems that provide good clocks will depend
on one’s background metaphysics of time. Here is a (very) rough characterization of three
such metaphysical positions and the significance they afford to the existence of good clocks.
Realist External time is absolute and a good clock is one that measures the passage of
absolute time.
Constructivist Time is nothing more than that which is read by a good clock.
Relationist Time is an order on events and nothing more.
For the realist, the existence of physical systems that act as good clocks is nothing but
a pragmatic issue. Newton took a characteristically obdurate stance on this matter.
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It may be, that there is no such thing as an equable motion, whereby time may
be accurately measured. All motions may be accelerated and retarded, but the
flowing of absolute time is not liable to any change. The duration or perseverance
of the existence of things remains the same, whether the motions are swift or slow,
or none at all: and therefore this duration ought to be distinguished from what
are only sensible measures thereof; and from which we deduce it, by means of
the astronomical equation. (Newton, 1934)
The significance of the ‘astronomical equation,’ which concerns the motion of the entire
solar system, is that (in Newton’s time) it provided the most effective means to correct the
non-uniformity of measures of absolute time such as the diurnal rotation of the Earth. The
equation of motion for the solar system provides a more stable standard against which the
uniformity of other motions may be judged.
For Newton, this is just a pragmatic affair of finding the best available standard for
temporal duration, defined as that which most closely approaches the intervals marked off
between events by absolute time. Absolute time is, admittedly, unobservable in itself, but
since absolute motions are given with respect to it there is some hope for using those mo-
tions to arrive at a good approximation of absolute time. No measure of time that we could
possess is incorrigible, but we may approach absolute time through successively better ap-
proximations. The realist, it seems, can rest content with the analysis of quantum clocks
offered here.
For the constructivist, however, the matter is of critical importance since her very notion
of temporal structure is closely linked to the means by which it may be measured. To take
a recent example, Brown (2005) argues that the significance that the realist attaches to the
geometrical structure of space-time is unjustified. He contends that what space-time really
represents is nothing more than a codification of the behavior of special types of physical
systems—good clocks and rigid rods—under certain dynamical motions corresponding to
symmetry transformations. On this view the use of a dynamical theory to define a good
clock must take on a special significance, since the very idea of a space-time geometry is to
be parasitic on the behavior of such systems. If such systems are not available, according to
the dynamical laws, then the structure of space-time lacks a precise operational definition.
For the constructivist, then, the existence of systems that act as good clocks is critical
for the definition of a notion of time. But there remains a sense in which the constructivist
maintains that time is to be given independently of the contents of the world: space-time
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geometry is to be thought of in terms of the behavior that a clock would display in such-
and-such a situation. For the relationist, on the other hand, the very notion of time is to be
constructed from the contents of the world as given, without reference to ideal instruments or
operations. In particular, Leibniz viewed the external time co-ordinate as ideal not because
it was to be measured by an ideal clock, but because it must be constructed from (and thus
must go beyond) what is given in the physical world: the temporal order of events.
The idea behind relationism is the following: given a full account of reality, the spatio-
temporal facts are fixed by the relations among the events and objects of the world.5 More-
over, there are no other temporal facts to be had. As Leibniz puts it: “times, considered
without the things or events, are nothing at all, and . . . they consist only in the successive
order of things and events” (Leibniz, 1716, original emphasis). In particular, Leibniz de-
nies that time has metrical properties, to which Clarke (in their famous correspondence)
responds: “it is obvious that time is not merely the order of things succeeding each other,
because the quantity of time may be greater or less while the order of events remains the
same.”6
More recent accounts of relationism in the context of dynamical theories have sought to
implement these ideas by stripping out any trace of the objectionable absolute relations from
the theory. Barbour & Bertotti (1982) set out to construct a theory of classical mechanics
whose notion of state made use only of relationist-friendly relative spatial distances. The
instantaneous configuration of a system of particles was to be completely specified by the
pair-wise relative distances, and the dynamics of such a theory consists merely in the order in
which such configurations obtain. By their procedure of ‘best-matching’ Barbour & Bertotti
were able to deliver a dynamical ordering that recovered a significant fragment of conventional
classical dynamics without reliance an illicit external time parameter.
This constructed ordering allows them to recovering a time parameter from the actual
course of events which need not be given ontological significance. Indeed, Barbour (1999)
5Witness Leibniz: “This shows us how we should understand the statement ‘God created things at what
time he pleased’, for it’s just a matter of what things he chose to create. Once he had decided on the things,
and on how they were to relate to one another, there was no further choice to make concerning the time and
the place, which have no intrinsic reality, nothing that can distinguish them, nothing discernible.” (Leibniz,
1716)
6Leibniz’s response to this (Fifth Letter, para. 54) is somewhat fudged, since he asserts that “order also
has its quantity; there’s what goes first and what follows; there’s distance or interval.” Does he mean to
concede the point to Clarke and admit that time does indeed have metrical properties in addition to order?
Or is this to be read as a claim that the order of events suffices to determine the metrical relations of events,
but temporal order is nonetheless fundamental? I believe the latter is the correct interpretation.
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argues for the elimination of time from our ontology. But there remains a sense in which
events have a objective temporal order since the successive states of the universe (in the
description he hopes to recover) serves to define an effective notion of time. A more radical
eliminitivist view has been suggested by Rovelli (1991, 2009) motivated by his theoretical
concern in the field of quantum gravity: Loop Quantum Gravity (Rovelli, 2004). According to
Rovelli, there is no unique temporal ordering to be had: a description of the world according
to our best physics fails to provide a unique ordering of events.7 In terms of Rovelli’s physics,
the reason for this is simple: at the level of fundamental physics there simply is no change.
Given the mutual inter-dependence of time and change, if there is no change then there is
no time. This view has been described perspicaciously as Parmenedian by Belot & Earman
(2001).8
It is incumbent on Rovelli, nonetheless, to recover our experience of time and change,
which he attempts to do through the introduction of a relative notion of temporal evolution
(Rovelli, 2002). While, according to his physics, there can be no unique ordering of events,
there is an opportunity to recover an effective notion of change in terms of the relative
values of physical variables, treated as clocks. Thus our experience of time is to be cashed
out in terms of a subsystem of the world, characterized by a physical variable treated as a
clock. Suitably chosen, the values of this ‘clock’ provide a parameterization of the evolution
of the physical variables pertaining to the remainder of the system. This description of
evolution and change, however, is essentially illusory, and any such description according to
a particular decomposition and choice of clock is on all fours, metaphysically speaking, with
another conflicting description according to a distinct choice of clock.
Although Rovelli (1997) describes himself as a relationist (since he does not posit separate
or substantial spatio-temporal structures) there is a sense in which Barbour is, and Rovelli
is not, a relationist about time. Barbour provides a global temporal order, which satisfies
the Leibnizian desire for time to be given by relations among the events. On Rovelli’s view,
however, it is not clear what there is that can be described as a temporal relation, and
certainly there is no objective order on events (nor an objective partial order).9 Thus it
7Note that this is distinct from relativistic concerns regarding the failure of the structure of a relativistic
space-time to determine a unique global temporal order but rather a partial order on timelike events.
8After the pre-Socratic philosopher-poet who first turned the problem of change into a modus tollens
against the existence of time.
9There is also the ‘thermal time hypothesis’ of Connes & Rovelli (1994), according to which time at a
macroscopic level may be recovered as a statistical or thermodynamic phenomenon. This is reminiscent of
the account given by Heisenberg in 1927. See Section 2.1.2.
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seems that one could argue that Rovelli provides here an expression of Mach’s philosophy,
since he regards spatio-temporal notions as redundant: according to Rovelli, a complete
description of the universe need make no mention of time, space, or temporal order.
The physical space I have in mind (and which also includes time) is therefore
nothing more than the dependence of the phenomena on one another. The perfect
physics, which knew of this basic dependence, would have no need of separate
concepts of time and space because they would be already exhausted [by this
description]. (Mach, 1866, translated)
This is because Rovelli hopes to give such a description in terms of a (proposed) theory of
quantum gravity, Loop Quantum Gravity, which appears to do without such notions. On the
other hand, Barbour appears to believe that there are determinate facts concerning temporal
order, although the facts in question depend on the distribution of matter (or, in general
relativity, the relation of spatio-temporal geometries).
But note that none of these latter day relationist physicists have considered time ac-
cording to Leibniz’s definition: as an order on events.10 The possibility I have offered for
interpreting quantum theory in terms of an ontology of events suggests the possibility of a
relationist account of time based on this Leibnizian notion of an order on events.
The dialectical situation is as follows: the realist (or substantivalist) posits the features
of time (and space) as she needs them, securing its existence by what is essentially an appeal
to an inference to the best explanation. The relationist rejects the explanatory value of this
schema, since she regards the independent existence of time as a highly dubious proposition.
(And why should she not? An appeal to the existence of time in an answer to the question
‘What is time?’ is hardly explanatory.) In Russell’s words:11 “The method of “postulating”
what we want has many advantages; they are the same as the advantages of theft over honest
toil.” (Russell, 1993).
Since Russell’s moral character was (more or less) unimpeachable, he was compelled to
take up the challenge of recovering the necessary features of substantival time (assumed to
have the structure of the real line) in terms of more fundamental relations among events.
This would, therefore, provide Leibniz with the means to answer Clarke’s complaint that
10Against Barbour, I would argue that he has provided an order on instantaneous spatial configuations of
point particles (or fields, or spatial geometries, or whatever). A instantaneous spatial configuration is not
an event but rather a state of affairs.
11Used here out of context, admittedly.
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order is not sufficient to ground metrical claims. Russell’s last publication on the topic was
‘On Order in Time’ (1936), in which he investigated the recovery of instants of time from
fundamental relations among events of temporal precedence and overlap. This has the spirit
of a reductionist project, since certain features of time (such as metrical features) are to be
recovered from more fundamental relations of order.12 However, the reduction in question is
partial at best since temporal precedence and overlap are themselves irreducibly temporal
notions. This is not, therefore, a reductive account of time, but of times (i.e. instants of
time).13
9.3 IN DEFENSE OF RUSSELL’S TEMPORAL RELATIONISM
Meyer’s (2013) fascinating recent monograph The Nature of Time argues for a ‘modal’ ac-
count of time by introducing instants of time as logical constructs related by primitive tense
operators. He begins the book by offering a novel negative argument against temporal rela-
tionism, the view that times are to be analysed in terms of relations between events. With
temporal relationism out of the way, Meyer advocates his view as the best hope for an ac-
count of time that meets the three criteria laid out in his Chapter 1: (i) solves the Problem
of Change; (ii) agrees with physics; (iii) agrees with the folk theory of time. He also places
their importance, I believe, in that order.
Here I will argue that Meyer is wrong to dismiss Russell’s relational account of time on
the basis of the argument offered in Chapter 2 of The Nature of Time. I contend that Russell
(1927) can escape the negative conclusion of Meyer’s argument by sticking to the view he
presents in The Analysis of Matter, according to which material objects are sets of events.
If Meyer’s negative argument is unsuccessful, as I claim, then Russell’s relationism deserves
to be considered as a genuine competitor to Meyer’s view. Moreover, in this dissertation
I have argued that fundamental physics can be understood in terms of an event ontology,
which has a mutually supportive relationship with an account of time based on the relations
among events.
12For recent attempts to see Russell’s program through to completion equipped with some more up to
date mathematical machinery see Anderson (1989); Bostock (2010).
13Leibniz, it seems, sought to ground the relations of temporal order in causal relations (see Futch (2008)),
but every explanation has to stop somewhere.
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9.3.1 Russell’s Analysis of Matter
Russell (1927) confronts the question of the constitution of matter in the following terms:
Assuming that the physical world consists of substances with qualities and re-
lations, are these substances to be taken as permanent bits of matter, or as
brief events? Common sense holds the former view, though its “things” are only
quasi-permanent. But science has found means of resolving “things” into groups
of electrons and protons . . . The question is: Are electrons and protons part of
the ultimate stuff of the world, or are they groups of events, or causal laws of
events?” (pp. 243–4)
Russell proposes a two-stage reduction of ‘things’ (material objects) to events. First, the
material objects of ordinary experience may be reduced in terms of the material objects
posited by fundamental physics (electrons and protons). Second, these fundamental objects
are to be reduced to series of events. Here is Russell’s account of that second reduction:
The substitution of space-time for space and time has made it much more natural
than formerly to conceive a piece of matter as a group of events.. . . Instead of a
permanent piece of matter, we have now the conception of a “world-line,” which
is a series of events connected with each other in a certain way. The parts of one
light-ray are connected with each other in a manner which enables us to consider
them as forming, together, one light-ray; but we do not conceive a light-ray as
a substance moving with the velocity of light. Just the same kind of connection
may be held to constitute the unity of an electron. We have a series of events
connected together by causal laws; these may be taken to be the electron, since
anything further is a rash inference which is theoretically useless. (p. 245, original
emphasis)
So Russell’s conception of matter in term of events essentially follows from relativity: in
relativistic physics, a material body follows a timelike curve (its world-line) and so it can be
thought of as nothing more than the events linked by that curve. In a later chapter, he gives
a concise summary of his view as follows: “Electrons and protons, however, are not the stuff
of the physical world: they are elaborate structures composed of events, and ultimately of
particulars.” (p. 386).
He also explicitly defines change in these terms, and rejects the idea than an electron is
anything more than a series of events.
Strings of events exist which are connected with each other according to the laws
of motion; one such string is called one piece of matter, and the transition from
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one event in the string to another is called motion. ... it is prudent, in physics, to
regard an electron as a group of events connected together in a certain way. An
electron may be a “thing” but it is absolutely impossible to obtain any evidence
for or against this possibility, which is scientifically unimportant, because the
group of events has all the requisite properties. . . . There is every reason, from the
standpoint of perception, to desire an interpretation of physics which dispenses
with permanent substance. (p. 246)
It seems quite justified, therefore, to regard Russell as wanting to eliminate material objects
qua ‘persisting things’ from our ontology. The apparently permanent (or quasi-permanent)
material objects of perception are to be analyzed, without remainder, in terms of events.
This is made particularly clear in his critical discussion of Whitehead, who views spatio-
temporally located events as mere aspects of a persistent object or process (to put it very
roughly). Russell objects to this view “on purely logical grounds” as follows:
Given a group of events, the evidence that they are “aspects” of one “thing”
must be inductive evidence, derived from perception . . . in calling two events “as-
pects” of one “thing,” we imply that their likeness is more important than their
difference; but for science both are facts, and of exactly the same importance.
(p. 248)
The idea appears to be this: the series of events that we take to compose a material thing
are taken by us to be sufficiently similar to regard as a single persisting thing, but they are
nevertheless distinct and so cannot be regarded as the aspects of the same thing. This is,
in effect, to take the Problem of Change as an an argument against the claim there exist
persisting objects, self-identical at every time they exist. Russell contends that if events
compose a material object with no remainder, then there simply cannot be a single thing
that possesses the properties of all the events. In this respect, Russell’s view is eliminativist
about material objects: in his event ontology, there is nothing that satisfies the requisite
criteria. This is perfectly consistent with the view of quantum theory I offered in Chapter
8, which proposed to do without the idea that quantum systems are persisting objects.
9.3.2 Avoiding Meyer’s Negative Argument
Meyer’s (2013) argument against temporal relationism begins with his characterisation of
relationism as the view that “all there is to time are events that stand in the relations of
temporal overlap and precedence to one another.” (p. 2).14 He proceeds to argue that events
14All references are to Meyer (2013).
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must be metaphysically simple if they are to play this role (pp. 15-16). He then argues that
events cannot be metaphysically simple if objects are to participate in events. He defines
participation as follows: “a material object participates in event e if the event’s occurrence
is conditional upon that object’s existence” (p. 18).
Meyer’s argument is valid, but I do not think Russell’s relationism is threatened by it.
We can lay out Meyer’s argument against relationism as follows:
1. (Relationism) All there is to time are events that stand in the relations of temporal
overlap and precedence to one another (p. 2)
2. Events cannot be both the primary occupants of the time series and be metaphysically
complex (pp. 15-16)
3. Events are metaphysically simple (from 1. and 2.)
4. A material object participates in an event if the event’s occurrence is conditional upon
that object’s existence (Df. p. 18)
5. Participants in past events are participants in present events (from 4.)
6. If 5. is false, then either 1. is false or objects do not participate in events.
7. If 1. is true then either no objects participate in events or events are complex (p. 19)
8. Events cannot be both the primary occupants of the time series and be metaphysically
simple. (from 1., 3. & 7.)
9. Relationism is false. (1., 3. & 8. by RAA)
The reason why this argument would not have troubled Russell is that Russell did not
believe that material objects participate in events. In The Analysis of Matter Russell adopts
an eliminativist (or at least reductionist) view of material objects, according to which they
are to be analyzed in terms of events. That is, according to Russell, material objects are not
metaphysically simple, and objects depend on events for their existence rather than the other
way around. So Russell would regard the conditional statement of 4. as true but vacuous,
and he could have accepted the dilemma of 6. without difficulty as rather than being forced
to consider events to be complex, he could have taken the other horn by concluding that
objects do not participate in events.
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This way out of the argument is considered by Meyer (although not on behalf of Russell)
and is dismissed on the grounds that
if we have no account of the relation between material objects and time then we
also have no account of what it is for an object to have a property at a time, and
thus no solution to the Problem of Change (pp. 19–20).
But rejecting the idea that material objects participate in events does not entail that one
cannot provide an alternative account of the relation between material objects and time,
and Russell does offer such an account—an account, moreover, that offers a solution to the
problem of change. The reductionist view of matter that Russell argues for in The Analysis
of Matter defines a material object as just a group of events. But, given relationism about
time, the relation of material objects to time is straightforward: it is given in terms of the
temporal relations possessed by the group of events which together compose the object.
Meyer regards the Problem of Change as that of “reconciling the possibility of change
with the Indiscernability of Identicals . . . [where] the object [a] experiences change if and
only if the following are true: a is K; a is not K” (p. 4). But since Russell identifies a
material object with a series of events his solution is straightforward: a is nothing but a
series of events, temporally related, some of which are K and some of which are not K. As
a simple example, take a to be identified with a series of events ei, and K to be ‘located in
spatial region R.’ Then a is located in spatial region R if some subset of {ei} is located in
R, and not located in spatial region R if some subset of {ei} is not.15 So long as the same ei
is not said to be both be located in R and not located in R, then there is no contradiction
involved in saying that a is K and a is not K.
This establishes, then, that Russell (at least, the Russell of The Analysis of Matter)
can embrace the conclusion that no material objects participate in events because, on his
view, there are no material objects. Thus he can avoid Meyer’s argument against temporal
relationism by accepting premise 6. and asserting that objects do not participate in events.
This suggests that an event ontology allowing for a relational account of time will have
to deny the independent existence of objects, considered as concrete individuals persisting
through time. Another consideration that Meyer invokes is the consistency of relationism
15It may be objected this example is misleading, since one is also owed an account of regions of space in
terms of events from the relationist. If this is troubling you, then substitute some other less controversial
predicate in the above analysis.
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with physical science. Russell takes his analysis to be suggested by both relativity and
quantum theory (at least, quantum theory as he understood it). I think Russell was right,
and his analysis can be brought up to date with a current understanding of modern physics.
This dissertation can be read as an attempt to provide a suitable understanding of quantum
theory; the corresponding project for relativistic physics awaits another occasion.
9.4 CODA: AN ONTOLOGY FOR SCIENTIFIC REALISM?
There are interesting echoes of Russell’s proposed reduction of objects to events in the
recent move of Ontic Structural Realists to deny the existence of objects, tout court. As
an indication of their rhetorical intent, Ladyman & Ross’ (2007) recent book is suggestively
entitled Every Thing Must Go. Like Russell, according to the Ontic Structural Realist there
are no objects (conceived as self-subsisting independent entities) but, unlike Russell, there
are also no non-structural elements of reality at all: structure is all there is. But Russell’s
denial of the existence of objects came from his reduction of persisting objects to series of
events, considered as particulars. This suggests that the two theses may be separated: on
one hand we have the denial that (unanalyzed) concrete material objects exist, on the other
the claim that there are no concrete particulars at all.
Where Ontic Structural Realism has come under attack from metaphysicians as inco-
herent, it is often the latter claim that has drawn their ire: how can one have structural
relations without the existence of relata for them to relate? Russell’s proposal for an event
ontology neatly sidesteps that objection since the structural relations in question do relate
concrete particulars: events. It is noteworthy here that Russell’s event ontology provides the
historical context for his adoption of structural realism.16 Where Russell advised restricting
belief to structural relations, these were relations among ontologically independent events
rather than objects or theoretical entities.
This use of events as a platform for structural realism suggests a possible rapprochement
of scientific realism and anti-realism, whereby reference to unobservable entities posited by
science (electrons, positrons etc.) is to be understood in terms of events. The reference
16This circumstance that is seldom reflected upon in later discussions of Russell’s structuralism, where he
is often taken to be an Epistemic Structural Realist, e.g. (Frigg & Votsis, 2011).
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relation, therefore, picks out certain series of events with a particular set of characteris-
tic properties rather than some set of independent entities given a definite description in
theoretical terms. The refinement and replacement of scientific theories by theories which
afford incompatible descriptions of those unobservable entities does not imply that the ear-
lier theories were unable to secure reference, since the (types of) series of events to which
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